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Editors’ Note

I

n October 2011 the human population of our planet officially
reached the high-water mark of seven billion.1 According to
the World Wildlife Fund’s Living Planet Index, the current
rate of consumption will see demand for two planets’ worth of
natural resources by 2030.2 With this increasing demand and the
continued development of virtually every corner of the globe,
the finite nature of the Earth’s resources presents a sobering reality. Through human ingenuity, industry now attempts to supplement scarce resources through research and development of
synthetic and other alternatives. However, a simple, stark fact
remains: certain resources such as water, timber, and land are
fundamental and aboriginal as the basic elements for human
survival. As the demand for natural resources rises in a finite
sphere, allocation, distribution, management, and governance of
these natural resources must be scrutinized. And at the core of
any such critique must be the availability of the natural resources
themselves.
This issue on Natural Resource Conflicts examines current
contestations arising out of the use, distribution, and governance
of these finite resources. We survey the globe, exploring the
causes and implications of individual and localized conflicts with
the ultimate goal of providing viable and successful resolutions.
Through the analysis of land-based conflicts centered upon the
public lands of the American West, participatory and collaborative management is heralded as one potentially effective method
of resolving these disputes. Left unresolved, disputes over natural resources can escalate into public demonstrations and even
armed conflicts. For example, where the imbalance of water
rights distribution in Latin America favors elites and private
corporations, neglected rural and indigenous communities have
taken to mass protests. In the resource-rich African continent,
natural resources, including petroleum and rare earth minerals,
have both catalyzed and fueled violent armed conflicts.3 Only by
carefully probing and dissecting these conflicts can we hope to
curb such ghastly consequences.
Here at home, highly contested domestic policy debates
center around petroleum extraction, especially in the American
Southwest. However, the conversation is not limited to traditional
1
Haya El Nasser, World Population Hits 7 Billion, USATODAY.com (Oct.
30, 2011), http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/story/2011-10-30/worldpopulation-hits-seven-billion/51007670/1.
2
World Wildlife Fund, Living Planet Report 2010 (2010), http://www.
footprintnetwork.org/en/index.php/GFN/page/living_planet_report_20101.
3
Rising Energy Use: Overview, World Resources Institute, http://www.
wri.org/publication/content/8332 (last visited Dec. 20, 2011).
4
See generally Alexander Carius et al., Water, Conflict, and Cooperation, in
Environmental Change and Security Project Report 10 (2004), http://
www.unep.org/dnc/Portals/155/dnc/docs/ecp/ecspr10_unf-caribelko.pdf.
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high-value resources such as oil and diamonds. Instead, scholars
are now turning their attention to conflicts emerging from water
disputes. For example, conflicts have arisen over water use in
Central Asia, stemming from long-term overexploitation and
mismanagement. As fresh water resources increase in scarcity,
this new “liquid gold” only amplifies the potential for conflict.4
This issue of Sustainable Development Law & Policy seeks
to facilitate the discussion and understanding of important
developments surrounding natural resources and their relationship to various types of conflicts. Our aim is to encourage further
integration of sustainable development principles within existing
and emerging legal and policy frameworks. The management
and governance of natural resources exert a significant influence
upon the fundamental survival and security of multiple stakeholders who live near, rely on, or benefit from those resources.
Resource development decision-making must take into account
relevant environmental, social, and political factors if the international environmental and legal communities are to minimize
and ultimately thwart natural resource conflicts.
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Introductory Comments:
The Pervasive, Persistent, and Profound Links Between
Conflict and the Environment
by Carroll Muffett and Carl Bruch*

W

e are pleased to introduce this special issue of Sustainable Development Law & Policy, which explores
the diverse linkages between conflict and the environment. For the last two and a half years, we have worked
together co-editing (with Sandra S. Nichols) a volume on Governance, Natural Resources, and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding
as part of a multi-volume series on post-conflict peacebuilding
and natural resource management being developed jointly by the
United Nations Environment Programme, the Environmental
Law Institute, the University of Tokyo, and McGill University.
The project incorporates the work of more than 230 researchers,
several of whom are represented in this issue.
As the articles in this issue demonstrate, the linkages
between conflict and natural resources are deep, complex, and
often surprising. Resource dependence is recognized as an indicator of conflict risk.1 Natural resources often serve as a vital
and indispensable subsistence base for those displaced by
conflict and for those working to rebuild their lives and communities when conflict has subsided. Managed improperly, however, these same resources may provide both an incentive and
a means to keep fighting for those who profit from insecurity.2
Similarly, natural resources can be both the subject and an incentive for crime—from petty thievery to complex timber mafias
to corruption at every level of government, each of which, in
turn, can erode personal security and social stability.3 And while
well-managed resources can help fund reconstruction efforts
and help bring order from chaos, access to high-value resources
can reduce government accountability to people and further
feed corruption.4 Thus, accountable and effective natural
resource management is a critical component of peacebuilding
in post-conflict countries.
The environment itself can also be a casualty of conflict.5
Forests may be denuded for conflict timber, oil fields set ablaze
as a form of scorched-earth warfare, or landmines and ordnance
left behind to render large areas of the countryside unsafe for
decades after a conflict ends. Still other impacts may be less
direct, but no less significant. People displaced by conflict
can be drawn together into informal tent cities or organized
encampments numbering in the hundreds of thousands. These
settlements can become major urban areas virtually overnight,
requiring a steady supply of fresh water, sanitation facilities,
fuel wood, building supplies, and food that far exceeds local
resources. More subtly, but no less importantly, conflict has
lasting and serious impacts on the infrastructure of natural
resource governance—both in terms of physical infrastructure
4

and in terms of the human capacity, political will, and the reservoir of civil order and trust that are needed to govern resources
effectively.
In internecine conflicts, control of natural resources—and
the substantial material wealth they can generate—can serve not
only as a driver of conflict, but as fuel for warring parties and,
ultimately, as a barrier to negotiating the peace.6 This is particularly the case when high-value resources such as oil, timber, and
precious minerals are involved.7 Clementine Burnley reflects on
this in Natural Resources Conflict in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo: A Question of Governance? She examines the
contrasting theories of natural resource wealth, on the one hand,
and environmental scarcity, on the other, as causes of conflict
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (“DRC”). The author
then asks why large-scale violence persists in some resourcerich parts of the country while other areas with similar resources
and multiple ethnic groups are spared. She finds that often these
clashes are linked to socio-economic factors at the local level.
Burnley observes that natural resource management remains
a low priority for political actors in the DRC, and that the interest
that does exist is too often focused on resource control as a
means of consolidating personal power and wealth for elites.
She discusses how the continued presence of stakeholders with a
material interest in profiting from instability remains one of the
most important obstacles to effective natural resource management and good governance in the DRC.
Burnley argues that both the context in which natural
resources are used and the way in which those resources are
managed are key to preventing and managing conflicts at all
levels. Because the nature and scale of these conflicts differ
widely, however, approaches to management must differ as well.
She outlines ways in which donor institutions have worked to
improve resource governance in the DRC—by supporting access
to alternate income opportunities for local people, distributing
revenues from extractive industries more equitably, and addressing local conflicts over resource access and use before they
escalate beyond control. Burnley argues that many of the most
successful initiatives emphasized active participation of affected
communities. She argues that what is now needed in the DRC is
to move beyond abstract commitments to strengthen institutions
*Carroll Muffett is President and CEO of the non-profit Center for International
Environmental Law and has held leadership positions with several environmental non-profits. Carl Bruch is a Senior Attorney and Co-Director of International
Programs at the Environmental Law Institute and co-chairs the IUCN Specialist
Group on Armed Conflict and the Environment.
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and improve rule of law to more detailed specifications of
concrete, context-specific measures to improve natural resource
management. Building on the structures and processes already
in place, it will take significantly more planning, resources,
and political will to bring the needed transparency and accountability to all natural resource management in the DRC.
As Burnley discusses, natural resources can serve as a
resource not only for those who would build and secure the
peace, but for those who seek to destroy it. On the long road from
a fragile ceasefire to a stable peace, there are many who have
strong incentives to reverse course, and who actively seek the
means to foment that reversal. From gold to diamonds to conflict
timber, natural resources have
provided that means in prominent examples, including
Sierra Leone and Liberia.8 The
problem of how to manage
these peace spoilers remains
one of the most challenging in
post-conflict natural resource
management. Philippe Le
Billon explores one possible
response to this challenge in
Bankrupting Peace Spoilers:
What Role for UN Peacekeepers? Le Billon discusses
how reducing belligerents’ access to revenues from high-value
resources might help limit the success of peace spoilers, particularly when paired with resource management reforms addressing
broader social and environmental causes of conflict and human
rights abuses associated with those resources. Specifically, Le
Billon examines the potential for the United Nations to move
beyond economic sanctions alone and empower UN peacekeepers to secure control of natural resource production or transportation as a means of bankrupting prospective peace spoilers. In so
doing, he considers not only the opportunities such an approach
provides, but the challenges and issues associated with deploying peacekeepers to curtail access to conflict resources.
Natural resources can also be a source of hope after conflict,
where they can be seen as a ready source of revenue for rebuilding a cash-strapped economy. Handled carelessly, however, this
can lead to the rapid liquidation of valuable resources while
further entrenching elites and risking reversion to conflict.9 In
both cases, natural resources come under profound pressure in
the wake of conflict. Päivi Lujala and Siri Aas Rustad, the editors
of the first edited book in the ELI/UNEP/University of Tokyo/
McGill University series, share some of the central lessons
from their work in High-Value Natural Resources: A Blessing
or a Curse for Peace? Drawing on the thirty different analyses
and case studies in their book, Lujala and Rustad highlight how
proper management of high-value natural resources is crucial in
the aftermath of armed conflict. They document how effective
management of such resources can be used to support a wide
range of peacebuilding objectives, including grassroots livelihoods, large-scale economic recovery, good governance and

inclusive processes, and a more secure and stable peace. At the
same time, the authors caution that the risk of negative outcomes
from post-conflict resource extraction is high.
Lujala and Rustad point out that there is no one-size-fits-all
approach to natural resource management in post-conflict settings. Rather, resource management must be based on a nuanced
understanding of the context in which the management takes
place. This context includes the numerous and complex linkages—past, current, and potential—between the resources and
conflict, international dynamics and trade patterns, institutional
capacity, the conditions that have shaped resource management
in the past, and the political will that will shape their management into the future. It is only
with close attention to these
factors, paired with good
governance, that the resource
curse can be turned into a
blessing.
In post-conflict regions,
careful management of natural resource issues can play a
critical role in ensuring a sustainable peace not only within
countries but also between
them.10 In Liquid Challenges:
Contested Water in Central
Asia, Christine Bichsel examines competing claims to water in
the Syr Darya river basin, which is shared by the former Soviet
States of Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and
Turkmenistan. She looks at water as a potentially contentious
issue and assesses international efforts to mitigate the potential
for violent escalation and degradation of the environment. She
concludes by arguing that conflicts over water in Central Asia
may be driven less by inter-state relations than by the particular
interests of specific domestic actors in each country.
This use of conflict, real or perceived, as a tool to advance
the economic interests of individual actors finds curious expression much closer to home in Natural Resource “Conflicts” in the
U.S. Southwest: A Story of Hype over Substance by Laura Peterson et al. The authors examine the putative “conflict” between
environmental protection and economic development in the
context of the U.S. Endangered Species Act (“ESA”). As the title
attests, the authors argue that the conflicts involved—between
oil exploitation and agriculture on the one hand and two candidate endangered species on the other—owes more to perception,
myth, and spin than to ineluctable reality. Peterson argues that
this “fear mongering”, and the attempts it has engendered to pass
species-specific legislation undermining the ESA, represent a
thinly veiled and dangerous attempt to push an industry agenda
at the expense of the public good. In this, there are faint but recognizable echoes of the high-stakes (and all too real) experience
with the peace spoilers discussed by Burnley, Le Billon, and
Lujala and Rustad.
Richard Sadowski explores this private influence on conflict dynamics from a much different vantage point in Cuban

natural resources can serve
as a resource not only for
those who would build and
secure the peace, but for
those who seek to destroy it
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Off-Shore Drilling: Preparation and Prevention within the
Framework of the United States’ Embargo. Sadowski considers how Cuba’s plans to exploit its offshore oil wealth have
increased calls from lawmakers and the oil industry to relax the
United States’ half-century old embargo on Cuba. Proponents
of greater engagement rest their arguments both on the potential
environmental risks of offshore drilling and on the prospective
economic benefits of partnering in the exploitation. Sadowski
argues that, despite this added pressure from the oil lobby, the
purpose of the embargo has not yet been met and calls for a continuation of the policy.
Disputes over access to and allocation of critical natural
resources can serve as a flashpoint for conflict at all levels of
social organization, including at the grassroots level.11 Rutgerd
Boelens et al. explore this phenomenon in the context of water in
Threats to a Sustainable Future: Water Accumulation and Conflict in Latin America. Arguing that the concentration of rights to
access water and participate in decision-making on water governance is a historical problem in Latin America, they examine
how contemporary water policies in Ecuador, Mexico, and Peru
have tended to aggravate this problem in the face of globalization, growing water demand, and decreasing water availability
caused by ecosystem degradation and climate change. The
authors argue that the context-based and locally devised water
practices of small-holder communities and indigenous territories
are being continually overruled by government bureaucracies,
market-driven water policies, and top-down measures developed
with little respect for the realities on the ground. The result is
that water resources fundamental to survival and economic
well-being accumulate in the hands of elites, to the detriment
of marginalized populations, leading to a deepening of societal
conflicts over water and mounting reactions “from below” to
water issues.
As the articles in this issue highlight, failures of democratic
inclusion are often a hallmark of natural resource-related conflict, in all its forms.12 Indeed, we have found this one of the most

recurring lessons from our own work in the field. Good natural
resource governance is, ultimately, just good governance—it is
strengthened by commitments to democracy, transparency, and
accountability.13 As a result, consulting and engaging stakeholders has proven time and again to be one of the most critical tools
for managing resources while minimizing conflict risk.14
Daniel Kemmis and Matthew McKinney provide three case
studies in how to do this from the ground up in Collaboration
and the Ecology of Democracy. Drawing from experience with
three stakeholder-driven resource governance efforts in the
United States, the authors highlight citizen-driven, multiparty
collaboration as an important tool in resource management and
as an “emerging species within the ‘ecology’ of democracy.”
They argue that such collaborative problem-solving is a fundamental form of democracy in which people are working together
to shape the very conditions under which they live.
The articles in this issue demonstrate the critical importance
of situational awareness and conflict management when managing natural resources in the post-conflict (or peri-conflict) context. Natural resource management is intimately interwoven with
conflict management; human security; livelihoods and recovery
at both the macroeconomic and microeconomic scales; efforts
at demobilizing, disarming, and reintegrating former combatants; transitional justice; and ongoing governance. Accordingly,
those who would preserve an existing peace or build a new one
must take care to identify, understand, and respond to the natural
resource dimensions relevant to their objectives. Correspondingly, those concerned with managing and protecting natural
resources in conflict-affected regions must expressly recognize
the potential conflict dimensions of their work, however remote
from conflict it may at first appear. Achieving this requires not
only recognizing how the existing context has been shaped by
conflict but how actions taken in seemingly unrelated fields can
contribute either to ameliorating and recovering from conflict or
to conflict reversion.

Endnotes: Introductory Comments: The Pervasive, Persistent,
and Profound Links between Conflict and the Environment

1
See Indra de Soysa, The Resource Curse: Are Civil Wars Driven by Rapacity or Paucity?, in Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars
(Mats Berdal & David M. Malone eds., 2000); Michael Ross, The Natural
Resource Curse: How Wealth Can Make You Poor, Natural Resources and
Violent Conflict: Options and Actions 17-18 (Ian Bannon & Paul Collier eds.,
2003).
2
See id.
3
See, e.g., Duncan Brack & Gavin Hayman, Illegal Logging and the Illegal
Trade in Forest and Timber Products, at http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/
content/2002/timber_mafia/viewpoints/viewpoints_ brack.htm (last visited
December 18, 2011).
4
See Philippe Le Billon, Fuelling War: Natural Resources and Armed
Conflict 36 (2005); De Soysa, supra note 1 at 121.
5
Id.

6

6

See Paul Collier, The Market for Civil War, Foreign Pol‘y, May-Jun. 2003,
at 38, 41-42.
7
See de Soysa, supra note 1, at 124.
8
See, e.g., Luke A. Whittemore, Intervention and Post-Conflict Natural
Resource Governance: Lessons from Liberia, 17 Minn. J. Int‘l L. 387, 407
(2008).
9
See Le Billon, supra note 3 at 15.
10 See id.
11 See generally, de Soysa, supra note 1; Ross, supra note 1.
12 See, e.g., Paul Collier & Anke Hoeffler, Greed and Grievance in Civil War,
56 Oxford Econ. Papers 563, 576 (2004); Ross, supra note 1 at 26.
13 See Philippe Le Billon, Securing Transparency: Armed Conflicts and the
Management of Natural Resource Revenues, 62 Int’l J 93, 95 (2006-2007).
14 Id at 106.
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Natural Resources Conflict in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo:
A Question of Governance?
by Clementine Burnley*

T

Introduction

he Democratic Republic of the Congo (“DRC”) is a fragile post-conflict state that is immensely rich in natural
resources. Effective management of its mining, oil, and
forestry resources is key to its future economic progress.1 However, the DRC is widely regarded as a textbook forum for natural resource-induced conflicts at both local and national levels.2
If natural resources are the main cause of conflicts, then improving governance over those resources could reduce the likelihood
of conflict. Academic studies on conflict causes could be usefully
linked to research on governance to improve the management of
natural resources in conflict-prone societies. For instance, studies
have revealed that countries with high quality institutions dedicated
to the management of valuable natural resources minimize potential problems faced by resource-rich and conflict-prone countries.3
However, natural resource management can be complex
and difficult due to incongruent political, social, economic,
and environmental goals even in peaceful societies.4 Conflictprone societies such as the DRC present even more complex
challenges given the underlying political and historical reasons
for the conflicts.5 Despite these significant difficulties, best
governance practices such as incorporating stakeholder input and
financing strategies could both prevent and resolve conflicts. This
article summarizes findings about a number of important external
and internal factors fueling conflict, institutional and governance
challenges in managing resources, and highlights a number of
ways in which donor institutions have worked with policymakers to
improve resource governance in the DRC. In adopting these techniques for equitable and efficient natural resource management, the
DRC could achieve long-term peace and economic stability.

Armed Conflict and the Role
of Natural Resources
There is a large body of quantitative research on the external
factors relevant for understanding civil conflicts at the local,
national, and international level.6 Examples of these external
factors include resources type and the characteristics of the
state.7 These studies have focused on the access to and use
of natural resources by conflict parties, especially the role of
conflict financing through the exploitation of natural resources.8
Valuable natural resources like diamonds, gold, oil, timber, and
even drug crops and medicinal plants, have been found to be
prone to misappropriation.9 The control of these resources may
allow rebels to generate conflict financing.10
Fall 2011

Along similar lines, several quantitative political science
studies demonstrated that the abundance of natural resources
increases the statistical risk of armed conflict at the national
level.11 However, numerous other studies have criticized the
robustness of such conclusions.12 This criticism reflects flaws
such as the methodology of the quantitative studies, which fail
to distinguish civil war onset and ongoing civil war as equal
components of civil war prevalence.13 Despite this flaw, these
studies can nonetheless be useful in understanding how conflict
makes the management of natural resources more difficult and
vice versa.14
Another set of academic studies focuses on environmental
scarcity and competition between groups for these natural
resources.15 Increasing demand from growing populations and
inequalities in the distribution of natural resources can ultimately lead to environmental degradation.16 These studies have
also been criticized for methodological weaknesses, paucity of
data, and according too much weight to environmental factors
and too little emphasis on human factors such as technological
innovativeness and ingenuity.17 Nevertheless, the concept of
competition between groups over distribution of resources
is pertinent to an understanding of the current, and sometimes
violent, community-level conflicts over land and forest usage in
the eastern provinces of the DRC.18

Past and Current Natural Resources
Conflicts in the DRC
The DRC includes most of the Congo Basin region, an
area of enormous wealth in terms of biodiversity, timber, and
mineral resources.19 Despite this natural wealth, however, the
DRC is one of the poorest countries in the world with significant infrastructure deficiencies and an economy that is highly
dependent upon agriculture and forestry.20 Violent and nonviolent conflicts linked to the use of its natural resources have
historically prevented the DRC from fully utilizing its resources
to generate revenue and improve quality of life for its citizens.21
Specifically, numerous policy reports have highlighted the
role of minerals in financing the armed groups involved in the
* Clementine Burnley works as a senior project manager for Adelphi Research
on topics of natural resources governance and peace building in the Great Lakes
region. She has carried out fieldwork in Western Uganda, Democratic Republic of Congo, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Clementine has also worked on several
research projects to derive indicators of environmental status from a combination of earth observation and socio-economic data.

7

most recent DRC conflicts.22 Control over mining areas in the
eastern provinces continues to shift between different independent armed groups and units of the Military of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (“FARDC”).23 The struggle for control
over these resources has exacerbated conflict and created greater
difficulty in managing the resources to benefit the public.24
Despite a recent transition towards peace, conflict and insecurity remain in the eastern provinces of North and South Kivu,
Orientale, Maniema, and Katanga.25 These conflicts are particularly acute in the northeastern provinces of Ituri in Orientale,
and North and South Kivu, where local militia and foreign rebel
forces continue to terrorize the regions.26 A prime example of
conflict is the Virunga National Park (“Park”) located in northeastern DRC, on the border with Uganda and Rwanda.27 The
Park was the site of some of the large-scale armed conflicts that
occurred in the Kivu Provinces.28 The 1994 Rwandan genocide
and resulting refugee crisis led to the presence of about 700,000
refugees on the edges of the Park.29 These displaced groups
increased the consumption of resources both inside and outside
the Park, furthering the impact on the environment and leading
to mass deforestation.30
Identity and nationality, which are linked to land and political power, have also played an important part in the different
conflicts of the DRC. In the absence of alternative incomeearning opportunities in the formal economy or in commerce,
access to land is essential to livelihoods in DRC.31 There have
been several historic conflicts over grazing land and land
ownership between Hema and Lendu peoples in Ituri.32 These
conflicts have killed 10,000 and displaced 50,000.33 Moreover,
these types of conflicts are likely to continue until those natural
resources with income-generating potential, such as timber, are
better managed.34

Natural Resource Management and
Governance Challenges
The twin challenges of governance for the DRC are to
provide security for all of its citizens and to build democratic,
transparent, and accountable institutions capable of managing its enormous resource wealth for the benefit of its entire
population.35 Although the existing legal framework recognizes
the right to use land via customary law, it also allows for land
grabbing, the purchase of occupied land, and the eviction of
tenants.36 And since the government retains the right to define
“Congolese people,” the issue of who is entitled to land rights is
highly politicized.37 Further tensions stem from the unclear role
of formal and customary authorities.38 Thus legal reform is necessary to prevent future land-grabbing opportunities that could
cause armed conflict.39 Legitimizing certain existing formal
and customary systems of land administration, and providing a
forum for land use disputes, could help diffuse both future conflicts and lay a framework for sustainable land management.48
The demarcation of conservation areas in the DRC is also a
contentious political issue. The existence of conservation areas
has been linked to colonial land demarcations, which are not
always understood or accepted by the communities affected.40
8

In response, managers of these protected areas have engaged
in participatory management methods involving local communities, such as consultations, participatory demarcation, and the
creation of alternative livelihood activities.41
However, conflict exists not only over the natural resources
but also over collaboration: site-specific, cross-border collaboration efforts between conservation organizations in Rwanda,
DRC, and Uganda have continued during various wars at the
regional level.42 Furthermore, the DRC continues to face significant challenges in its reform processes in all natural resources
sectors.43 The widespread disintegration of government functionality during the prolonged conflicts has left a legacy of
bureaucratic inefficiencies in knowledge, expertise, capacity,
and resourcing across all sectors.44 These shortcomings mean
that institutions often are unable to respond to the serious problems they face.45 For instance, in the area of education, only
thirty-two percent of teachers in secondary school and twenty
percent of those in higher education are qualified at the level
mandated by their posts.46 Congo’s National Statistical Institute
(“INS”) lacks resources to collect the necessary information by
which ministries’ performance can be verified.47 Even in areas
where periodic reporting is mandatory, such as the mining industry, it is still difficult to find reliable data on mining operators,
production, or exported commodities.48
Transparency in governance remains another main challenge to effective natural resources in the DRC. The country now
ranks 164th out of 178 in the 2011 Transparency International
Corruption Perception Index, while the World Bank/IFC Doing
Business 2011 survey ranks DRC 175th out of 183 countries.49
A number of authors have highlighted the negative effects of
corruption on the management of natural resources in DRC.50
For instance, policy processes are prone to disruption by politicians acting in their own, rent-seeking interests.51 Furthermore,
government agents at mine sites illegally tax the operations in
eastern DRC, justifying their practice by blaming the lack of
monetary support from the central government.52

The Need for Capacity Building in the DRC
The concept of “capacity” refers to the ability of individuals
and institutions to conceive and carry out decisions effectively
and efficiently.53 There is a clear need for institutional capacity
building in the DRC to ensure compliance with the international
norms and agreements relevant to environmental management.54
At the individual level, capacity building refers to the
processes of teaching and skills training. 55 At the local and
national institutional level, improvements to the functioning
of institutions and capacity of administrators could help civil
services better use revenue and natural resources to reduce
poverty.56 Increasingly, administrators are using capacity building to encourage ownership through participation and mutual
exchange of knowledge.57 Building individual capacity in terms
of natural resource management would involve increasing the
level of expertise in its legal, scientific, or technical aspects.58
For example, increasing expertise in the implementation and
monitoring of regulatory compliance or increasing awareness of
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the conflict risk in managing natural resources would increase
the government and different communities’ ability to address
these conflicts.59 Moreover, increasing scientific expertise in
the geological field would allow DRC’s institutions to improve
their negotiating power with extractive industry counterparts.60
Similarly, capacity building for local businesses could help
to promote the development of homegrown industries in the
minerals sector.61
On the international level, governance initiatives relevant
to the environment in the DRC are conditioned by the various
international treaties and environmental agreements to which
the country is a signatory.62 These initiatives and treaties specify
actions to protect the DRC’s biodiversity, endangered species,
timber, and wetlands as well as to mitigate climate change.63
USAID and the European Development Fund both have agreements with the DRC to fund such programs, which encompass
regional conservation and production areas.64 Given this outside
support for local and national institutions, it is vital to create
an implementation framework that creates coherent sector-wide
programs.65
Specifically, the DRC is currently developing a governance
framework for the forestry sector.66 The population is highly
dependent on the forestry sector and, although precise data is
uncertain, the expansive forests of the DRC provide a wide array
of benefits, including timber for domestic use and export, fuel
wood, a variety of forest foods and medicines, and a carbon
sink for sequestration programs.67 It is estimated that the DRC’s
timber resources are equal to that of all other African countries
combined and the timber industry is expected to benefit from
increasing demand in China and India.68 Therefore, this sector
is a high priority for reform.69 The ongoing forestry reforms
are part of the preparation of a national strategy for Reducing
Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation
(“REDD”), by the Ministry of Environment, Nature Conservation and Tourism (known by the French acronym “MECNT”).70
The DRC’s 2002 Forest Code is an important first step in both
regulating an important resource and creating an implementation
framework for fund programs such as REDD. 71

Best Practices of Post-Conflict Natural
Resources Management
Land use conflicts between different resource users and
managers have often arisen in eastern DRC. And although
individual organizations managing land within or adjacent to
protected areas have each addressed the conflicts differently,
a number of good practices have been proven to reduce usage
conflicts.72 Such practices include devolving rights to local
communities, diversifying economic activities around protected
areas, improving land use planning and zoning, securing tenure
to land and resources, ensuring stakeholder participation in
resource management, integrating policies relating to natural
resources, and legitimizing community-based management
initiatives.73 Given the success of these tactics, many national
programs in the DRC are beginning to embrace these concepts.
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Accordingly, donors and the government of the DRC are
working together to build institutional and individual capacities
for participatory management of natural resources in various
sectors.74

Forestry
In the forestry sector, the International Development
Association and the Global Environment Facility are supporting the Forest and Nature Conservation Project to provide
infrastructure, equipment, training, and project coordination
at the national level for the MECNT, regional, and provincial management bodies.75 Implementing best practices will
strengthen MECNT’s institutional capacity to as well as community participation in sustainable forest management.76 Striving
for similar goals, WWF and United Nations Human Settlements
Programme (“UN-HABITAT”) are collaborating to manage
conflicts linked to land tenure bordering protected areas in eastern DRC, combining participatory demarcation with conflict
mediation and land administration.77
To facilitate best practices, it is important to recognize that
the external economic environment, such as levels of direct
foreign investment and variability in price of commodities,
is largely outside the control of the Congolese.78 However, Congolese policymakers and administrators can nonetheless control
how revenues and investments are managed.79 Improvements to
the institutional governance systems for resource revenues have
focused on increasing efficiency in three dimensions: management, allocation of revenue, and distribution of benefits.80
International efforts have focused on supporting transparency in revenue management and restricting the financing
of armed groups.81 The Extractive Industries Transparency
Initiative (“EITI”) tries to increase transparency surrounding
resources exploitation, revenue generation, and budget allocations.82 The DRC has been classified by the EITI as “close to
compliant.”83 Transparency initiative objectives support the
disclosure of information for the extractive industry and civil
stakeholders’ demands for accountability from policymakers
and institutions.84 However, it will take time for capacity building to redress the current imbalance between levels of influence
by state and civil society actors.85 At the moment, capacity and
knowledge gaps on the part of civil society mean that it is difficult for civil stakeholders to hold institutions and political actors
accountable for their actions.86

Mining
Trade restrictions have also been introduced to reduce
availability of resource-based financing to conflict actors.87 For
example, the Kimberley Process for Conflict Diamonds is an
intergovernmental process established to regulate and reduce
trading in diamonds from rebel-controlled areas.88 This and
other similar initiatives require companies to report whether
their supply chain contains minerals sourced from conflict zones
that may have contributed to the financing of armed groups.89
This, in turn, requires due diligence and traceability mechanisms
to distinguish between “clean” and “dirty” minerals.90
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In the DRC, a number of traceability initiatives already exist
at the national, regional, and international levels. At the national
level, the DRC’s Mining Law of 2002 requires community
consultations, disclosure of contract terms by both companies
and the government, and revenue transparency through adherence to EITI guidelines.91 The publication of the 2010 Mining
Contracts Review, carried out to determine benefits of these
contracts to the DRC, is still in progress.92
At the regional level, several regional groups have adopted
traceability and accountability mechanisms. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”),
for example, has drawn up auditing guidelines for mineral
processors.93 The International Conference of the Great Lakes
has also committed to a regional certification mechanism, which
provides a clear procedure and adequate records of mineral
origins.94 The International Tin Research Initiative has also
improved due diligence, traceability, and certification processes
for tin through the Tin Supply Chain Initiative.95 However,
these traceability initiatives in DRC ultimately face difficulties
linked to cost, implementation, monitoring, human capacity, and
resource gaps.96
National initiatives supplement industry-led and regional
traceability schemes. In the United States, the recent 2010
Conflict Minerals Provision of the Dodd–Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act requires companies to
represent accurate information regarding the source and supply
chain of certain minerals.97 The German Federal Institute for
Geosciences and Natural Resources has supported the establishment of Certified Trading Chains.98 These initiatives would
assist in reducing resource-based financing to conflict actors
through international trade channels.99
There are some examples of good non-renewable resource
management in from countries of the global north. Norway, for
example, has successfully used macroeconomic tools to guide
oil revenues, domestic oil retention, and revenue utilization,
avoiding the potentially harmful effects of equitable redistribution.100 In this way, Norway has managed to avoid the typical
problems of an oil economy, such as the boom-bust cycle and
wealth concentration.101 Despite the fact that the two countries
differ in their government accountability systems and transparency, Norway’s solutions may provide guidance to the DRC.102
Combining Norway’s approach with transparency and accountability initiatives could provide a better system for managing
non-renewable resources.103
The challenge for the DRC is to improve the workings of
institutional and political processes at both the national and
the local level to ensure that natural resources are used in a
sustainable manner to improve the lives of communities.
International examples of successful resource management
are often supported by international organizations and private
nongovernmental organizations (“NGOs”). The World Heritage
Institute (UNESCO), Congolese Institute for the Conservation
of Nature (“ICCN”), and local NGOs are currently collaborating
on “Biodiversity Conservation in Regions of Armed Conflict:
Protecting World Heritage in the Democratic Republic of the
10

Congo.”104 That project, which has been running since 2000
with multi-donor funding, supports not only the key financial,
logistical, and technical sectors, but also provides access to the
higher political decision-makers at the national regional and
international levels.105
Another example, the World Wildlife Fund’s (“WWF”)
Eco-Makala Project, has responded to the deforestation by refugees in the southern part of the Virunga National Park in North
Kivu Province by introducing legal fuel wood plantations.106 The
WWF project increases the availability of sustainable energy
for the area around Goma and to reduce rural poverty in Masisi
and Rutshuru.107 The United States Agency for International
Development (“USAID”) Central Africa Regional Program on
the Environment is helping to support the WWF, demarking
protected areas using a combination of participatory methods,
mapping, and GIS tools.108 The project works with local communities and chiefs, restricting access to certain areas in order to
sensitize communities to the benefits of maintaining biodiversity
in their surrounding areas.109 Conservation International is supporting the ICCN to jointly manage resource reserves with local
communities in the Equateur Province to provide livelihood
alternatives and also to track deforestation.110
With normalization of relations between the DRC and
Rwanda, and integration of some armed groups into the state
army and police forces, the most important conflict management
processes affecting the Kivu Provinces have taken place at the
national and international level.111 Security sector reform is
also ongoing, but still leaves much to be desired.112 The most
immediate challenge for policymakers is to end illegal control
over, and taxation of, mining, both by the Congolese army and
by armed groups.113 This would require bringing areas currently
under the control of armed groups under state control through
military action or negotiation.114
Additionally, the government needs to stop those at the
highest military and political levels from seizing the profits from
minerals. A number of specific recommendations have been
made by expert organizations working in the field of safeguards,
advocating the monitoring and inspection systems for mining
areas where the Congolese military are deployed and reinforcement of military sanctions to end impunity and increase accountability in army units.115

Conclusion
The theories of environmental scarcity and of natural
resources wealth as conflict causes in the DRC are well documented. What remains unclear, however, is why large-scale
armed violence persists in some eastern provinces of the
country, while other, equally resource rich provinces, such as
Katanga and the hinterlands of the Kivu Provinces, escape such
violence.116 This suggests that additional tensions, such as those
between industrial and artisanal miners and those linked to local
socioeconomic factors are of the upmost relevance.117
This article has described the consequences of prolonged
instability for natural resource management in the DRC. Further, natural resources management remains a low priority for
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political actors, many of whom favor the consolidation of power
and wealth.118 The presence of those stakeholders who instigate
and profit from instability constitutes the major obstacle to
effective natural resources management and to improvements in
overall governance in the DRC.119
The political, economic, and social contexts in which natural
resources are used and the manner in which resources are managed is paramount to prevent and manage conflicts at all levels.
The nature and scale of the conflicts described in this paper are
each different and, therefore, the management approaches correspondingly different.
This article has also outlined a number of ways in which
donor institutions have worked with policymakers to improve
resource governance in the DRC. The initiatives described support alternative income opportunities for local communities,
redistribution of revenues from some extractive industries, and

prevention of local resources usage conflicts. Many of the natural resources management activities have had active participation of communities as a key component.
Governance objectives are often broadly formulated to
strengthen institutions, build institutional and human capacity,
and improve rule of law. These broad aims, while useful as guiding principles, remain extremely abstract. Successful governance,
however, requires specific measures and binding timeframes for
implementation in order to reform key areas such as the accurate
monitoring and legal enforcement of natural resources management strategies. While the institutional structures and processes
may already be in place, it will still take a long planning process,
significant additional resources, and political will to achieve the
needed transparency and accountability for the management of
all natural resources sectors in the DRC.

Endnotes: Natural Resources Conflict in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo: A question of Governance?

1
See World Development Indicators, World Bank (last updated Sept. 2011),
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators.
2
See United Nations, Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal
Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2002/1146 (2009), http://www.victorbout.com/
Documents/S_2002_1146_Congo.pdf.
3
Ivar Kolstad et al., Corruption in Natural Resource Management –
An Introduction 2 (2008), http://www.u4.no/document/publication.
cfm?2936=corruption-in-natural-resource-management-an.
4
See Peter J. Balint et al., Wicked Environmental Problems: Managing
Uncertainty and Conflict (2011).
5
See Philippe le Billon, The Political Ecology of War: Natural Resources
and Armed Conflicts, 20 Pol. Geography 562-66 (2001), http://www.geog.ubc.
ca/~lebillon/ecowar.pdf.
6
See, e.g., Paul Collier & Anke Hoeffler, Greed and Grievance in Civil War,
56 Oxford Eco. Papers No.4 563 (2004) (arguing that economic reliance on
primary commodity exports and large diaspora increases risk of conflict).
7
Id. See also David Collier et al., A Sea Change in Political Methodology,
9 Newsl. of the Am. Pol. Sci. Ass’n (2010).
8
See Indra de Soysa, Paradise is a Bazaar? Greed, Creed, and Governance
in Civil War, 39 J. of Peace Research 395, 404-05, 413 (2002). See also Collier
& Hoeffler, supra note 7, at 1.
9
See generally United nations, supra note 2.
10 See United Nations, supra note 2, at 20.
11 See Collier & Hoeffler, supra note 7; see also Le Billon, supra note 5.
12 See Nicholas Sambanis & Ibrahim Elbadawi, How Much War Will We See?
Explaining the Prevalence of Civil War, 46 J. of Conflict Resolution 307-34
(2002); see also James Fearon, Primary Commodity Exports and Civil War,
49 J. of Conflict Resolution 483-507 (2005); see also Håvard Hegre & Nicholas
Sambanis, Sensitivity Analysis of Empirical Results on Civil War Onset, J. of
Conflict Resolution 508-35 (2006).
13 Sambanis & Elbadawi, supra note 13, at 307.
14 See Le Billon, supra note 5, at 563-66.
15 See Michael Renner, Fighting for Survival: Environmental Decline,
Social Conflict, and the New Age of Insecurity (1996); see also Thomas F.
Homer-Dixon, Environment, Scarcity and Violence (1999).
16 See Renner, supra note 16, at 36, 59.
17 See Nils P. Gleditsch et al., Armed conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset,
39 J. of Peace Research, 615-37 (2002).
18 See generally Collier & Hoeffler supra note 7. See also International Peace
Information Service (IPIS), The Complexity of Resource Governance in a
Context of State Fragility: The Case of Eastern DRC 8, 54 (Nov. 2010),
http://www.ipisresearch.be/publications_reports.php?&lang=en.

Fall 2011

19

U.S. Department of State, Bureau of African Affairs, Background Note:
Democratic Republic of the Congo (Sept. 30, 2011), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/
ei/bgn/2823.htm.
20 See Peter Bofin et al. (eds.), REDD Integrity: Addressing governance and
corruption challenges in schemes for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation
and Forest Degradation 25 (2011), http://www.cmi.no/publications/file/3967redd-integrity-addressing-governance-and.pdf.
21 See U.S. Department of State, supra note 20.
22 See IPIS, supra note 19. See also United Nations, Final Report of the
Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other
Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, supra note 2.
23 IPIS, supra note 19, at 10.
24 Id. at 68-69.
25 Id. at 8, 54.
26 Id.
27 José Kalpers, Volcanoes under Siege: Impact of a Decade of Armed Conflict in the Virungas, Worldwildlife.org, http://www.worldwildlife.org/bsp/
publications/africa/144/titlepage.htm (last visited Nov. 18, 2011).
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 See René Lemarchand, The Democratic Republic of Congo: From Collapse
to Potential Reconstruction 35, 36 (Oct. 27, 2011), http://www.teol.ku.dk/cas/
research/publications/occ._papers/lemarchand2001.pdf.
33 Id.
34 See Forests Monitor, The Timber Trade and Poverty Alleviation in the
Upper Great Lakes Region 8-9 (2007), http://www.forestsmonitor.org/en/
reports/556666.
35 See USAID, Country Profile: Democratic Republic of Congo, http://
usaidlandtenure.net/usaidltprproducts/country-profiles/democratic-republicof-congo (last visited Nov. 18, 2011).
36 Id.
37 Id. See also IPIS, supra note 19, at 71.
38 USAID, supra note 35.
39 Id.
40 See Kalpers, supra note 28.
41 Id.
42 See Connectivity Conservation Management: A Global Guide 73, 76
(Graeme L. Worboys et al. eds., 2010).
43 See USAID, supra note 35.
44 Id.
45 Id.
continued on page 52

11

Water Crisis in the Murray-Darling Basin:
Australia Attempts to Balance Agricultural
Need with Environmental Reality
by Joshua Axelrod*

O

veruse, pollution, increased salinity, and drought
are threatening the water resources of Australia’s
Murray-Darling River Basin (“MDB”), a drainage
of twenty-three rivers that is home to more than two million
people1 and generates nearly forty percent of Australia’s agricultural revenue.2 To address these threats, the Murray-Darling
Basin Authority (“MDBA”) submitted the Guide to the Basin
Plan (“Guide”) for public comment in October 2010, sparking
controversy between the government and MDB’s agricultural
communities.3 The Guide’s comprehensive sustainable water
management strategies seek to balance human and environmental
water needs.4 In an attempt to minimize the socio-economic
impact of policy changes, the Australian government is buying water allocations from farmers and investing in irrigation
infrastructure improvements.5 Despite public opposition to these
actions, aggressive sustainable water management strategies
must nonetheless be implemented, and tied to environmental
outcomes, if the MDB is to remain a key agricultural producer
in the future.6
Efforts to implement sustainable water use policies are recent
innovations in Australia.7 The Australian states and territorial
governments took significant steps to reform the management
of overused rivers in 2004 with the ratification of the National
Water Initiative.8 Since the Initiative, the Australian government
has moved quickly to preserve scarce water resources. The 2007
passage of the Water Act gave Australia’s national government
the legal authorization to create a centralized, independent
agency9 to draft, implement, and enforce water use policy for
the MDB.10 Soon after, the newly created MDBA began its work
on the Guide.11 The Guide provides the scientific,12 economic,13
and sociologic14 rationale for a proposed Basin Plan that will be
released in late 2011.15
The Guide sets forth comprehensive and aggressive water
use policies with the goal of stabilizing and improving the
health of the MDB’s critical natural resources.16 To accomplish
this goal, the Guide proposes four key management policies:
sustainable diversion limits (“SDLs”), environmental quality
benchmarks, state-level SDL compliance, and an efficient water
market.17 SDLs will limit the volume of water that may be taken
from a given river or aquifer;18 environmental benchmarks
will measure river salinity, overall water quality,19 and wetland
health;20 monitoring state-level SDL compliance will localize
enforcement of water resource allocation;21 and an efficient
water market will allow farmers to buy and sell allocated water
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resources to ensure a reliable revenue stream or increased water
needs.22
Critics of the Guide argue that there was a lack of public
input during the planning process and that the proposed plan
will have a disproportionate impact on the communities most
dependent on the MDB’s water resources.23 Food processers,24
farmers,25 and irrigation organizations26 contest the MDBA’s
reliance on economic models that show that the proposed water
management changes will have minimal impacts on the overall
MDB economy.27 They argue that economic assessments should
have focused on short-term impacts to local and regional communities instead of nation-wide impacts.28 Individual citizens,
meanwhile, suggest that the Guide’s proposals will lead to the
continued economic and cultural decay of MDB cities and towns
as residents relocate and abandon the MDB in search of economic stability.29
However, the fundamental issue remains: Action is required
if Australia’s scarce water resources are to be preserved. The
MDB recently suffered the longest drought in recorded history
and faces a predicted eleven percent decline in surface water
availability by 2030.30 At the same time, water use in the MDB
has increased from 2,000 gigaliters annually in the early 1900s to
more than 10,000 gigaliters in 2010.31 The escalation of human
water use coupled with historic drought illustrates the need for
Basin-wide adaptation to diminished water resources if these
resources are to remain viable in the future.32
Decision-makers must implement policies that require
adaptation to declining water availability without compromising
the overall economic vitality of the region.33 Though irrigated
agriculture in the MDB is vital to Australia’s agricultural sector,34 it represents only seven percent of the MDB’s economy.35
Thus, while reports to the MDBA suggest that there will likely
be significant socio-economic impact on irrigation-dependent
farmers36 and communities,37 actions can be taken to transition
these communities to a more stable economic foundation.38 Economic diversification of local communities39 through flexible
labor and capital markets seems to be the most viable option.40
Delaying reform because of community disappointment and
apprehension presents a risk that the Australian government and
local communities cannot afford to take.41 Still, it is important
for the MDBA to consider community input in order to ensure
continued on page 51
* Joshua Axelrod is a J.D. candidate, May 2014, at American University
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Sustainable Development Law & Policy

Bankrupting Peace Spoilers:
What Role for UN Peacekeepers?
by Philippe Le Billon*

C

Introduction

urtailing belligerents’ access to weapons has been a
major focus of international security actors.1 Although
weapons embargoes and disarmament initiatives remain
important, they are difficult to implement and generally insufficient to secure long-term peace.2 Curtailing belligerents’ access
to revenues from high-value natural resources—such as timber,
minerals, and opium—provides a complementary approach to
attain security, particularly when combined with resource management reforms.3
This paper focuses on the methods that United Nations
(“UN”) peacekeepers employ and their capacity to help curtail
belligerents’ access to resource revenues.4 The first part of this
paper reviews the principal instruments used by the UNSC to
address “conflict resources.”5 The second part examines the
specific use of peacekeeping forces to secure resource production areas and prevent the trafficking of conflict resources. Issues
associated with the deployment of peacekeepers in efforts to
curtail access to conflict resources are also discussed.

UN Initiatives
UN initiatives to address the links between high-value
natural resources and armed conflicts have included commodity
sanctions, expert panels, and specific measures undertaken6 as
part of the peacemaking, peacekeeping, or peacebuilding tasks.7
Among these methods, the main approach taken by the United
Nations Security Council (“UNSC” or “Security Council”) to
curtail belligerents’ access to resource revenues has been economic sanctions.8 Commodity sanctions target rebel groups by
curtailing their access to resources in order to “bankrupt” peace
spoilers.9 Examples include the Khmer Rouge’s access to logs
in Cambodia;10 the National Union for the Total Independence
of Angola’s (“União Nacional para a Independência Total de
Angola” or “UNITA”) access to diamonds;11 the Revolutionary
United Front (“RUF”) access to diamonds in Sierra Leone;12
the Taliban’s access to opium production in Afghanistan;13 and
the New Forces’ (“Forces Nouvelles”) access to diamonds in
Côte d’Ivoire.14 Resource-focused sanctions have also targeted
the governments of Iraq15 and Liberia,16 for their training and
funding of insurgent groups in civil wars, and Libya,17 for its
involvement in the Lockerbie bombing.18
With the exceptions of Cambodia, Iraq, and Libya, all
these sanction regimes were associated with investigations by
UN expert panels—consultants hired by the UN Secretariat to
investigate war economies and “sanction-busting,” or “trading
with a country with which trade has been forbidden.”19 Because
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the panels’ reports are made public, they have been instrumental
in successful “naming and shaming” campaigns.20 Even though
less than a handful of sanction busters were successfully prosecuted by 2006, the public reports nonetheless had the desired
chilling effect.21
Although the UNSC holds the greatest potential and has so
far carried the most weight in efforts to address linkages between
high-value resources and armed conflicts, UN transitional
authorities and specialized UN agencies have also engaged in
activities related to managing conflict resources, by deploying
border monitors and troops, deploying UN troops as backup
for resource management officials, and providing supervision
and technical assistance for economic reforms and resource
management.22 Furthermore, these UN entities have partnered
with national authorities and international aid agencies to reform
resource sectors and build local institutional capacity to peacefully manage resources in post-conflict settings.23 For example,
the UN Transitional Authority in Timor-Leste renegotiated
the maritime boundary between Timor-Leste and Australia,
the results of which had implications for petroleum exploitation.24 Additionally, the UN Mission in Liberia supported the
Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program
(“GEMAP”).25 An initiative led by the World Bank, GEMAP
is a quasi-trusteeship agreement that allows direct international
supervision of most of the financial operations of the Liberian
government—including monitoring the administration of
natural resources such as timber and mine products.26 Other UN
missions have had an indirect impact on resource sectors; for
example, effective disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs often lead to employment for former soldiers who
might otherwise turn to illegal resource exploitation.27
The UNSC decides whether to impose economic sanctions
and dispatch UN expert panels, as well as the size and mandate
of UN missions in conflict-affected countries.28 Since the end
of the cold war, the UNSC has theoretically had greater freedom to impose sanctions and similar measures because fewer
members of the Security Council were inclined to veto such
steps in order to support their allies.29 However, he UNSC
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has been somewhat slow in adopting this potential in practice.
Meanwhile, the importance of resources to armed groups
has grown rapidly since the late 1980s, as belligerents turned
to natural resources to replace external political sponsorship.30
For most of the 1990s, the UNSC made increasing use of arms
sanctions, negotiated settlements, and regional or UN peacekeeping missions, but rarely placed commodity sanctions. 31
Although arms sanctions may be more effective than commodity
sanctions, and may therefore continue to be the principal sanction strategy, the two approaches can be combined to resolve
conflicts.32
Although the UNSC began implementing commodity
sanctions in the late 1980s, it has only done so in approximately
one-third of the conflicts involving resources between 1989
and 2006.33 Furthermore, most of these sanctions have been
imposed after the late 1990s, nearly a decade after resources
came to play a major role in belligerents’ finances.34 When the
use of commodity sanctions finally increased, it was given a further boost by a more proactive use of sanction committees and
expert panels.35 Because of broader engagement on the part of
nongovernmental organizations (“NGOs”), conflict analysts, and
resource industries, sanctions are now better targeted, monitored,
and enforced, and their humanitarian impact is more carefully
considered.36 The UNSC has even recently bolstered the authority and capacity of UN peacekeeping missions to more directly
intervene in the control of resource sectors, most notably in the
case of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (“DRC”).37

UN Peacekeeping Missions
and Conflict Resources
UN peacekeeping operations have been established in at
least eight countries where conflict resources contributed to
prolonging hostilities. This section briefly reviews the mandates,
specific measures, and effectiveness in each case building on the
three main cases: Sierra Leone, Liberia and the DRC.

Sierra Leone
Despite UN hesitation, the UN Assistance Mission in Sierra
Leone (“UNAMSIL”) used peacekeeping forces to regulate the
diamond sector during the last stages of its 1999-2005 operation.38 Before that point, peacekeeping forces had intervened in
an ad hoc fashion to prevent the escalation of resource-related
conflicts.39 This ad hoc intervention was based on UNAMSIL’s
fear of overstepping its mandate,40 antagonizing local interest
groups, exposing UN troops to criminal violence, and reinforcing rumors that peacekeeping forces were involved in diamond
deals.41 Although some of these concerns were legitimate,
reports from military observers about diamond-related armed
conflicts, as well as requests for assistance from the government and from the donors who were funding diamond reforms,
eventually led UNAMSIL to take on a more proactive role.42 In
2003, two years after hostilities had ceased, UNAMSIL began
conducting aerial surveys, deploying foot patrols, and engaging
in targeted conflict-settlement interventions in the diamond sector.43 Most notably, UNAMSIL also worked to prevent clashes
between local youths with former RUF soldiers.44 These efforts
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were often undertaken jointly with the Sierra Leone Ministry of
Mines, where UNAMSIL occasionally served in a supervisory
capacity for the ministry.45

Liberia
The ongoing UN Mission in Liberia (“UNMIL”), established in 2003, has illustrated potential complications of using
peacekeeping methods to address conflict resources. UNMIL’s
mandate is “to assist the transitional government in restoring
proper administration of natural resources” as part of the implementation of the peace process.46 Conflict resources—mostly
timber, but also rubber and diamonds—had played a major role
in the Liberian conflicts between 1989 and 2003.47
Because of the rapid cessation of hostilities and improving
security after 2003, UNMIL did not confront extensive problems
with conflict commodities.48 This was a positive factor considering that UNMIL’s full deployment took nine months, largely
because UN member countries failed to provide the pledged
troops.49 Nevertheless, UNMIL was subject to criticism for failing to do more to address the problem of conflict resources.50
Among its critics was Global Witness, the leading NGO in
the realm of resources and armed conflicts.51 In 2005, Global
Witness wrote a letter to the UNSC, stating that UNMIL had
failed to implement its mandate because
they have not been given the legal authority to act
as independently and proactively as they need to
effectively seek out and stop illegal timber or diamond
operations. . . . UNMIL’s ability to fulfill its mandate
is further undermined by its lack of deployment
in diamond and timber-rich areas, particularly along
Liberia’s porous border regions with Côte d’Ivoire,
Guinea and Sierra Leone.52
While UNMIL did not undertake sufficient efforts to secure
conflict commodities, it did create an environment and natural
resources unit that worked with local and international organizations on protecting Liberia’s natural resources53 Arguably, other
UN agencies—such as the UN Environment Programme, the
Food and Agriculture Organization, and the UN Development
Programme—have a more general mandate to engage in environmental protection and resource management, but the creation
of the environment and natural resources unit was in line with
UNMIL’s quasi-trusteeship functions during the transition period
from 2003 to 2005.54
UNMIL did carry out some aerial reconnaissance to monitor
mining, along with occasional, but rare, ground patrols.55 On
some occasions, UNMIL also deployed troops in resource-rich
areas—for example, to remove artisanal diamond miners operating illegally within an oil palm plantation;56 to close a large
artisanal diamond mining site that had been identified by an
expert panel but had not been shut down by the transitional government—allegedly, diamonds were being stockpiled at the site
while the owners waited for sanctions to be lifted;57 and to protect the interests of a U.S. diamond company and “restore calm
and order” after demonstrations at a Firestone rubber concession
in 2007.58 Some troop deployments have sparked controversy.
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In particular, Liberian mining interests and company employees have accused UNMIL of protecting the interests of foreign
companies over those of local populations.59 Such accusations
demonstrate that UN peacekeeping activities in resource sectors
can generate new conflicts, and should therefore be considered
from a political perspective instead of being narrowly conceived
as a law-and-order measure.

Democratic Republic of the Congo (“DRC”)
The UNSC has implemented an array of peacekeeping
tools to address conflict resources during the UN mission in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (“Mission de l’Organisation
des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo,” or
“MONUC”). Mineral resources have historically financed both
local and foreign-armed groups especially in the eastern part of
the country during the first civil war between 1996 to 1997, the
second war from 1998 to 2003, as well as during the aftermath of
the second war.60 Although the UN has used expert panel investigations and public reporting to address this issue, it did not
impose sanctions on conflict resources in the DRC until 2008.61

In December 2008, through Resolution 1856, the Security
Council gave MONUC a mandate to “coordinate operations with
the [Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(“FARDC”) to prevent] the provision of support to illegal armed
groups, including support derived from illicit economic activities.”62 Resolution 1856 also gave MONUC the authority to “use
its monitoring and inspection capacities to curtail the provision
of support to illegal armed groups derived from illicit trade in
natural resources.”63 In Resolution 1857, the UNSC extended
the list of individuals and companies subject to travel sanctions,
financial sanctions, or both, to “individuals or entities supporting
the illegal armed groups in the eastern part of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo through illicit trade of natural resources,”
sending a strong signal to companies involved in trading conflict
resources.64 Despite its broad authority, however, MONUC faced
challenges implementing Resolution 1856. These challenges
included the fact that MONUC troops’ lacked autonomous
authority to intervene without the FARDC, and accusations of
human rights abuses and resource trafficking by the FARDC.65

Table 1. Control of Conflict Resources by UN Peacekeeping Missions, 1988–200992
Mission
Afghanistan:
UNAMAh (2002–present)

General mandate and conflict
Outcomes
resources related measures
Assistance. Counternarcotics
Policy coordination and technical cooperation; no military component.
operations

Angola: UNAVEMa (1988–1997);
MONUAb (1997–1999)

Observation. Ban on
noncertified diamond exports

Cambodia: UNTACc (1992–
1993)

Transitional authority. Ban on
logging exports (sawn timber
exempt)

Côte d’Ivoire: MINUCIj (2003–
2004), UNOCIk (2004–present)

Assistance. Ban on all
diamond exports

Croatia: UNTAESd (1996–1998)

Transitional authority.
Border monitoring

Limited support for local police forces.

DRC: MONUCf (1999–2010),
MONUSCOg (2010-present)

Assistance. Curtailing
financing of illegal groups

Monitoring, border control at airports, some military assistance to Congolese
army to curtail armed groups’ access to natural resources.

Liberia: UNMILi (2003–present)

Assistance. Ban on timber and
all diamond exports

Limited assistance in key areas; UNMIL also maintains an
Environment and Natural Resources Unit, which assists UN expert panels.

Sierra Leone: UNAMSILe
(1999–2005)

Assistance. Ban on noncertified
diamond exports

Peacekeepers provided some assistance with monitoring and conflict resolution in the diamond sector.

The mission had very limited effectiveness, but the ban was effective—partly
because of military pressure on UNITA from the Angolan government, and
partly because the governments in Kinshasa and Brazzaville, which had provided conduits for UNITA’s diamond smuggling, were toppled; peacekeepers
provided some assistance to UN expert panels.
Limited effectiveness because the ban was not implemented for long enough,
and there was no UN enforcement of the ban in Khmer Rouge areas along the
Thai border; the UN mission provided some assistance as a transitional authority in the area of environmental and resource management.
Embargo-monitoring unit; no mandate to address key resource sectors (e.g.,
cocoa) from which rebels obtain financing.

Notes:
a. UN Angola Verification Missions; b. UN Observer Mission in Angola; c. UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia; d. UN Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium; e. UN Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone; f. UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo (Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo); g. UN Stabilization Mission in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en République Démocratique du Congo); h. UN Assistance
Mission in Afghanistan; i. UN Mission in Liberia ; j. UN Mission in Côte d’Ivoire ; k. UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire.
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Discussion
As an international military force deployed to “keep the
peace,” UN peacekeeping operations—and, more broadly,
non-UN peacekeeping forces, such as regional peacekeeping
forces—have a unique ability to help sever links between resources
and peace spoilers. Although peacekeepers could theoretically be
deployed to control diamond mining, logging, or drug trafficking
operations that finance armed groups, the governments that are
mandating peacekeeping operations—through the UNSC, for
example—are often reluctant to assign peacekeepers such roles.66
When deciding whether to deploy UN troops for combat
operations intended to curtail rebel access to resources a number
of considerations must be addressed, including the direct intervention’s legality, the intervention’s affect on relations between
the UN mission, the host government, and local populations, and
the peacekeeping missions capacity to intervene successfully. 67
Legally, local authorities have the right to prohibit unilateral UN troop deployment, unless the country is under a UN
trusteeship mandate whereby sovereign authority is vested in a
UN administrative body.68 Moreover, because many missions
are carried out under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, which
addresses pacific settlement of disputes, rather than Chapter
VII, which addresses forceful settlement of disputes, peacekeeping missions are prevented from engaging in any “offensive”
combat role, such as taking control of resource production
areas.69 Out of the half-dozen peacekeeping missions established since 1989 in response to commodity-financed conflicts,
only one—MONUC—has been specifically mandated to address
the financing of illegal groups by illicit economic activities.70
That lone example included military support to DRC government troops.71 In recent years, the UN Head of Mission and the
UN Mission Chief of Staff, as well as individual UN-mandated
military contingents have used their “room for maneuver”
to investigate, report on, or stop illegal resource trade and
management practices.72 Despite this trend, decision makers
within UN missions have generally been wary of overstepping
their mandate, overextending or diverting resources, alienating
economic or political stakeholders, or putting both peacekeepers
and civilians at risk by interfering with the economic interests of
criminals and armed groups.73
Sovereignty issues, including sovereignty over resources,
have also discouraged those governments sending and receiving
resources from assigning UN peacekeepers an active role in
preventing conflict resources from funding peace spoilers.74 The
economic interests of governments and companies may conflict
either because a company and a host government are competing
producers, or because a sending government also happens to be
the home government of investors.75 Therefore, if peacekeepers
are directly involved in conflict resources issue, there may be
allegations that the peacekeepers are serving the interests of
their home countries—specifically by protecting those countries’
access to resources.76 Although the U.S. invasion of Iraq was not
a “peacekeeping” mission, the non-UN mandated and U.S.-led
“coalition of the willing” was the subject of such allegations.77
On the other hand, shared economic interests could create an
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incentive for granting peacekeeping missions broader mandates
and thereby increasing their effectiveness.
Military capacity must also be considered when deciding
whether to deploy UN troops to protect resources from peace
spoilers. Most governments provide troops to UN missions on the
assumption that the risk of casualties is very low.78 In addition,
the military capacity of most UN contingents is usually limited,
especially for offensive combat operations.79 Many governments
that send troops to UN peacekeeping missions view resource
control not only as a high-risk option, but as a distraction from
or counterproductive to peacekeepers’ principal political and
humanitarian mandates.80 “Robust” peacekeeping—entailing
combat operations in mining or logging areas, for example—is
thus unlikely, in part because of the risk of casualties among
both civilians and UN troops.81 Nevertheless, in some cases, the
deployment of UN troops in resource areas has been viewed as a
necessity.82 Where such efforts have been undertaken, however,
they have occasionally met with determined resistance from
armed groups, and the resource-rich areas have often been the
last ones to come under UN control.83
At the mission level, operational staffs, both at headquarters and on the ground, recognize the importance of curtailing
peace spoilers’ access to high-value resources, but they are also
aware of the difficulties associated with intervention. Mission
staff often report on the role of resources in local skirmishes,
not only between armed groups, but also between rival government security agencies, private militias, and criminal gangs.84
This low-level violence rarely receives political attention,
but political affairs officers in UN missions have nevertheless
warned of the potential for escalation.85 They have also noted the
broader implications of resource revenues for relations within
and between armed groups.86 Such issues have also received
greater consideration because UN intelligence efforts have been
boosted by Joint Mission Analysis Cells, which are charged
with assessing the overall political and security situations of UN
missions and reporting to the Special Representatives of the UN
Secretary General that head the missions.87
After addressing these considerations, the UN intervention
would proceed if it will likely make a substantial contribution to
a speedier end to the conflict, without creating harmful consequences in the future, for example loss of livelihood or abuse by
rebel groups. When armed groups’ access to conflict resources
is curtailed, they sometimes turn on the local populations, either
to obtain funding or simply for revenge—events for which the
UN would bear some responsibility.88 Furthermore, analysis
reveals that rebel groups operating in resource-rich environments tend to commit worse abuses against civilians.89 This
behavior appears to be associated with a membership pool of
“consumers” rather than “investors”—that is, combatants who
are drawn to the rebellion by short-term, opportunistic economic
objectives rather than by long-term political objectives.90 In the
short term, UN military interventions in resource sectors may
risk exacerbating abuses by rebels against civilian populations.
But in the long term, such interventions may not only reduce the
funding and operating capacity of rebel groups, but may also
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help focus rebel movements on political objectives, and therefore on negotiations, rather than on survival and profiteering.91

Conclusion
Peacekeeping forces can play a role in curtailing peace
spoilers’ access to resource revenues. Yet, the evidence reviewed
for this paper suggests that peacekeeping missions have so
far gained limited direct experience in seeking to achieve this
goal. Such interventions must be carefully considered from
legal, humanitarian, political and economic standpoints before

being carried out, preceded by careful operational planning, and
conducted by adequately trained, equipped, and disciplined
international forces so that the risks of human rights abuses,
military failure and corruption are minimized. Additionally, any
collaboration between peacekeepers with local forces should be
come under stringent guidelines and monitoring. Short of engaging in interdiction, peacekeepers do have the potential to help
collect information on resource sectors, remove peace spoilers
from important resource extraction areas, and back up police
efforts to arrest illicit traders.
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The Real Cost of China’s Rare Earth Export
Quotas on American Job Security
by Katherine Weatherford*

T

he populist appeal for job creation currently dominating U.S. politics has spurred copious discussion about whether regulatory policy is responsible
for the present economic condition.1 Although this debate centers primarily on domestic regulations, recent congressional action2 confirms reports that China’s economic policies,
particularly its export restraints and currency manipulation,
have not only increased the already significant trade deficit
between the U.S. and China, but have cost approximately 2.8
million U.S. jobs.3 Of specific concern are China’s export
quotas on Rare Earth Minerals (“REMs”).
REMs are used in the production of virtually all technological
goods—from cell phones to wind turbines.4 Thus, it is no surprise
that the demand for REMs has increased exponentially over the last
decade.5 Even though the U.S. has sufficient REM reserves to satisfy
demand, importing REMs from China costs less than producing them
domestically.6 And because many other nations also rely on China’s
low–cost REMs, China has dominated the global REM market, and
currently produces 97% of the world’s supply.7 Consequently, when
China set export quotas on REMs, it resulted in uncertainty about
future availability accompanied by a drastic price increase.8
The implications of export quotas on rare earths, especially in
light of the current economic downturn, make it evident that the U.S.
must begin to consider feasible solutions to the REM access conflict.9 One option is to continue accepting REMs from China subject
to its export quotas. Yet, choosing this option will undoubtedly force
U.S. taxpayers to continue financing China’s REM stockpiles at the
expense of American jobs.10 This is because product manufacturers located in China can purchase REMs without the added costs
associated with export quotas. This incents foreign manufacturers,
including U.S.based companies, to relocate to China in pursuit of
these cheaper REMs, and ultimately, to take U.S. manufacturing
jobs overseas as well.11
A second option is for the United States to file a complaint
with the World Trade Organization (“WTO”), as it did in 2009 in
collaboration with the European Union and Mexico.12 This 2009
complaint asserted that China’s export quotas on raw minerals violated Article XI:1 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(“GATT”),13 and various provisions of China’s Accession Protocol
and China’s Working Party Report.14 China invoked GATT Article
XX exceptions, framing its export restraints as a means to “protect
the environment and [its] limited resources” and arguing that its
actions advance “the sustainable development of the global economy.”15 Nevertheless, the WTO panel rejected China’s defense,16
prompting China to file an appeal, which is currently pending.17
In both the 2009 complaint and the current conflict over REMs,
China disguises its economic motives by implying that export
18

quotas will result in reduced production, which will help protect
natural resources. But this is not the case if China merely supplements wouldbe exports with domestic production. If China actually
intended to protect its environment, it should have regulated its
mining operations rather than its exports.18 Regardless of China’s
intention, it seems futile for the United States to pursue a resolution
through the WTO process given the failure of the 2009 consultations to produce an effective outcome thus far.
A third option is for the U.S. to produce REMs domestically.19
While this is technically feasible, the U.S. closed its only remaining
rare earth mining operation in 2002 as a result of environmental
damage and intense global competition.20 Plans are in motion to
reopen the Molycorp, Inc. facility in Mountain Pass, California by
2012;21 however, building new facilities will require a large investment.22 Even with domestic production, the U.S. will still need to
send the REMs to China for alloying and manufacturing, at least
until the technology needed to safely and economically perform
these processes is developed.23 Although domestic production is
likely the most sustainable mechanism to stimulate longterm job
growth, the United States must take other steps in the interim to
respond to China’s REM export quotas.24
One intermediate step is to enact legislation modeled after
the Conflict Minerals provision in § 1502 of the Dodd–Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.25 That provision
instructs the Securities and Exchange Commission to promulgate a
rule requiring any producer who uses conflict minerals “to disclose
in . . . its annual report whether its conflict minerals originated in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo or an adjoining country.”26
Just as the § 1502 reporting requirement will help to prevent human
rights abuses in the Congo, a similar rule requiring disclosure of
REMs originating in China would assist in combating China’s protectionist policies and lax environmental regulations.27
Ultimately, the United States must begin evaluating legitimate
solutions to the REM access conflict. In doing so, the U.S. must
not act hastily, as an illconsidered solution will likely fail to focus
on longterm sustainable development. Most importantly, in choosing whether and how to pursue domestic REM production the U.S.
must be especially attentive not to neglect environmental protection
in favor of economic stability.28 Only by considering both domestic
action and international diplomacy can the United States resolve the
REM access conflict.
Endnotes: The Real Cost of China’s Rare Earth Export Quotas
on American Job Security on page 55
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High-value Natural Resources:
A Blessing or a Curse for Peace?
by Päivi Lujala and Siri Aas Rustad*
Introduction

than sixty percent of government revenues and over ninety percent
of all export revenues.5 See Figure 1. In Sierra Leone, following
igh-value natural resources have the potential to
a brutal civil war that ended in 2002, when diamonds accounted
promote and consolidate peace. Too often, however,
for ninety-six percent of all exports.6 And in Chad, Iraq, Libya,
they make the path to sustainable peace long and hazand Nigeria—all of which were affected by armed conflict during
ardous. Valuable resources can help to jump-start development,
the early years of the twenty-first century—oil and gas account for
secure sustainable growth, raise living standards, and increase
1
as much as seventy percent of gross domestic product and more
economic equality. They are also an important source of forthan eighty percent of government revenues.7 In Niger, uranium
eign currency for cash-strapped governments, can reduce depenand gold are important revenue sources,8 as are oil, cocoa, and
dence on international aid, and can support compensation and
coffee in Côte d’Ivoire,9 and diamonds and timber in the Central
post-conflict relief for war-affected populations.2 But the promAfrican Republic.10 In Burma, gas exports made up one-quarter
ise of a brighter and more peaceful future is often spoiled by
of all exports, while forest products and gemstones were other
deep-rooted corruption and patronage, which confer benefits on
important exports between 2008 and 2010.11
small groups rather than on the population as a whole, and by
When peace comes, the revenues from high-value natural
shortsighted management of the resources and the revenues they
3
resources—when
managed well—can help finance reconstrucgenerate. In addition, the mere presence of high-value resources
tion
and
other
vital
peace-related needs.13 When mismanaged,
can jeopardize peace if the resources become the focus of viohowever, resource revenues can undermine both economic perlent disputes or provide financing for groups that seek to ignite
formance and the quality of governance, and thereby increase
(or resume) armed conflict.
the risk of renewed violence.14
Figure 1. The Economic Role of the Extractive Sector in Selected
Recent high-prof ile reports
Post-Conflict and Conflict-Affected Countries12
by the U.N. Secretary-General, the
World Bank, the U.N. Environment
Programme, and the United Nations
have highlighted the need to more
effectively harness high-value natural
resources for development and peacebuilding.15 If managed effectively,
high-value natural resources constitute
substantial assets that national and
international actors can use to support core peace building objectives,
including macroeconomic recovery,
generation and support of livelihood,
the reform of governance and political
processes, and security improvement.16
The fact that so many resourcerich countries are unable to achieve
long-term peace, however, raises some
difficult questions about how highvalue resources should be managed
in post-conflict settings. For example,

H

In many post-conflict countries, revenues from high-value
natural resources— such as oil, natural gas, minerals, gemstones,
and timber—are an integral (and even dominant) part of the
national economy and state budget.4 In post-conflict Algeria,
Angola, and Sudan, for example, oil and gas account for more
Fall 2011
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how can the environmental effects of resource extraction be
minimized? How can illegal extraction be curtailed without
damaging livelihoods? How can one ensure that revenues are
used to advance long-term development objectives? The goal
of our analysis here is to provide insight into these and similar
questions — for the benefit of national and local governments,
national and transnational civil society organizations, extractive
industries, and the international community. To this end, policy
makers, field researchers, practitioners, and scholars—all of
whom have close knowledge of the issues at hand—have been
asked to share their views on the challenges associated with
the management of high-value resources in post-conflict and
conflict-affected countries.

From Potential Prosperity to Conflict:
What Goes Wrong?

supporters.26 For example, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, or
“FARC”) has for decades relied on kidnapping and the production and selling drugs to finance its insurgency.27 As efforts to
curtail FARC’s access to income from these activities have met
with some success, FARC has turned to gold mining to support
its violent campaign against the government.28
Grievances can motivate armed conflict, particularly when
the parties to a resource related dispute are divided along
ethnic, religious, or other lines.29 Among the events that may
spark violent uprisings are land appropriation, environmental
degradation, population displacement, large inflows of migrants,
and frustration over unfulfilled economic expectations.30 Examples of grievance-based conflicts include Aceh, in Indonesia;
Bougainville, in Papua New Guinea; Kurdistan, in Iraq; northern
Niger; and southern Sudan.31 Grievances do not necessarily arise
in the context of potential regional autonomy, as was the case in
Aceh and South Sudan.32 They may also occur in response to the
abuse of power by local elites, as was the case in Sierra Leone.33

High-value natural resources have been associated with
dozens of armed conflicts, millions of deaths, and the collapse
of several peace processes; case study and statistical evidence
confirms that such resources play a role in sparking and fueling armed civil conflict.17 According to
data gathered by Siri Aas Rustad and Helga
Figure 2. Armed Civil Conflicts Involving High-value Natural Resources, 1970
Malmin Binningsbø, between 1970 and
–200834
2008 the portion of armed civil conflicts
that were in some way related to high-value
natural resources ranged from twenty-nine
to fifty-seven percent.18 See Figure 2.
Why is peace so difficult to achieve
and sustain in the presence of these
resources?19 High-value natural resources
increase the risk of conflict in a number of
ways. The risk of conflict can be directly
increased when access to revenues motivates or finances belligerent movements, or
when grievances are created (1) by unmet
expectations or inequalities in the distribution of revenues, jobs, and other benefits, or
(2) by the negative side effects of resource
exploitation.20 The risk of conflict can be
indirectly increased when resource sectors
undermine a nation’s economic performance and the quality of its institutions.21
Thus, the three main avenues that lead
from natural resources to armed conflict
are resource capture, resource related grievances, and adverse
With respect to economic growth and developmental outeffects on the economy and institutions.22
comes, many resource-rich countries perform poorly in compariPaul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, and Päivi Lujala suggest that
son to their less resource-rich counterparts.35 This phenomenon,
the capture of resources for personal or regional enrichment is a
often referred to as the resource curse or the paradox of plenty,36
possible motivation for rebel uprisings and violent secessionist
is exemplified in countries such as Algeria, the Democratic
movements.23 Although resource capture can be one of the goals
Republic of the Congo, Iraq, and Nigeria.37 The resource curse
of armed rebellion, it is rarely, if ever, the sole motivation.24
has a number of potential causes, including the following:
Even in Sierra Leone, where the Revolutionary United Front has
• A government that is able to finance its budget through natbeen represented as the classic example of a predatory, greedural resource revenues rather than public taxation can easily
driven movement, the reality is far more complex.25 More often,
become detached from, and therefore less accountable to,
resource capture is a means of financing warfare and attracting
the populace.38
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• Resource revenues often fuel patronage, corruption, and
rent seeking, all of which may promote the interests of a
small and predatory elite.39 In Nigeria, for example, it is
estimated that one percent of the population enjoys eighty
percent of the oil revenues.40
• When the group in power focuses on short-term gains
(sometimes in an effort to meet popular demands), the
results may include overspending, poor investment decisions, and ill-conceived economic policies.41
• In countries whose economies depend on a few valuable
resources, the weakness of political and economic institutions may be compounded by exposure to price shocks,
which occur when rapid shifts in raw material prices lead to
abrupt fluctuations in resource revenues.42
Political and economic underperformance is endemic in
many resource-rich countries—which, according to empirical
studies, renders them vulnerable
to conflict.43 Several studies have
documented that armed civil
conflict is more likely to occur in
poor countries than in rich ones.44
Research also shows that dysfunctional institutions and low state
capacity are positively correlated
with an increased likelihood of
conflict.45
Supporting the case study
evidence, several statistical studies
document strong and significant relationships between particular natural resources and
conflict, but few have been able to
disentangle the possible mechanisms behind the relationships.46
James Fearon and David Laitin,
for example, have found that oil
increases the likelihood of conflict—a finding that has been
confirmed by the work of Indra de Soysa and Eric Neumayer,
Macartan Humphreys, and Päivi Lujala.47 Lujala has also found
that when oil and gas are located in the conflict area, conflicts
tend to be longer and more severe.48 Taken together, Lujala shows
that (1) oil-producing countries are 1.5 to 2 times more likely to
experience armed civil conflict than nonproducers, and that (2)
when internal conflict occurs in a region that has oil reserves,
it lasts twice as long as conflicts that occur in areas without oil
reserves, and combatant deaths are twice as high.49 Collier and
Hoeffler’s 2006 study of conflict types links oil to higher risk of
secessionist conflict, and Lujala shows that secessionist conflicts
in regions with oil reserves tend to be more severe than any other
conflicts.50
Diamonds and other gemstones have also been subject
to statistical studies.51 Fearon and Lujala have shown that gemstones have effects similar to those of oil—namely, conflict is
more likely and tends to last longer.52 The role of timber, opium,
and other high-value crops is less clear.53 There is some evidence

that opium cultivation makes conflicts last longer, but little
systematic evidence links timber production to civil war.54

Resources for Conflict
Because natural resources have varying characteristics, they
are not equally relevant to conflict—and those that are relevant
may be so for different reasons.55 High-value resources, for
example, may be either renewable or nonrenewable, although
most— such as oil, gas, rutile, coltan, cobalt, diamonds, and
gold—are nonrenewable, and tend to be located in geographically limited areas.56 What all high-value resources have in common, however, is the potential to yield substantial revenue.57
Some high-value resources are limited to confined areas
and depend on sophisticated and expensive extraction methods
or require special types of transportation (e.g., pipelines).58
Because such resources are difficult to loot and are generally
securely controlled by the government during periods of both peace
and war, they provide fewer opportunities for conflict financing.59
Thus, the revenues from resources
such as oil, natural gas, kimberlite
diamonds, copper, and rutile are
likely to accrue to the central government and those who control it.60
Such resources may nevertheless
play a role in conflict: rebel movements may seek to oust the government to gain control of them, and
if the resources are located in more
remote areas, they may play a role
in secessionist uprisings.61 Rebels
may also loot existing stockpiles
of commodities or may attempt to
bring extraction or transportation
to a halt, in order to cut off the
central government from its revenue source.62 Finally, the large
revenues derived from high-value resources may increase the
risk of conflict through adverse effects on political and economic
institutions.63
Some high-value resources are linked to conflict because
of their financing potential.64 However deep grievances may be,
rebellion is unlikely to begin or to be sustained without financing opportunities.65 Since the end of the Cold War, financing
from the superpowers has declined and revenues from valuable
natural resources have gained importance as a source of conflict
financing.66 The resources most suitable for wartime looting
have extremely high value-to-weight ratio and can be easily
extracted, concealed, smuggled, and sold.67 Easy extraction is a
particular advantage: a resource that can be extracted by individuals or small groups using simple tools (that is, through artisanal mining techniques) can be readily exploited by rebels who
either undertake the mining themselves or use forced labor.68
Among the commodities with high price-to-weight ratios that
can be artisanally mined are alluvial gold, alluvial diamonds, and

…when internal conflict
occurs in a region that
has oil reserves, it lasts
twice as long as conflicts
that occur in areas
without oil reserves,
and combatant deaths
are twice as high.
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gemstones such as rubies and sapphires.69 Rebels do not need to
rely on extraction directly; they also engage in illegal taxation
of trade and export routes.70 In some cases, including Colombia
and Nigeria, rebels have succeeded in obtaining ransoms from
extractive firms by threatening to blow up oil pipelines or by
kidnapping personnel working on installations.71
When it comes to conflict financing, many natural resources
have another advantage: they are generic, which means that their
origins cannot be traced as easily as those of manufactured products.72 Because generic illegal commodities can be readily integrated into legal trade channels, they are a particularly lucrative
form of contraband, with trade prices that differ only marginally
from those of their legal counterparts.73 Another advantage of
some high-value resources is their scarcity.74 Some occur in only
a small number of countries and have few substitutes, and are,
therefore, of strategic importance.75 Demand for such resources
may sometimes override other considerations, such as the legality of the exploitation, the behavior of the government that has
granted exploitation rights, and the role of the commodities in
financing warfare.76
Of course, resources other than high-value minerals may
play a role in conflict or have adverse effects on economic
and political institutions.77 Most notable are coca and opium,
which have been linked to conflicts in Latin America and Asia,
respectively, and timber, which has been connected to a number
of conflicts in Africa and Southeast Asia.78 Fisheries have also
been used to finance conflict; in Somalia, for example, some
warring groups have sold false fishing licenses for offshore tuna
reserves.79

The difficulty of sustaining peace when high-value natural
resources are involved has two key implications: (1) the conflicts
involving such resources are generally harder to resolve; and (2)
thus far, the measures that have been used to manage natural
resources and their associated revenues are generally unsatisfactory.84 Thus, improved management of high-value natural
resources and the associated revenues is fundamental to peace
building.
This article is an edited version of the first chapter
of a volume entitled High-Value Natural Resources and
Post-Conflict Peacebuilding, which addresses a full range
of challenges associated with high-value resources in postconflict settings. This volume reflects the perspectives of
forty-one contributors and considers the experiences of
eighteen countries with analyses of additional countries.
The volume’s chapters are grouped into five sections
that examine specific challenges and opportunities within
each stage of the resource chain:
1. The ways in which host governments, extractive industries, and the international community can strengthen
the management of extraction to promote peace.
2. The instruments used to track commodities and
revenues.
3. The pros and cons of various options for revenue
distribution, including whether producing regions
should receive preferential treatment in revenue distribution, as well as measures for stemming corruption.
4. The role of revenue allocation and institution building,
including several in-depth case studies on various
approaches.
5. The importance of taking local livelihoods and economies into account in the design and implementation of
approaches to managing high-value natural resources.

Conclusion
When conflict ends, many of the original causes often
remain unresolved—whether they relate to resources or not—
and may even have been aggravated by the grievances and economic and political havoc associated with the conflict itself.80
Post-conflict countries thus face daunting challenges when it
comes to building peace, reducing poverty, and managing natural
resources—particularly when poor resource management may
be undermining both peacebuilding and poverty reduction.81
It is clear that many resource-rich post-conflict countries are
unable to sustain peace.82 This observation has been confirmed
by empirical studies: for example, Rustad and Binningsbø’s
analysis of 285 episodes of armed civil conflict shows that when
natural resources play a role, the period of post-conflict peace is
forty percent shorter than when they do not.83

Taken together, the chapters in the volume offer a consistent
message: proper management of high-value natural resources
is crucial in the aftermath of armed conflict. Effective management of these key assets can support a range of peacebuilding
objectives—from livelihood and macroeconomic recovery,
to good governance and inclusive political processes, to
improved security. The volume also demonstrates that there is
no single, universally applicable approach to natural resource
management in post-conflict settings.

Endnotes: High-value Natural Resources: A Blessing or a Curse for Peace?
1
See generally Shahid Yusuf, World Bank, Economics through the Critical
Look at Thirty Years of the World Development Report (2008) (discussing the
successes and failures of the World Bank and global development).
2
See generally U.N. Env’t Programme, From Conflict to Peacebuilding: The
Role of Natural Resources and the Environment, (Feb. 2009), http://www.unep.
org/pdf/pcdmb_policy_01.pdf.

3

See Philippe Le Billon, The Political Ecology of War: Natural Resources
and Armed Conflict, 20 Pol. Geography 561, 566-67, 578 (2001) (asserting that
although many patronage systems are corrupt, the phenomenon of patronage is
distinct from that of corruption).
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Weak Planning Process Frustrates Protection
of Puerto Rico’s Threatened Coastline
by Mark Borak*

F

or over a decade, conservationists in Puerto Rico have
waged a constant battle to gain legal protection for one of
the island’s most ecologically sensitive natural resources.1
Thanks in part to its location on a picturesque stretch of coastline
near its capital, San Juan, a swath of undeveloped land known
as the Northeast Ecological Corridor (“NEC”) has come under
constant threat of large scale development.2 Aside from its stunning view of verdant hills descending from El Yunque National
Forest to the pristine shoreline, the corridor harbors a seven
mile long sandy beach, a bioluminescent lagoon, mangrove forest, and habitats for over fifty rare, threatened, endangered and
endemic species—including the leatherback sea turtle.3 The critically endangered leatherback returns each year to nest on the
beach, which is one of only three significant nesting sites left in
the United States.4 Leatherbacks are especially vulnerable to the
effects of development activity such as beach renourishment and
artificial lighting.5 In response to a petition from the Sierra Club
in August 2011, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service expressed
its intent to review and revise the designated critical habitat for
the leatherback, and possibly add the NEC as a critical habitat.6
This review process, however, will likely take several years, and
would only afford protection from Federal actions, leaving the
NEC vulnerable to private development.7
During the administration of former Governor Aníbal Acevedo Vilá, concerned residents, fisherman, and environmental
activists formed the Coalition for the Northeast Ecological Corridor (“Coalition”), which successfully swayed the former Governor to designate the area as a nature reserve.8 Acevedo Vilá’s
order prohibited the planned development of large-scale Marriott and Four Seasons golf resorts in favor of less invasive uses
centered on eco-tourism.9 However, once Vilá’s term expired in
2009, his successor Governor Luis Fortuño abruptly rescinded
the nature reserve designation and pushed through a new plan
that allows large scale residential, commercial and tourist
development.10 After a decade-long citizens campaign finally
secured protection for the corridor, there was no effective check
to prevent the new administration from reversing the order and
further hampering conservation by changing the planning and
permitting process in order to encourage more development.11
Among the first actions that Fortuño took upon entering
office was to create a new agency to handle construction permits, which promises to process most permits within ninety days
of receipt regardless of their complexity.12 With the stewardship
of several officials who had direct ties with local developers, the
new development plan for the corridor was shuttled through the
planning process with minimal opportunity for review or public
comment.13 This new plan, dubbed the Great Northeast Reserve,
Fall 2011

cobbles together tracts of existing parkland and retains some of
the originally protected areas, but omits over 430 acres that were
protected under the previous designation and permits extensive
development in the heart of the corridor.14
While representatives from the Coalition contend that the
new plan falls far short of conservation and are backing a Puerto
Rico Senate bill to reverse it, the deeper issue is the manner in
which it was approved.15 After limited opportunity for public
review, the plan gained rapid approval by the Puerto Rico Planning Board (whose Chair and four other members were appointed
by Fortuño) and the Department of Natural and Environmental
Resources (whose Secretary consulted for a private development
project that was included in the new plan).16 The Tourism Company (whose Director of Planning and Development prepared
the Environmental Impact Statement for one of the developers)
and the Department of Economic Development and Commerce
(whose principal officer in charge of strategic project development served as construction manager for one of the proposed
resorts) both assented to the plan after limited review.17
These direct conflicts of interest demonstrate how Puerto
Rico’s land use process has succumbed to regulatory capture, a
condition in which industries most affected by regulation exert
a disproportionately large amount of influence over the regulatory bodies meant to keep them in check.18 Aside from the harm
this bias toward rapid development does to responsible land use
planning, the situation can also have a detrimental effect on the
economic growth of the island, and even on real estate developers themselves.19 Agency officials’ current favoritism toward
developers is largely a result of the pro-development Governor’s
ability to place sympathetic officials in key agencies. Likewise,
the future election of a populist, anti-development Governor
could result in a sharp reversal of fortunes and a chilling effect
on development. Additionally, the Fortuño administration seems
to have overlooked the fact that the NEC in its natural state is
both an ecological haven and a tourist attraction that cannot be
replicated elsewhere, which makes it an integral asset to the
long-term viability of Puerto Rico’s tourism industry. In the long
run, political instability and unpredictable development policies
satisfy neither the environmentalist nor the real estate developer.
Such has largely been the experience of Puerto Rico’s land
use planning process–repeated attempts at solidifying a predictable land use scheme have been frustrated by countless exceptions and orders circumventing the process.20 Furthermore,
continued on page 51
* Mark Borak is a J.D. candidate, May 2013, at American University Washington
College of Law.
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Liquid Challenges:
Contested Water in Central Asia
by Christine Bichsel*

W

Introduction

ith the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991,
the two large river systems of the Syr Darya and the
Amu Darya were no longer situated within one state,
but instead transected the borders of five newly independent
states: Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan,
and Turkmenistan.1 In the discourse of hydro politics, this was
perceived as a geographical misfit between water and state
boundaries, raising the potential for “water
wars.”2 Water is a scarce resource that may be
contended for by states and identity groups
because it is essential for physical survival
and basic for most human activities.3 Indeed,
water plays a crucial role in all five states of
post-Soviet Central Asia.4 The existing arid
climate in the region limits the possibility
for rain-fed agriculture and necessitates the
supply of additional water.5
Irrigation zones have been mainly
developed along the two major rivers, the
Syr Darya and the Amu Darya, which drain
into the Aral Sea.6 One of the most hospitable areas to irrigated agriculture in Central
Asia is the Ferghana Valley, an almondshaped intramontane basin surrounded by
extensive mountain ranges.7 United as part
of the Soviet Union until 1991, the Ferghana
Valley is presently divided among the three
successor states Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan.8 It accounts for forty-five percent
of the total irrigated area within the Syr
Darya basin.9 However, water in Central Asia is not only used
for irrigated agriculture, but also for energy production.10
This article discusses conflicting claims to water in the Syr
Darya basin with a specific focus on the Ferghana Valley. It traces
the emergence of these claims back to Soviet water management
and irrigation and explores the contentious nature of water both
at the regional as well as sub-state level. It equally assesses
international efforts to mitigate the potential for violence and
degradation of the environment. This article also makes recommendations in three fields. First, it stresses the continued need
to address water conflicts and related issues in Central Asia
not solely in the technical, but also the social, economic, and
political contexts. Secondly, it emphasizes the links between the
work of border commissions and water conflicts, particularly
those in the Ferghana Valley. Thirdly, it proposes a rethinking
24

of blueprint approaches to water management in Central Asia,
and to allow for more space for alternative conceptualizations.
The article concludes with the opinion that conflicts over water
in Central Asia may be driven more by particular interests of
specific domestic actors in each country than by non-cooperative
inter-state relations.

Map 1: The Aral Sea Basin, courtesy of International Water
Management Institute

The Syr Darya Basin and The Ferghana Valley
The irrigation network in Soviet Central Asia received
particularly large financial and technological investments after
World War II.11 This entailed not only extending and widening
the major canals, but also expanding the irrigated area upwards
and outwards from the plains to the foothills.12 Built in the
1970s on the territory of Kyrgyzstan, the Toktogul reservoir
was designed to support this expansion and provide seasonal
and multi-year water storage in order to increase the availability
*Christine Bichsel is a senior researcher of the Department of Geosciences
at the University of Fribourg, Switzerland. This article has been adapted from
Christine Bichsel (Switzerland), with Kholnazar Mukhabbatov (Tajikistan) and
Lenzi Sherfedinov (Uzbekistan), “Land, Water, and Ecology,” in Ferghana Valley:
The Heart of Central Asia, ed. S. Frederick Starr (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe,
2011): 253-277. Used by permission of M.E. Sharpe, Inc.
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of water for irrigation in the Uzbek and Kazakh republics, as
well as to regulate the distribution of water downstream in the
Syr Darya River basin.13 As was common with reservoirs in the
USSR, a hydroelectric plant was constructed at the same time,
enabling the Toktogul reservoir to generate hydropower in conjunction with its water management function.14
The Soviet Union, like the Russian Empire before it, encouraged cotton production in Central Asia to satisfy the demand
of the domestic textile industry.15 The Soviet Union therefore
fervently pressed this water-intensive crop on the agriculturally
and ecologically suitable lowlands of the Uzbek and Tajik republics, as well as further downstream in the Kazakh republic.16
There, the Soviet Union developed irrigation and drainage projects primarily to increase cotton production in these lowland
republics, which facilitated the rise in cotton production from 4.3
million tons in 1960 to approximately 10 to 11 tons in 1990.17
With cotton being a strategic priority, Soviet leaders designated
the lion’s share of the Syr Darya river’s flow to cotton production
in the lowlands.18 Conversely, Soviet planners resolved that the
strategic priority in the Kyrgyz republic was animal husbandry
with a focus on meat and milk products, as well as growing rainfed fodder.19 The energy needs of the Kyrgyz Republic were met
by importing electricity and/or natural gas, coal, and oil for its
thermal power plants from the downstream Central Asian and other
Soviet republics.20 Thanks to these arrangements, the Toktogul
reservoir, as part of a highly integrated network, became the key ele
ment in large scale cotton growing in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. 21
With the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, the formerly integrated scheme of economic management collapsed.22
Each of the five newly-independent Central Asian states was left
to restructure the previously centralized water management system.23 The Soviet Union left behind a highly integrated network
of large irrigation canals and reservoirs, which was parceled out
among its successor states.24 This sudden transition meant that
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan were now
individually responsible for managing the Syr Darya’s water.25
Moreover, these countries had to face the environmental consequences of Soviet irrigation practices.26 During the 1970s it
became apparent that the massive Soviet investments had not
increased the efficiency of water use in Central Asia.27 Rather,
infrastructure problems actually led to huge water losses and
inappropriate irrigation practices caused excessive application
of water to the fields.28 These problems culminated in the wellpublicized disaster of the Aral Sea, which suffered decrease
in water levels, substantial pollution, and increased salinity as
a result of heavy water diversion for irrigation and poor water
management policies.29 Finally, although ample funds had been
devoted to the construction of an irrigation infrastructure, little
was spent on maintaining it.30 Thus, by the early 1990s when
these countries became independent large parts of the irrigation
networks in Central Asia were already in need of repair.31
Accordingly, independence necessitated the subsequent
establishment of new water management organizations, at both
a domestic and inter-state level.32 Each country established its
own ministries and departments to supervise water resources.33
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These new, individualized ministries retained many of the Soviet
organizational structures, yet faced drastically reduced funding.34 The resulting water management organizations suffered
from declining salary pools, shrunken operating budgets, and
little money for equipment.35 These difficulties, along with concerns over the efficiency of water usage, prompted the new states
to introduce cost recovery measures, and shift the ownership of
tertiary irrigation infrastructures to local water users as a way to
increase their rights and responsibilities.36
The end of the centralized Soviet system of water management also necessitated new agreements among the new Central
Asian states to regulate the Syr Darya and Amu Darya Rivers.37 The Almaty Agreement of 1992 established the Interstate
Commission for Water Coordination (“ICWC”) as the highest
decision-making body for all matters pertaining to the regulation, efficient use, and protection of interstate watercourses
and bodies of water in Central Asia.38 The ICWC consists of
leading water officials from each of the five countries, who
met several times annually to set allocations and quotas as
well as resolve disputes.39 From this commission a number of
additional agreements emerged, some of them pertaining to all
Central Asia and others to specific rivers.40 On the Syr Darya
River, annual agreements were reached in 1995 and subsequent
years among riparian states concerning the allocation of water
and energy.41 In 1998, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan
concluded a watercourse-specific agreement on the use of the
water and energy resources of the Syr Darya River, thus folding
earlier annual agreements into the new Syr Darya Framework
Agreement.42 Tajikistan joined this agreement in 1999.43 Thus,
while the countries retained national control over crops, industrial goods, and electric power generated by their use, they also
worked with one another to manage available water resources. 44

Contested Links Between Water,
Energy and Political Independence
Neither the processes of domestic reform nor inter-state
negotiations have been smooth or predictable as disputes over
how to distribute shared water resources have arisen. The first
major conflict regarding the seasonal distribution of water across
the Ferghana Valley involves the operation of the Toktogul reservoir and hydroelectric plant.45 The disintegration of the Soviet
Union placed great stress on the existing system of inter-republican compensation for water and energy.46 The newly independent downstream countries experienced difficulties consistently
providing cheap gas for Kyrganstan, and ultimately raised
prices.47 Unable to purchase enough gas to generate its thermal
power plants, Kyrgyzstan experienced chronic electrical outages
during the winter, and in the early 1990s began to release more
water from the Toktogul reservoir during that season to drive its
hydroelectric generators.48 But by providing for its own heating
and lighting needs in winter, Kyrgyzstan reduces the quantity
of water available to downstream Uzbekistan for irrigating its
sector of the Ferghana Valley in the spring and summer.49 And
since a limited quantity of water can be retained in facilities such
as the Kairakkum reservoir, Kyrgyzstan’s release of water in the
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wintertime have repeatedly flooded these downstream areas.50
Uzbekistan often complains about the damage caused by winter
flooding, demanding that water should be released mainly in
summer so as to prevent flooding and sustain irrigated crops.51
A second dispute concerns the economic value of water
provided across national borders. Since its independence, Kyrgyzstan has been neither willing nor able to assume the total
financial burden of operating and maintaining the Toktogul dam
and hydroelectric station nor willing to take actions to regulate
the flow of water into the Naryn River and, accordingly, the flow
into the Syr Darya.52 Kyrgyzstan therefore seeks compensation
from the downstream countries.53 The annual cost to Kyrgyzstan
of maintaining the Toktogul reservoir and its related infrastructure amounts to an estimated $15 to $27 million.54 Until 2002,
however, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan did not contribute to the
cost of maintaining and operating this facility.55 Rising gas
prices and the shift to a more market-oriented economy have
prompted Kyrgyzstan’s lawmakers to re-evaluate the value of
water as a resource.56 They argue that the Syr Darya waters flowing from Kyrgyzstan bring considerable economic benefit to the
downstream countries via irrigated agriculture.57 Therefore, they
seek to place a specific value or price on water and to charge
its users for what they receive from Kyrgyzstan.58 Uzbekistan
has, to date, been critical of this idea, questioning whether any
country can actually own water and whether the water supply
should be treated as an economic commodity.59 Moreover, it
asserts that because Kyrgyzstan provides no “value added” to the
water flowing from its territory, it is hardly justified in asking for
financial compensation.60
A third point of contention concerns the apportionment of
water from the Syr Darya River and the quantity to which the
respective riparian countries are entitled. Kyrgyzstan contests
the old Soviet inter-republican quotas, which designated the
lion’s share of the Syr Darya’s water to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.61 With the 1992 Almaty Agreement on Water Resources,
the new states confirmed that they would continue to observe
the existing quotas for the time being, but did not detail the possibility of later changes.62 The Agreement assigned 51.7 percent
of the river flow to Uzbekistan, 38.1 percent to Kazakhstan, 9.2
percent to Tajikistan and only 1 percent to Kyrgyzstan.63 The
Kyrgyz claim is that this arrangement effectively barred them
from developing irrigated agriculture during the Soviet period
and denied them the economic benefit that would have come
from development.64 Kyrgyzstan, therefore, now seeks to correct
what it sees as a historical injustice by claiming enough water to
develop self-sustaining and market-based irrigated agriculture.65
However, this runs in direct conflict with plans by Uzbekistan,
Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, all of which seek to expand and modernize their own irrigated agriculture.66
At present, the outlined disagreements have resulted in
plans to build new dams and to deal with the accompanying or
resulting controversies. Among many smaller dam building projects in Central Asia, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are each attempting to resume the construction of large reservoirs designed in
the 1960s and 1970s and partly constructed in the 1980s.67 In
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Kyrgyzstan, the two Kambar-Ata dam structures are planned
upstream of the Toktogul reservoir on the Naryn River.68 These
dams would allow electricity production during winter, while
saving water in the Toktogul reservoir for downstream irrigation purposes in the summer.69 Moreover, since the necessary
grid is already in place, the hydropower complex could generate
surplus electricity for exportation.70 However, there are doubts
about the financial viability and environmental impacts of the
project, one being that climate change-induced glacial melt and
projected reduced water flow could render the structure obsolete
within a generation.71 Kambar-Ata I and II are estimated to cost
around $3 billion, a significant investment which Kyrgyzstan is
unlikely to assume.72 So far, possible investors, including Russia, have been hesitant to invest.73 Questions of political stability
aside, this may also be due to Uzbekistan’s firm opposition to the
project, objecting, among other issues, to the increased control
Kyrgyzstan would acquire over the Syr Darya River flow.74
The Rogun dam in Tajikistan is a similar project with comparable goals to regulate water usage and release of the Amu
Darya River.75 Its original purpose was to guarantee sufficient
water supply during water-scarce years for users in the Amu
Darya basin, an area that suffers from a greater lack of regulation than the Syr Darya River.76 The Soviets never completed
the project due to the USSR’s collapse that delayed construction in 1992 but if completed, the large hydropower plant and
enormous water reservoir to be situated on the Vaksh River, a
tributary of the Amu Darya River, will provide yearly water runoff regulation of the Amu Darya.77 This goal is aided by the fact
that the Rogun River is not followed by a downstream reservoir,
which would likely affect the flow of the Amu Darya directly.78
However, the Rogun Dam has significant hurdles to overcome
before it can become a reality as the huge financial investment
needed to resume and complete the construction has not yet been
secured.79 Once operational, Rogun is expected to cover as much
as eighty percent of Tajikistan’s average energy consumption
and even offers opportunities for exporting electricity.80 However, Uzbekistan has raised opposition toward the dam, listing
concerns about reduced downstream water availability and dam
safety.81 Downstream countries are particularly worried about
water availability during the one to two decades in which the reservoir would need to be filled.82 Moreover, downstream nations
and communities stress the future risks of the dam, as Rogun is
situated in a seismically active area near a geological fault line.83
A potentially sudden outflow of such a large scale could have
disastrous consequences for downstream riparian zones.84

Inter-Group Conflicts Over Water and Land
Thus far, the focus of disputes over water and energy has
been among the successor states following the disintegration of
the Soviet Union. However, no less serious tensions over water
can arise within states.85 With regard to conflicts over water, Eric
Sievers, a Harvard University Russian and Eurasian scholar,
writes that, “As the Syr Darya basin contains the Ferghana Valley,
which is the most sensitive part of modern Central Asia in terms
of ethnic violence, it presents a special case of conflict.”86 He
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suggests that water scarcity and strained inter-ethnic relations
could lead to violent conflict.87 Indeed, many water users have
faced declining access to water and greater uncertainties over its
delivery after independence.88 The changing seasonal patterns
of water distribution and the effects of the inefficient and dilapidated infrastructure have negatively affected the situation. 89
Moreover, as the population continues to grow, there will be a
further increase of pressure on water, land, and other natural
resources.90 Finally, as Sievers suggests, parts of the Ferghana
Valley experienced a rapid social and economic decline following independence, which, if accelerated, could spur violence
among a population overwhelmingly dependent on irrigated
agriculture.91
Conflicts over water distribution are a frequent occurrence
in the irrigated sections of the Ferghana Valley.92 On the southern
side of the valley, tensions tend to emerge in springtime when the
beginning of the agricultural season brings a high water demand
but the flow of the glacier-fed rivers has not yet filled irrigation
canals to meet that demand.93 Since most of the Ferghana Valley irrigation systems are gravity-operated, nearly all conflicts
occur between upstream and downstream users.94 A more erratic
post-independence water supply has accentuated differences in
access to water between upstream and downstream users and has
increased competition for water during the springtime.95 As a
result, conflict parties form along territorial or residential affiliation rather than ethnic or kinship lines, although these categories
frequently overlap.96
Water sources are contested particularly when rivers or
canals transect the new international borders and are thus subject
to inter-state agreements.97 In the southern part of the Ferghana
Valley this has entailed revising the allocation of water from
several rivers and springs.98 For example, during the Soviet
period sixty-nine percent of the Shakhimardan Sai River’s flow
was allocated to the Uzbek Socialist Soviet Republic SSR, as
compared with twenty-one percent for the Kyrgyz SSR (plus ten
percent “water losses”).99 After the disintegration of the Soviet
Union, Kyrgyzstan claimed, and sometimes simply appropriated,
more water for itself.100 Finally, in 2001 the Departments of
Water Resources in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan agreed that the
water of the river should be divided equally between them.101
Similar claims have been made on other rivers and sources,
with several of them ending in allocation agreements.102 These
changed allocations that benefit upstream users have left downstream users discontent over their reduced water supply.103 It is
tempting to attribute these conflicts to the inevitable disputes
arising out of new inter-state borders, however, it is at least as
valid to suggest that they should be understood as the fallout from
long-term economic shifts that are occurring in the region, the
character and final dimensions of which are not yet fully evident.
As a general rule, Uzbek and Tajik groups in the Ferghana
plains have a much longer history of agricultural production
and sedentary lifestyles than the Kyrgyz, most of whom practiced animal husbandry and pursued a nomadic or transhumant
existence in the foothills and premontane zones.104 However,
without clear-cut boundaries between them, there were constant
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interactions between these modes of production and lifestyle. 105
But with the 1924 Soviet national-territorial delimitation, these
socio-economic distinctions became territorialized. 106 They
served as a basis for establishing the political-administrative
divisions of the Ferghana Valley in the Uzbek, Tajik, and Kyrgyz
SSRs.107 The borderlines of the Ferghana Valley represented
not only the territory of newly established Soviet nationalities,
but to some extent follow the territorial distinction between
different socio-economic practices such as irrigated agriculture
and animal husbandry.108
Initially, Soviet regional economic specialization enhanced
these territorialized socio-economic distinctions. For example,
specialization fostered irrigated agriculture in the form of cotton
production in the Uzbek SSR and animal husbandry in the
form of meat and milk production in the Kyrgyz SSR.109 Later,
however, Soviet actions undermined specialization. The effort to
relocate and permanently resettle nomadic populations as well as
the expansion of irrigated agriculture zones into the foothills had
precisely this effect.110 With independence, the disintegration of
the big state farms that produced meat and milk in the Kyrgyz
sector, and the subsequent privatization of land, led many Kyrgyz
to turn to private agriculture for their livelihood.111 Today,
Kyrgyz, Uzbeks, and Tajiks in the foothills practice both animal
husbandry and agriculture.112 This has had the effect of further
increasing the demand for both land and water in the foothills of
the Ferghana Valley.113
This shift in resettlement created new claims for water and
land in the foothills of the Ferghana Valley, with the competing
interests drawn along geographic zones, economic classes,
and ethnic distinctions.114 Thus, conflicts over water and land
are also driven by territorial claims to the Ferghana Valley.115
Although the current de facto borderline is unlikely to undergo
major changes resulting from delimitation, many areas on the
border are still contested among the three countries. 116 Ultimately, the form of land use and the identities of the people using
a specific section may influence decisions on the borderline. 117
A consequence of national-territorial delimitation is conflicting
territorial claims among the new countries.118 These tensions
tend to be especially concentrated in the irrigation systems
in the foothills.119 While such claims have existed throughout
the Soviet period, they acquired a new dimension with the
post-independence nation-building processes. 120

International Involvement
Immediately after the Central Asian countries gained their
independence in 1991, a large number of international aid agencies rushed into the region with projects and funding.121 A prime
concern of early international engagement was to avoid violent
conflict among new states over water and to instead seek more
cooperative modes of engagement.122 A further concern was the
shrinking of the Aral Sea and its adverse impact on the people
and the environment.123 With a growing emphasis on agriculture,
an increased need for irrigation and a wasteful water distribution
infrastructure caused124 the water levels in the Aral Sea to drop
between thirteen and eighteen meters since 1960.125 Combined
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with salinity levels eight times higher than they were in 1960
and over 400,000 kilometers of land lost to heavy pollution, the
Aral Sea garnered much attention.126 Efforts were geared toward
mitigating the disaster as well as protecting the environment for
the future.127 This meant reducing the draw of water for agriculture
from the Amu Darya and Syr Darya Rivers by rehabilitating
infrastructure and instituting water-saving irrigation practices.128
It also meant finding more efficient means of using water,
including the institution of some sort of pricing mechanism.129
Finally, international institutions criticized Soviet top-down
approaches that had reduced farmers—or farm workers, as it
were—to the status of passive implementers of decisions rather
than entrusting them with responsibility for their own water
use.130 Instead, international groups opted for decentralization in
water management and supported the granting of a high degree
of self-governance to water users.131
Efforts to rectify the Aral Sea environmental disaster
led directly to the formulation of inter-state initiatives for
the improvement of water management in Central Asia as a
whole.132 The well-publicized disaster generated large funds
and a multitude of projects from multilateral agencies, bilateral
donors, and private foundations.133 Spearheading these projects
from the outset were the World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme (“UNDP”), the European Union (“EU”),
and the United States Agency for International Development
(“USAID”).134 To different degrees, each of these organizations
conducted scientific assessments, produced management plans,
initiated conservation schemes, and held inter-state negotiations
to improve the water regulation and ecological condition of the
Aral Sea.135
Opinions differ on what all this work and funding actually
accomplished.136 Several agreements were reached on the
management of water in the Syr Darya basin and the institutions established to implement them.137 However, the actual
allocations of water remain hostage to yearly barter agreements
among the states.138 Moreover, while the ecological condition of
the Aral Sea region has been improved, it remains unlikely that
this body of water will ever be restored to its pre-1960s level.139
Among the many explanations for these outcomes, two warrant
thorough consideration. One is that nearly all the inter-state
negotiations sponsored by international agencies focused on the
nexus of water and energy, but devoted insufficient attention to
agriculture.140 As a result, parties ignored environmental issues
in the Syr Darya basin that were caused by water-intensive production and other critical agricultural policies.141 Second, many
of the international funders and agencies were not organized
enough to assure substantial outcomes, while the local actors
with whom they interacted lacked commitment to the projects
and offered only hollow promises.142
Additionally, international involvement with water management in Central Asia has focused on promoting reform along
the lines of Integrated Water Resource Management (“IWRM”),
usually coupled with the rehabilitation of infrastructure.143 In the
Ferghana Valley, for example, the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation has run an IWRM project in cooperation
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with the ICWC since 2001.144 The aim of the project was to
improve and reorganize the institutional arrangements for water
management.145 This included the restructuring of water management on the basis of hydrological rather than administrative
boundaries, and increasing farmers’ participation in decisionmaking.146 The project was joined by an effort towards Canal
Automation, which would automate the measurement of water
flows and the transmission of data.147 More generally, international funders and organizations have been involved in decentralizing irrigation management along the lines of IWRM have
established Water User Associations (“WUAs”). Major donor
organizations promoting this work include the World Bank and
Asian Development Bank in Kyrgyzstan, USAID in Uzbekistan
and Kazakhstan, and the World Bank in Tajikistan. 148
Irrigation reform based on IWRM principles altered the
structure of water management in Central Asia. For example,
International donors have established a large number of WUAs
and introduced water service fees in Central Asia.149 Considerable progress has recently been made to actually collect water
fees, a process which was initially under-enforced.150 Nonetheless, shortcomings remain.151 WUAs usually enjoy little legitimacy in the irrigation communities in which they operate, exert
limited influence on the actual distribution of water compared to
informal authorities, and are frequently misunderstood as an arm
of the state instead of representatives of local communities.152
Yet it remains unclear who is to blame for these shortcomings.
Dr. Jenniver Sehring, a policy associate at Ecologic Institute, has
analyzed the irrigation reforms in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan,
finding that WUAs themselves must bear responsibility for their
modest impact on the distribution of water.153 Thus, the WUAs’
failures stem from their faulty implementation.
IWRM is a prescriptive concept predicated on the belief that
democratic governance is good governance.154 IWRM is based
on a market economy and democratic governance inspired by
neo-liberal thinking and assumes that the conditions for such
governance are already in place.155 As a consequence, IWRM
is “politically blind” to the actual political economy and power
relations which exist in the Ferghana Valley, especially in
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.156 It is questionable whether the
IWRM goals of economic decentralization, self-government,
and empowerment of water users can ever be achieved within
strongly centralized governance systems.
At present, another major organization in Central Asian
water relations is the bilateral donor Deutsche Gesellschaft für
Internationale Zusammenarbeit (“GIZ”).157 GIZ is commissioned by the German Federal Foreign Office to run the program
“Transboundary Water Management in Central Asia” during the
period of 2009-2011, targeting all five countries of the region.158
The program aims to enhance the expertise and capacity of
supra-state water management institutions and the International
Fund for the Aral Sea (“IFAS”).159 An additional focus is on
the improvement of management by river basin organizations
situated on selected cross-border rivers.160 GIZ approaches
these issues with the advisory support of experts, the training of
personnel, and the creation and facilitation of forums to foster
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interdisciplinary and cross-regional exchange.161 GIZ also provides
funds for technical equipment, refurbishment of irrigation infrastructure, demonstration facilities, and small hydroelectric plants.162

Policy Recommendations
Irrigated agriculture is likely to continue to play a major
role in Central Asia, particularly in the Ferghana Valley.163 It
remains the source of people’s livelihoods and the backbone
of the economies of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and of Kyrgyzstan,
especially because of the water-energy nexus.164 Desertification
of the Aral Sea basin remains a critical issue affecting all Central Asian countries.165 Although largely a result of poor Soviet
management, like water diversion schemes, the Aral Sea basin
remains a major environmental concern and an area of political contention.166 In the coming years, the possible restoration
of infrastructure and the correction of existing flaws remain a
daunting challenge due to the social and economic concerns.167
Constructing and maintaining a viable water management
infrastructure will be a critical step towards mitigating the tension over water as the expansion of agriculture further forces
nations to secure their own water needs even at the expense of
a neighboring country.168 Estimates from scholars Dukhovny
and Sokolov show the cost of such repairs throughout the Aral
Sea basin would reach $16 billion.169 Still, this figure does not
include the cost of applying water-saving technologies or adding
new hydropower complexes.170
Identifying sources of such large investments will be a
major challenge that cannot be borne by the Central Asian states
alone.171 Moreover, while the updating of irrigation systems is
seemingly a matter of technical considerations, the physical,
economic, and legal configuration of such systems are also
shaped by the character of property rights and user relations.172
Any effective step towards improving and expanding irrigation
systems in the Ferghana Valley must address the social and
political challenges relating to irrigated agriculture. Decisions
on what form of irrigated agriculture are economically viable,
environmentally sustainable, and ethically acceptable in the
Ferghana Valley should be the result of social negotiation. Furthermore, that negotiation requires considering both the existing
political economies and the needs of people’s livelihoods.
As outlined above, the dilapidated infrastructural heritage
of the late Soviet period has left huge problems which must be
addressed. Water is limited in the Ferghana Valley and might
become even scarcer in the Syr Darya basin over time due to
climate change and population increase.173 Moreover, these
concerns are at the same time bound up with state territorialization and the construction of new collective identities.174 Yet, the
evidence presented above suggests that the core conflicts over
land and water do not trace back to any inherent ethnic animosities, but to the to the economic and social modes that define the
lives of each group.175 This becomes particularly relevant as the
ongoing processes of state-building foster new economic and
moral attachments. Therefore, the decision of the bilateral and
tripartite border commissions involving Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan on the final delimitation and demarcation of
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the Ferghana Valley will have a decisive impact on these conflicts.176 However, the border commissions have not yet finished
their work and the process is likely to be slow at best.177 The
historical changes of these borders and their linkages with the
spatial layout irrigation infrastructure must be taken into account
if conflict over water is to be addressed.
International actors have been engaged with water and
ecological issues in the Ferghana Valley for fifteen years, and
they are likely to continue such work in the future.178 Large sums
have been invested, but limited results have been attained.179
This is partly the result of the normal work constraints of the
involved international agencies. However, involvement has
largely taken place within the framework of promoting neoliberal reforms leading to market economies and democratic
politics in the region.180 In the area of water management, the
IWRM model was promoted both for its own survival and also
as an indirect means of providing some kind of quid pro quo for
broader governance reforms.181 This may not always be the most
productive way to resolve pressing water problems as overly normative or prescriptive approaches may divert attention from the
stubborn realities on the ground. It is thus necessary to rethink
approaches to water management and allow room for alternative
conceptualizations.

Conclusion
Yearly barter agreements remain the central mechanism
to determine water and energy transfers between upstream and
downstream countries.182 Again, it is important to note that they
do not only result from interstate relations characterized by an
uncooperative mode, but also from the domestic politics in the
respective states.183 Currently Kyrgyzstan is still cash-strapped
and, thus, limited in acquiring energy carriers from abroad.184
Kyrygyzstan’s inevitable need for heating during cold winters,
and the government’s inability to provide sufficient electricity,
is likely to give rise to public discontent and political unrest.185
Operating the Toktogul reservoir to generate hydropower in wintertime, therefore, is an urgent political and economic concern
of the government of Kyrgyzstan.186 A similar logic applies to
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan interests in the construction of Kambar-Ata and Rogun dams as well as hydropower plants. Beyond
solving perennial power shortages, both countries also hope
to export electricity to Central Asia and neighbors and, thus,
become regional energy suppliers.187
Conversely, political elites in Uzbekistan, and to some extent
Tajikistan, rely on cotton production in the Ferghana Valley to
generate income and to support the existing system of social,
political, and economic control.188 This partly accounts for leaders’ unwillingness to change to less water-intensive crops in the
Ferghana Valley.189 Furthermore, any related economic change
may not sustain the existing, cotton reliant systems, which are
based on exploitation and rent-seeking.190 Thus, the annual ad hoc
barter agreements on the use of Syr Darya’s water may be less the
result of inter-state cooperation and more the result of the conflicting political interests of domestic actors within each country.
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Addressing the challenges in Central Asia requires the reassessment of domestic and regional policies, including improvement to the water management infrastructure of the Aral Sea
basin. Additionally, any improvements to, or expansion of, the
irrigation systems in the Ferghana Valley must first consider the
social and political challenges relating to irrigated agriculture.

International actors need to consider alternative approaches to
water management outside of the prevailing neo-liberal reforms.
Only by assessing the spatial layout of watercourses and irrigation infrastructure can resource management effectively avert
conflicts over water and land in Central Asia.
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A Case for the United States’ Opposition of
International and Domestic Coal Subsidies
by Josh Fieldstone*

S

ince the United Nations’ Framework Convention on
Climate Change1 came into effect in 1994, international
financial institutions have provided more than $37 billion in direct financial support for at least 88 new and expanded
coal plants.2 Although the United States has stated that it wants
to deter international financial institutions from subsidizing
coal,3 it supports its vast domestic coal subsidies.4 So long as
these subsidies remain, the United States should refrain from
opposing international coal subsidies in order to maintain its
credibility.5 The United States faces the following dilemma:
it could either actively oppose domestic and international coal
subsidies even though the subsidies are in its short-term energy
interest, or it could continue supporting coal subsidies despite
coal’s long-term damaging effect on the environment and human
health. The United States should prioritize public health and
environmental interests and oppose all coal subsidies domestically and internationally. Specifically, it should begin by withdrawing tax credits for domestic coal production and pressure
the World Bank to stop funding coal projects internationally.
International financial institutions have continued to finance
coal projects despite the emergence of climate change as a major
international issue.6 Meanwhile, the United States refrained
from applying political pressure to curb such financing. In 2010,
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(“IBRD”), one of five institutions that compose the World Bank
Group, funded a record high $4.4 billion for coal projects7 in
the face of both substantial protests8 and a recommendation by
the World Bank’s Extractive Industries Review to refrain from
financing coal.9 The United States Executive Director abstained
from voting on—and using its substantial political clout10 to
oppose—the largest of the projects,11 a $3 billion loan to a South
African coal-fired power plant.12 However, if the United States
takes a more active stance against coal projects, it could send
a stronger message of opposition to international institutions
that fund coal, in which the United States is involved, including
the Inter-American Development Bank13 and the African Development Bank.14
The United States has not only refrained from opposing
international financial institutions’ funding of coal, it has also
continued subsidizing coal domestically. A great percentage of
these domestic subsidies come from the Internal Revenue Code
Section 45k15 credit for production of nonconventional fuels.16
This tax credit amounted to a $14 billion subsidy between 2002
and 2008, which has primarily benefited coal producers. 17 In
addition to tax credits, the United States’ subsidies for coal
include low-interest loans18 and loan guarantees.19
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The United States has a strong incentive to promote coal
subsidies because it has substantial short-term interest in
maintaining—and even expanding—its present coal use to
reduce energy costs and unemployment.20 The United States
has more coal reserves than anywhere else in the world and is
the second largest producer after China.21 In 2009, coal mines
alone employed 90,000 people in the United States.22 Coal can
generate usable energy at a cost between $1 and $2 per Million
Metric British Thermal Units (“MMBtu”) compared to $6 to $12
per MMBtu for oil and natural gas, providing an inexpensive and
relatively stable energy source.23 Additionally fifty percent of
electricity generation in the United States is dependant on coal,
illustrating both the United States’ interest in coal use and the
importance of its domestic coal policy.24
Even though the United States’ short term interests favor
coal subsidies, its long term interest are against them. Some
of the downsides of coal use are immediately tangible such
as harm to the environment25 and health hazards to those
working at coal facilities.26 Still, perhaps the most pressing
concern is its effect on climate change.27 A recent study of
Harvard’s Center for Health and the Global Environment found
that the total external cost—the negative effect of an economic
activity on a third party—of United States’ coal-use28 could
amount to $523 billion annually.29 The National Resource
Council found the external costs to be $120 billion even without
generally taking coal’s effect on climate change into account.30
In light of these long-term realities, the United Sates
should oppose coal subsidies domestically by terminating the
tax credit for production of nonconventional fuels and internationally by pressuring the IBRD to refrain from giving any
further loans to coal projects. By subsidizing coal now and
leaving the greater cost of externalities for the future, the United
States is supporting an economically and socially irresponsible
position. Ending the existing tax credit and pressuring the IBRD
would help mitigate coal’s effect on climate change, catapult the
United States as a credible leader on the climate change debate,
and protect the United States from the predicted economic losses
that far outweigh its current problems.

Endnotes: A Case for the United States’ Opposition of International
and Domestic Coal Subsidies on page 61

*Josh Fieldstone is a J.D. candidate, May 2013, at American University Washington College of Law.

31

Natural Resource “Conflicts” in the U.S.
Southwest: A Story of Hype over Substance
by Laura Peterson, Jay C. Lininger, Marty Bergoffen, Bill Snape, and Curt Bradley*

E

Introduction

Figure 1: Dunes Sagebrush Lizard Distribution, 2010

nvironmental laws and the ecosystems they
support are under attack. Intermittently since
the Reagan administration and increasingly
since the 2008 economic collapse, certain politicians
and their industry sponsors have inundated the media
with angry rhetoric, blaming historic job losses on
“overregulation.”1 Environmental laws are a frequent
target of these politicians who often benefit from
contributions supplied by the fossil fuel and mining
industries.2 Ignoring the successes of these laws—
cleaner air, cleaner water, and recovering imperiled
wild species and habitat—they claim that environmental regulations are “job killers.”3 Reflecting the
success of these claims, the recent House Fiscal Year
2012 Interior and Environment spending bill contained forty-two proposed anti-environmental riders.
These riders range from limiting the Environmental
Protection Agency’s ability to curb carbon emissions4
to blocking the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service’s ability to list new threatened and endangered species.5
In the midst of these attacks, the Endangered
Species Act (“ESA”)—an act President Nixon signed
in 1973 with the enormous popular support of the
American people—has become a target for repeal.6
A bedrock environmental law, the ESA protects both
imperiled species and the habitat necessary for those
vulnerable species to survive.7 Capitalizing on widespread economic anxieties, opponents of industry
regulation have proposed legislation to undermine the
ESA and block the listing of threatened and endangered species.8 Sometimes based on more hyperbole
than fact, these opponents promote the false belief that
resource development and environmental protection
are mutually exclusive. Some industry supporters argue that
jobs would be created if the government opened up protected
lands for private use,9 and that increased regulation may block
development and destroy jobs, leading to further economic
depression.10 Such attacks on the ESA characterize the issue as
a tradeoff between the economy and the environment, claiming
that the government must choose between using scarce natural
resources to protect wildlife or help the economy.11 In the current climate of economic distress, these arguments, regardless of
their truth, are particularly effective. Whenever environmental
protections are proposed or enforced, industry proponents
predictably forecast dire economic consequences.12 However,
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these gloomy predictions rarely materialize.13 There is no stark
dichotomy of economy versus the environment when it comes to
developing natural resources; the issues are much more nuanced.
Overblown rhetoric about environmental regulation obstruct the
public’s access to open and honest debate about the best uses for
scarce natural resources.
* Laura Peterson is a Legal Fellow at the Center for Biological Diversity; Jay C.
Lininger is an Ecologist at the Center for Biological Diversity; Marty Bergoffen
is an Endangered Species Organizer at the Center for Biological Diversity; Bill
Snape is Senior Counsel at the Center for Biological Diversity and a Practitioner
in Residence at American University, Washington College of Law;Curt Bradley is
a GIS Specialist and Information Technology Director at the Center for Biological Diversity.
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Controversy in the Permian Basin
The American Southwest, which is itself an intersection
of diverse cultures, ecosystems, and political ideologies, is the
on the front line for the cutting-edge natural resource battles of
the early 21st Century.14 The Permian Basin in southeast New
Mexico and west Texas is the focus of the latest and most serious
attacks on the ESA (See Figure 1). The Permian Basin is an area
of great economic and ecological significance. It is one of the
largest domestic producers of fossil fuel in the United States,
providing seventeen percent of the nation’s domestic crude oil.15
In 2004, the Permian Basin produced about 841,000 barrels of
oil per day.16 In addition to oil and gas extraction, the Permian
Basin is home to significant agricultural interests, producing
both food crops and grazing livestock.17 While these activities
are important for the region’s economy, they also have a significant effect on wildlife.18 The lesser prairie chicken and the dunes
sagebrush lizard are particularly vulnerable to these industrial
activities that are destroying their diminishing habitats.19 Their
habitats and populations have been declining steadily for decades
and their survival depends on protection under the ESA.20
As a result of their population decline, these two species are
now candidates for listing under the ESA.21 If approved, their
listing would trigger certain protections for both the species
and their habitats.22 However, opponents argue that listing these
imperiled species would virtually shut down oil and gas drilling
and inhibit agricultural production, both of which are bases of
the local economy.23 These opponents argue that public resources
should be dedicated to economic development to benefit workers
rather than protecting environmental resources.24 Responding
to these claims, local members of Congress have spearheaded
legislation that would preclude listing the dunes sagebrush lizard
and lesser prairie chicken, regardless of the scientific merit of
protecting them as endangered species.25
This article examines the pronounced controversy over
natural resources in the Permian Basin, arguing that the supposed conflict between environmental protection and resource
exploitation is not as stark as many claim. Protection would have
little real effect on energy development and may ultimately help
the economy of the American Southwest and lead to improved
land management practices.26 To the extent that there is a real
conflict over use of scarce resources, the controversy presents a
much-needed opportunity for healthy dialogue about sustainable
development in the region. Any actual conflict can be resolved
within the existing flexible mechanisms provided in the ESA.

The Lesser Prairie Chicken
The lesser prairie chicken is a medium-sized, gray-brown
member of the grouse family that lives in the short grass prairies
of the American Southwest.27 It forages for insects, leaves, and
buds on the shinnery oak and sand sagebrush grasslands in limited areas of Colorado, Kansas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and
Texas.28 While the prairie chicken is best known for the male’s
unique courtship displays on communal breeding grounds, it
also provides the vital ecosystem service of regulating the grassland insect populations, which can cause substantial economic
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damage to agricultural operations.29 Destruction of habitat is
one of the primary threats to the lesser prairie chicken.30 Since
the 1800s, its range has been reduced by over 90%, and its
population has declined significantly.31 The remaining habitat
faces a myriad of ongoing threats from livestock grazing, oil
and gas drilling, fire suppression, deliberate poisoning of shinnery oak, and fragmentation from structural and transportation
development.32
The lesser prairie chicken has been caught in regulatory
limbo for over a decade. In 1998, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service (“FWS”) concluded that it warranted protection as an
endangered species.33 However, it has since remained a “candidate
species” with no protection while its numbers decline.34 Now, the
FWS characterizes the extinction threat to this terrestrial bird as
high, ongoing, and imminent.35 To survive and recover, the lesser
prairie chicken needs protection under the ESA.

The Dunes Sagebrush Lizard
The dunes sagebrush lizard is arguably the most controversial animal in the current ESA fight. The lizard exclusively
makes its home in shinnery oaks on the sand dunes of southeastern New Mexico and west Texas.36 This habitat specialist
has a limited range.37 living under the shade of oak trees and
burying itself in white sand to avoid predators and regulate its
body temperature.38
The primary threats to the lizard stem from fossil fuel development and agricultural activities within the lizard’s specialized
habitat.39 Roads, pipelines, and power lines, as well as vehicular
traffic and soil compaction associated with extraction operations,
have destroyed and fragmented the lizard’s native environment.40
In addition, ranchers historically used herbicides to kill the
shinnery oak necessary for the lizard’s survival because it is poisonous to livestock in the spring when it is budding.41 Farmers
also remove the oak to clear land for livestock grazing and crop
production.42 Killing the shinnery oak not only removes the
lizard’s habitat, it also destabilizes the entire dunes ecosystem.43
The FWS classified the dunes sagebrush lizard as a candidate for listing under the ESA in 1982. 44 As a candidate
species, neither the lizard nor its habitat has received any federal protection.45 As a result, and despite listing by the State of
New Mexico as an endangered species, its habitat has decreased
by forty percent since 1982.46 This fact is particularly troubling
given the direct link between the lizard’s survival and the quality
and quantity of the shinnery oak.47 In 2010, after twenty-eight
years, the FWS proposed to formally list the dunes sagebrush
lizard as endangered under the ESA.48 The survival of the dunes
sagebrush lizard depends on its ultimate protection under the
ESA. However, this protection could be undermined if federal
action under the ESA is blocked by oil, gas, and agricultural
interests.

Backlash over Protection Exploits Economic Fears
Based on media reports, it would seem that protecting
the lesser prairie chicken and the dunes sagebrush lizard from
extinction would have a significant negative impact on economic
33

activity in the Permian Basin.49 Proposed ESA listings have
generated virulent opposition, with some predicting dire
economic scenarios in the region if these at-risk species receive
protection.50 Representative (“Rep.”) Steve Pearce (R-NM)
alleged that protecting the lizard would place “[m]ost of the oil
and gas jobs in southeast New Mexico . . . at risk.”51 Echoing
this sentiment, a Texas newspaper asserted that listing the lizard
as an endangered species would put 27,000 jobs in jeopardy by
severely limiting oil production.52 Senator (“Sen.”) John Cornyn
(R-TX) has advanced similar claims, stating that lizard protection is just another way the federal government puts obstacles
in the way of job creation.53 These members of Congress have
proposed legislation that would preclude the ability of the FWS
to list either species as endangered.54 In addition to these claims,
industry has inundated the local media with claims that environmentalists are determined “to shut down the oil and gas industry
in Texas.”55
However, when the rhetoric is peeled away, these claims of
imminent job loss resulting from wildlife protection have little
substance. Instead, protection of at-risk wildlife would arguably
have little or no effect on continued fossil fuel extraction in the
Permian Basin.56 A recent study on the impact of listing the
dunes sagebrush lizard on oil and gas activities in New Mexico
shows that claims of economic calamity are overblown.57 The
dunes sagebrush lizard’s potentially suitable habitat covers
only 600,000 acres—less than one percent of all oil and gas
lands in the Permian Basin.58 The study examined the leasing
activity from January 2010 to July 2011 of the Bureau of Land
Management (“BLM”) Pecos District, which manages most of
the land in the animal’s range in New Mexico.59 Instead of the
consequences purported the media, the study shows that lizard
protection will have almost no effect on oil and gas activity.60
Only five percent (2,920 acres) of 52,874 acres offered for lease
in New Mexico are habitat for the lizard.61 Moreover, only fifteen percent (3,484 acres) of 22,383 acres where BLM proposed
leases in the second half of 2011 were lizard habitat.62 The
Permian Basin Petroleum Association claims that lizard protection “would shut down drilling activity for a minimum of two
and as many as five years” while the FWS determines whether
listing is warranted.63 On the contrary, BLM will defer leasing
of only 560 acres—less than one percent of lands proposed for
oil and gas development during the study period—to conserve
habitat for the animal.64 Further, leases offered by BLM during
the study period outnumbered those purchased by oil and gas
companies, indicating a market surplus.65 Additionally, in Texas,
the state comptroller and land commissioner jointly found that
only three percent of the 197,606 acres of dunes sagebrush lizard
habitat overlaps developable oil and gas land.66
Instead of shutting down all oil and gas activities in the
Permian Basin, protecting the dunes sagebrush lizard and its
habitat would affect only a miniscule portion of lands that the
oil and gas industry wishes to exploit in the Permian Basin.67
Given the current surplus of leasing opportunities on public land
in New Mexico alone, listing the lizard would have little effect
on oil and gas activities in the Permian Basin.68
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The ESA Provides the Flexibility
Deal with Conflicts that Arise

to

This article does not deny the existence of conflict over
natural resource development in the American Southwest or that
the ESA can inhibit resource development. The ESA does and
should prevent development in certain circumstances. However,
to the extent that conflicts about the use of natural resources in
the Permian Basin exist, the ESA provides flexible mechanisms
to minimize the economic impacts of wildlife protection.
The ESA requires public involvement and recognition
of competing interests when the FWS considers protection of
at-risk species.69 The ESA is flexible: it either mandates or
allows socio-economic considerations at nearly every stage
of the process including designation of critical habitat,70 consultation with federal action agencies,71 recovery planning,72
and prohibition against “take”73 (i.e., harm or harassment of
endangered species).74 The act provides ample opportunity for
public involvement and for provision of information on listing
decisions and critical habitat determinations.
The decision to list an imperiled species under the ESA
must take into account only “the best scientific and commercial
data available” after a status review.75 This science-based listing
requirement ensures that decisions are based on the actual status
of the species as opposed to politics.76 However, the FWS does
not act unilaterally.77 Before making a determination of whether
to list a species as endangered, the agency must take into account
any state or local efforts to protect that species.78 Although the
FWS ultimately must base its decision to list a species only
on the best available science—a requirement that is essential
to prevent extinction—it must undertake extensive procedural
steps to ensure that wildlife protection is accomplished through
a transparent process.79 The FWS must notify the state and local
jurisdiction that might be affected by the listing decision.80 If it
decides that listing is warranted, the FWS must conduct a “status
review” and solicit comments and information from the public,
including industry and conservation groups, scientific experts,
as well as affected state, local, tribal and federal agencies.81
After the status review, the FWS must publish a proposed rule
in the Federal Register, which then undergoes another public
comment process and sometimes includes public hearings.82 The
FWS then incorporates the comments into a final listing rule.83
In addition to the public review processes, listings undergo
considerable internal review as well as formal, independent
scientific peer review.84
The FWS must undertake a similarly public process when
it designates critical habitat, which by law is necessary for the
survival and recovery of imperiled species.85 The FWS must
consider economic impacts, the impacts on national security, as
well as any other relevant impact of specifying a particular area
as critical habitat.86 The FWS can go so far as to exclude an area
from critical habitat if it determines that the benefits of excluding the area outweigh the benefits of designation as long as this
decision will not result in the extinction of the species.87
Beyond these opportunities for involvement in the decisionmaking process, stakeholders can minimize the impact of
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regulatory protections by voluntarily entering into conservation
agreements to prevent extinction of a species and potentially
preclude the need for listing under the ESA.88 Conservation
agreements routinely facilitate the protection of species that
are candidates for listing or are proposed to be candidates for
listing.89 They give non-federal property owners incentives to
implement measures that prevent the decline of imperiled species.90 Conservation agreements are not overly burdensome, and
participants must only address the issues that they can control
under their property rights.91 Such agreements can protect populations on participants’ land, restore degraded habitat, create
new habitat, and promise not to take an action that would harm
an at-risk population of wildlife.92 After signing a conservation
agreement, if the FWS later lists the species under the ESA,
non-federal property owners may not be subject to additional use
restrictions beyond those agreed to in the conservation agreement.93 This provides landowners with valuable operational
certainty in the face of potential regulation.

What is Driving the Attacks on the
ESA in the Permian Basin?
Resistance to regulation by affected industries is the primary
force driving attacks on the ESA. By capitalizing on widelyshared anxieties created by the current economic climate and
high unemployment, industry proponents can advance a longstanding agenda to avoid new regulations and rollback existing
ones.94 Backers of industry claim that listing the chicken or the
lizard will lead to regulatory uncertainty and cost jobs in rural
communities.95 However, there is little evidence to support this
contention.96 Studies show that there is little connection between
supposed “regulatory uncertainty,” and economic growth.97
Financial incentives play a significant role in the decisions
of potentially affected industries. Accordingly, industry financial
support of Congressional initiatives to block wildlife protection
is not surprising. Rep. Pearce is largely funded by the oil, gas and
agriculture industries.98 In the 2011 to 2012 campaign cycle, the
oil and gas industry was his number one industrial contributor.99
Yates Petroleum, Mack Energy, and Exxon Mobil were included
in Pearce’s top five individual contributors.100 In 2009-2010,
Pearce’s top contributors included Yates Petroleum, Marbob
Energy, Devon Energy, Chesapeake Energy and Exxon Mobil.101
Sen. Cornyn is similarly funded by the oil and gas industry—
Exxon Mobil is his largest organizational contributor.102 The
heavy industry backing of both politicians may explain their
stances on federal regulation that would financially benefit these
contributors with promises of increased profits.

Blocking Wildlife Protection is
Counterproductive to the Public Interest
Proposed amendments to shortcut listing the lesser prairie
chicken and dunes sagebrush lizard under the ESA would
exclude the public from standard ESA involvement in the
decision-making process.103 Rep. Pearce and Sen. Cornyn’s
proposed policy riders to appropriations bills would therefore
prevent the consideration of competing interests in making
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decisions regarding natural resources. This result is unacceptable. A functioning democracy requires accurate information
about the real implications and benefits of wildlife protection
and an open and honest dialogue about the best uses for natural
resources.
Creating a false dichotomy between economic development
and wildlife protection is also counterproductive to the economic future of the Permian Basin. Studies show that protection
of natural resources actually helps to diversify local economies
and can even lead to job growth.104
The Pacific Northwest provides an instructive example of
habitat protection improving long-term economic health.105
Like the current controversy in the Permian Basin, there were
foreboding claims in the Pacific Northwest that species protection would lead to significant job losses in the region.106 In
response to a federal court ruling temporarily banning logging
on twenty-four million acres of national forest land to protect
the northern spotted owl from habitat loss, the local timber
industry rallied communities around predictions of a widespread
economic depression.107 Industry spokespersons stated that the
ban would cost hundreds of thousands of jobs and create ghost
towns throughout the region.108 However, these predictions
failed to materialize. Instead, in the decade following the temporary logging ban, the Pacific Northwest’s economy outperformed
the rest of the country in job and income growth.109 The regional
economy’s base has continued shifting away from the logging
industry and the newly-protected forests provide recreational
opportunities and enhanced quality of life, drawing new businesses and mobile professionals.110 Accordingly, protection
of owl habitat directly contributed to the economic growth of
the Pacific Northwest, leading to higher quality of life, higher
income, and more jobs.111
Protecting the lesser prairie chicken and the dunes
sagebrush lizard in the Permian Basin would arguably lead to
similar benefits. For one, a healthy economy is linked to a healthy
environment and preservation of resources.112 From quality
of life to public health to recreation and tourism, preservation
of resources has a positive effect on regional economies.113
In addition, protecting at-risk wildlife in the Permian Basin
will likely have a beneficial effect on the very industries that
currently seek to avoid new regulation. Preserving the shinnery
oak habitat that is necessary for the survival of both species
keeps sand dunes intact and prevents erosion.114 The continued
existence of the lesser prairie chicken allows that species to
continue regulating the insect population in a way that could
benefit agricultural interests.115 Sustainable development of
energy resources will promote the continued vitality of the
region in the long term. Therefore, species protection will not
only benefit these individual species, but will benefit the public
at large.

Conclusion
Conflicts over the allocation of natural resources in the
American Southwest are overblown, driven more likely by economic greed and political power than a rational examination of
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the public interest. The economic downturn has provided a convenient opportunity for industry-backed interests to capitalize
on economic fears and campaign for de-regulation of the powerful fossil fuel industry. Listing and protecting the lesser prairie
chicken and the dunes sagebrush lizard under the ESA will not
destroy the economy of the Southwest, nor will it stop oil and
gas drilling or lead to widespread job loss. Instead, protecting
these animals from extinction will uphold an honest and sciencebased debate of the best uses of the natural resources.

To ensure constructive dialogue about the use of natural
resources, Congress and the current Administration must allow
environmental laws to work. Yielding to hyperbolic rhetoric
neither preserves natural resources nor aids the working people
directly impacted by natural resource conservation. The goal of
natural resource management must continue to be the recovery
of imperiled species and their natural habitats, which remain the
best gauge of healthy ecosystems and the economies upon which
we ultimately depend.
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Cuban Offshore Drilling: Preparation
and Prevention within the Framework
of the United States’ Embargo
by Richard Sadowski*
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Introduction

uba plans to drill seven exploratory oil wells in the
Gulf of Mexico by 2014.1 Some argue that the threat of
Cuban offshore oil drilling will increase the embargo’s
costs and that U.S. oil companies will miss out on oil exploration
that will go to foreign countries.2 In response, some U.S. lawmakers and U.S. oil lobbyists have advocated for an exception
to the Cuban embargo permitting energy cooperation.3 Notwithstanding these concerns, the long-standing Cuban embargo is an
economic restriction with a significant purpose and should not
so easily be forsaken.
This article argues that, despite the added pressure Cuba’s
offshore oil developments have placed on U.S. policy, the embargo’s twin goals of bringing democracy to the Cuban people
and ending their oppressive rule have not been met. Thus, now
is not the time to lift or ease the embargo. The embargo itself
serves to restrict Cuba’s drilling efforts4 and new legislation may
further hamper Cuba’s exploration.5 Additionally, the economic
concerns of the U.S. energy industry do not warrant a change
in the U.S. foreign policy toward Cuba, and those concerns can
be better met by tapping U.S. resources. Furthermore, fears of
a Cuban oil spill can be assuaged through less drastic measures
such as an oil spill emergency response agreement with Cuba,
similar to the one that the United States has enacted with Mexico.

The Embargo
In 1960, President Eisenhower ended U.S. sugar purchases
from Cuba and halted all oil deliveries to Cuba in response to
the then new communist government under Fidel Castro.6 These
sanctions were put into place to destabilize Castro’s new government and promote democracy.7 The Foreign Assistance Act of
1961 authorized the president to impose a “total embargo upon
all trade between the United Stated and Cuba.”8 On February 7,
1962, President Kennedy signed an Executive Order9 utilizing this
authority to initiate the Cuban embargo.10 This was followed by
the enactment of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations on July 8,
1963,11 under the Trading with the Enemy Act (“TWEA”).12
In 1996, during the Clinton administration, the HelmsBurton Act13 was passed in an effort to prevent foreign companies from trading with Cuba.14 The Helms-Burton Act also
codified much of the embargo as well as restricted the power
of the President to unilaterally remove the embargo.15 President
Obama recently eased restrictions through the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 200916 and has planned even further changes.17
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The Cuban government applauded these new measures, but
averred that the United States did not go far enough to ease
the economic sanctions.18 According to the Cuban Foreign
Minister, Bruno Rodriguez, U.S. policy has, in fact, become
more restrictive.19 Indeed, these changes stop well short of
ending the embargo20 or even opening dialogue between the
United States and Cuba.21 Ultimately, trade between the United
States and Cuba remains heavily restricted.

Restrictions Relevant to Cuba’s Oil Exploration
The embargo on Cuba has widespread and significant
economic effects for both the United States and Cuba. Various
provisions of the embargo impact Cuba’s ability to obtain U.S.
technology and to work with U.S. companies.22 Additionally,
TWEA prohibits U.S. oil exploration companies from dealing
with Cuba by prohibiting the transfer of assets in which the
Cuban government or Cuban nationals have an interest.23
On September 9, 2009, Platte River Associates (“PRA”),
a U.S. company, was fined for violating TWEA.24 PRA sold
oil and gas exploration software to the Spanish oil company
Repsol25 even though PRA was told that the software was being
utilized for drilling in Cuban waters.26 Describing the seriousness of the violations, United States Attorney David Gaouette
explained that “[t]rading with the enemy is a serious crime,
and in this case, a Colorado company has been rightfully held
accountable for committing that crime.”27 PRA was sentenced
to a fine of $14,500 for its violations.28 This case exemplifies
the extent of the embargo and the related laws to restrict Cuba’s
access to offshore-drilling technology.

Increased Pressure to End the Embargo
A U.S. Geological Survey estimates that Cuba’s offshore
oil fields hold at least four and a half billion barrels of recoverable oil and ten trillion cubic feet of natural gas.29 Cupet, the
state-owned Cuban energy company, insists that actual reserves
are double that of the U.S. estimate.30 One estimate indicates
that Cuba could be producing 525,000 barrels of oil per day.31
Given this vast resource, Cuba has already leased offshore oil
exploration blocks to operators from Spain, Norway, and India.32
Offshore oil discoveries in Cuba are placing increasing pressure
for the United States to end the embargo. First, U.S. energy companies are eager to compete for access to Cuban oil reserves.33
*Richard Sadowski is a Class of 2012 J.D. candidate, at Hofstra University
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Secondly, fears of a Cuban oil spill are argued to warrant U.S.
investment and technology.34 Finally, the concern over Cuban
offshore drilling renews cries that the embargo is largely a failure and harms human rights.

Economics: U.S. Companies Want In
For U.S. companies, the embargo creates concern that they
will lose out on an opportunity to develop a nearby resource.35
Oil companies have a long history of utilizing political pressure
for self-serving purposes.36 American politicians, ever fearful of
high energy costs, are especially susceptible to oil-lobby pressures.37 This dynamic was exemplified in 2008, when then-Vice
President Dick Cheney told the board of directors of the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce that “oil is being drilled right now sixty
miles off the coast of Florida. But we’re not doing it, the Chinese
are, in cooperation with the Cuban government. Even the communists have figured out that a good answer to high prices is
more supply.”38
This pressure for U.S. investment in oil is exacerbated by
America’s expected increase in consumption rates.39 Oil company stocks are valued in large part on access to reserves.40 Thus,
more leases, including those in Cuban waters, equal higher stock
valuation.41 “The last thing that American energy companies
want is to be trapped on the sidelines by sanctions while European, Canadian and Latin American rivals are free to develop
new oil resources on the doorstep of the United States.”42

The BP Disaster Adds to Concerns
Further pressure on the embargo comes from those voicing
environmental concerns about Cuba’s drilling plans.43 These
concerns are undoubtedly more poignant in the wake of British Petroleum’s (“BP”) historically tragic Deepwater Horizon
oil spill.44 Currently, there is no agreement between the United
States and Cuba to deal with oil spills.45 The embargo would prevent, or at least hamper, any efforts by U.S. companies to aid any
cleanup efforts.46 In addition, the embargo bans U.S. technologies
designed to prevent or contain oil spills from being sold to Cuba.47
David Guggenheim, a senior fellow at the Washington
Ocean Foundation punctuated the United States’ concerns over
the potential impacts of Cuba’s drilling by remarking that “the
Gulf isn’t going to respect any boundaries when it comes to oil
spills.”48 This statement was recently exemplified by Cuba’s
own expressed fears that oil from the BP disaster would reach
its shores.49 The Deep Horizon oil spill’s threat was enough that
several Cuban leaders called for the reexamination of Cuba’s
own plan to extract oil off its shores.50 Nonetheless, Cuba’s oil
exploration plans seem unfazed.51

Opponents Argue the Embargo Harms Human
Rights and Does Not Work
Many critics of the embargo complain that the policy is
inherently ineffective and actually exacts a human toll.52 They
note that many of the societal ills of the Cuban people are
furthered by the embargo’s economic impacts on Cuba. 53 For
instance, the American Association for World Health’s yearlong study of Cuba concluded that the embargo itself has led
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to increased suffering and death in Cuba, a condition that has
been aggravated by the passage of the Helms-Burton Act. 54
The study found that “the declining availability of foodstuffs,
medicines and such basic medical supplies as replacement parts
for 30-year-old X-ray machines is taking a tragic human toll.”55
Further, they argue that the opposition of the Cuban people to
the embargo is ignored.56 Opponents view the embargo as a hypocritical U.S. policy that allows enthusiastic trade with China, a
communist nation where political oppression is at least as great
as in Cuba.57 These criticisms put further demands on the United
States to end the embargo in the interest of human rights.58

Dealing with Cuba’s Oil Plans without
Compromising the Embargo
The Embargo is Still Necessary
Despite calls for its revocation, the embargo’s purpose is as
important now as when it was enacted. Cuba is still an oppressive
country.59 Cubans may not leave the country without permission and still lack fundamental freedoms of expression.60 José
Miguel Vivanco, the director of Americas division at Human
Rights Watch, notes that as “Cuba’s draconian laws and sham
trials remain in place, [the country] continue[s] to restock the
prison cells with new generations of innocent Cubans who dare
to exercise their basic rights.”61 Moreover, a recent proposal by
the Cuban Communist Party makes clear that there will be no
change in the country’s oppressive one-party political system.62
In doing so, the lengthy document declares “[o]nly socialism
is capable of overcoming the current difficulties and preserving the victories of the revolution.”63 Cuba’s treatment of its
own citizens is a situation the United States cannot ignore. The
embargo’s twin goals of backing democracy and ending oppressive rule have not been met. Until they are, the embargo must
remain in place.

Calming Environmental Fears with an Oil
Spill Response Agreement with Cuba
Fears that Cuban offshore drilling poses serious environmental threats because of the proximity to the United States and
the prohibition on U.S. technology transfer are overblown. Cuba
has at least as much incentive to ensure safe-drilling practices
as does the United States, and reports indicate that Cuba is taking safety seriously.64 Lee Hunt, President of the Houston-based
International Association of Drilling Contractors, said, “[t]he
Cuban oil industry has put a lot of research, study and thought
into what will be required to safely drill,” and that “they are
very knowledgeable of international industry practices and have
incorporated many of these principles into their safety and regulatory planning and requirements.”65 Thus, while the economic
embargo of Cuba restricts American technology from being utilized, foreign sources have provided supplemental alternatives.66
Further, spill response planning can be implemented before
drilling begins. The United States currently has oil spill response
agreements with Mexico67 and Canada,68 but not with Cuba.69
As the Deepwater Horizon spill highlighted, planning for disaster is essential. To achieve this goal, the United States can model
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a Cuban plan on the Joint Contingency Plan between the United
Mexican States and the United States of America Regarding
Pollution of the Maritime Environment by Discharge of Hydrocarbons or Other Hazardous Substances (“MEXUS Plan”). 70
That plan originates from an agreement between Mexico and
the United States signed on July 24, 1980, and developed in
accordance with the International Convention on Oil Pollution
Preparedness, Response and Cooperation, adopted on November
30, 1990.71 The Plan pre-designates on-scene coordinators, a
joint response team, response coordination centers, rapid notification protocols, and communications procedures for the event
of an oil disaster.72 The Plan has triumphed in test simulations,
which validates its concepts.73
The United States must initiate the same level of planning with Cuba. Given the proximity of potential Cuban wells
to the Florida coast, the need for a contingency plan is clear.
Fortunately, the MEXUS Plan provides a guiding framework
upon which the United States and Cuba can draw. Furthermore,
a recent Congressional report indicates that Cuba is open to
certain bilateral agreements with the United States, noting Raul
Castro’s willingness to engage with the United States where
mutual interests exist.74 Since an oil spill agreement is of mutual
interest, both countries should work to draft and implement it.

The United States Should First Utilize
U.S. Oil Resources
The United States’ thirst for oil should first be quenched
with local resources before resorting to end the embargo. Allowing U.S. companies access to Cuban offshore oil fields would
effectively allow those companies to drill for oil in waters closer
to the U.S. coast than laws currently allow.75 J. Larry Nichols,
Chairman of Devon Energy, an independent U.S. oil and natural
gas producer, opined that “[w]hen U.S. companies are not even
allowed to drill in the eastern half of the Gulf of Mexico, we
have a long way to go before we can think about international
waters off the coast of Cuba.”76 If access to oil is indeed the
main U.S. rationale behind lifting the embargo, this need is best
met by first allowing companies to drill more extensively in U.S.
waters.77
Moreover, dependence on other countries for oil is not a
responsible option.78 Because the United States has the best oil
safety standards in the world, it is most environmentally competent to tap America’s own natural resources.79 Furthermore,
because drilling has yet to start, there is time yet for Cuban
political change to occur.80 Not only is there simply no pressing
need for Cuban oil, as portrayed by U.S. oil lobbyists, but U.S.
resources offer a more attractive alternative.81

Recent Economic Policy Changes in Cuba Signal
the End of Oppressive Cuban Rule
Economic pressure has been weighing heavy on the Castro
regime, foreshadowing an end to its oppressive rule over Cuba.82
When asked if Cuba’s economic system was still worth exporting, Fidel Castro admitted, “[t]he Cuban model doesn’t even
work for us any more.”83 Stephen Wilkinson, a Cuba expert at
the London Metropolitan University, notes that Castro’s words
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are not a condemnation of socialism but rather “an acknowledgement that the way in which the Cuban system is organised has to
change . . . [w]e can now expect a lot more changes and perhaps
more rapid changes as a consequence.”84 Fidel’s departure as
the leader of Cuba and Raul’s subsequent economic reforms are
indicative of imminent political changes, and signal the end of
communism in Cuba.85 These developments may result in an
improvement in Cuban human rights and social conditions. For
example, Raul has already eased the impact of the world food
crisis, released prisoners, and commuted death sentences.86

Congressman Buchanan’s Bill to Stop Cuban
Offshore Drilling is the Proper Action for the
United States
On January 21, 2011, Florida Congressman Vern Buchanan
introduced a bill in the House of Representatives aimed at
thwarting Cuba’s drilling efforts.87 The bill would permit the
U.S. Secretary of the Interior to deny drilling leases to foreign
companies that deal with countries under U.S. trade sanctions,
including Cuba.88 Following the successful application of U.S.
pressure on Repsol to pull out of drilling in Iran, Buchanan’s bill
is designed to again put pressure on Repsol to pull out of Cuban
drilling plans.89 Buchanan’s bill could threaten Repsol’s projects
elsewhere in U.S. territory where the company operates rigs near
Texas and Louisiana.90
While the success of the bill is not yet certain,91 foreign
firms should seriously weigh the rewards of Cuban oil against the
possible risk of being ostracized by America economically.92 Mr.
Buchanan’s bill is the proper approach for U.S. legislation and
policy to make a stand against Cuba’s offshore oil exploration.93

Conclusion
Since its inception, the Cuban embargo has ebbed and
flowed in severity and support. While the measure seems to be
increasingly unpopular, it takes legitimate aim at a Cuban regime
characterized by intolerance and oppression. Though the Castros
utilize the embargo as a scapegoat upon which to blame Cuba’s
failures,94 recent changes suggest the embargo is indeed close to
accomplishing its goals.95 Despite this, critics, including U.S. oil
producers, want the embargo dropped.
Regardless of criticism, the embargo must remain in place
until its goals are met. Environmental fears can be effectively
countered through bilateral response and preparation agreements with Cuba. Also, economic and energy needs are more
properly addressed through drilling U.S. resources. Ultimately,
with the aid of legislation such as Buchanan’s bill, the United
States should exercise its political and economic power to pressure foreign companies to avoid offshore drilling in Cuba. The
United States can dissuade foreign investment without compromising the embargo. It appears an end to oppressive communist
rule in Cuba is nearing. Now is the time for the United States to
both reject offshore drilling in Cuba and demonstrate resolve in
meeting the goals of the economic embargo.
Endnotes: Cuban Offshore Drilling: Preparation and Prevention
within the Framework of the United States’ Embargo on page 63
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The Arctic Council: Gatekeeper or Doormat
to the World’s Next Major Resource Battle?
by Oded Cedar*

I

t has long been said that “Those who cannot remember the
past are condemned to repeat it.”1 If history indeed repeats
itself, then all indicators suggest that the global community
is ripe for another major “land grab.”2 This time, the land at issue
is the Arctic3 and the bounty is the abundant oil and natural gas
reserves trapped beneath its surface.4
Over the last decade, a coalescence of different factors has
shifted the search for natural resources such as oil and gas to the
Arctic.5 Advances in exploration, drilling, and extraction technologies have helped mitigate the traditionally cost-prohibitive
factors of developing ice-locked reserves.6 Geopolitical concerns
about the waning global supply of oil and gas have also driven
countries to explore for these resources in the Arctic.7 However,
the primary force behind this focus is the undeniable fact that the
Earth’s changing climate is melting away the Arctic’s ice sheet
and permafrost, making the region’s oil and gas reserves accessible for the first time.8
The Arctic Council (“AC” or “Council”) is a leading forum
for the dialogue on the development of natural resources in the
region.9 This intergovernmental body is comprised of eight
member-nations, all of which border the Arctic Circle.10 The
Council also includes six “permanent-observer” nations11 who,
though they have no voting rights, can participate and contribute to the work of the Council.12 The AC’s stated mission is to:
“promot[e] cooperation, coordination, and interaction among
the Arctic States . . . on common Arctic issues, in particular [on]
issues of sustainable development and environmental protection
in the Arctic.”13
The AC’s mission stems from the Ottawa Declaration, which
established the AC in 1996.14 This document avows the commitment of AC member-nations to seek “sustainable development
in the Arctic region including conservation and sustainable use
of natural resources.”15 This language from the Ottawa Declaration incorporates the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy
(“AEPS”) that was instrumental the Council’s creation.16 Thus,
the impetus behind the AEPS and the AC makes it reasonable to
expect as well as demand some action from the Arctic Council
to oversee and regulate the development of fossil fuels in the
Arctic.17
Despite its benevolent mission and establishing documents,
the AC has in actuality provided a forum for member-nations
to lay the groundwork for unsustainable fossil fuel development
in the Arctic.18 Most recently, the Danish ambassador to China
noted his strong support for China’s inclusion into the AC as a
permanent-observer nation.19 This move garnered speculation
from scholars and analysts, who noted China’s aid to Denmark
in the development of Greenland’s natural resources, and China’s
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interest in Arctic resources since 2004.20 Canada is an especially
vocal claimant, touting the country’s long-standing sovereignty
over certain areas in the Arctic, and further expressing the country’s intent to exercise its sovereignty in documents published
with the AC.21 Other actions by the AC member-nations outside
of the forum, like Russia’s placement of a national flag on the
Arctic’s ocean floor, presumably stir echoes through the AC.22
At one point or another, every member nation of the AC has
published reports with the council, expressing their plans to
exercise sovereignty over the region and to develop its fossil fuel
resources.23
These national assertions make fossil fuel extraction in the
Arctic seemingly expected and inevitable.24 However, the AC
member-nations’ plans for fossil fuel extraction contradict their
commitment to protecting the Arctic environment expressed in
the Ottawa Declaration.25 In addition to worsening the effects
of climate change, unchecked oil and gas development can have
direct, catastrophic environmental consequences. For example,
the lack of oversight that allowed the BP oil spill to occur illustrates what could happen in the Arctic without proper regulation by the AC.26 Furthermore, the AC has emerged as the key
platform for the indigenous tribes of the Arctic to voice their
concerns.27 Without a proper oversight mechanism, these indigenous tribes will lose a key forum for ensuring their negotiating
parity with the member-nations.28 Therefore, it is imperative for
the AC to develop environmentally conscious standards for fossil fuel extraction to protect the Arctic environment under the
Ottawa Declaration. If the AC fails to do so, then it risks becoming an obsolete and ineffectual organization.
The AC should also create mechanisms that will enforce
the member-nations’ Ottawa commitments and environmental
regulations for oil and gas development in the Arctic. However,
since the AC is a “cooperative” group it currently has no binding enforcement authority.29 Therefore, the first step must be
the establishment of the AC’s binding powers, .30 Without the
essential ability to enforce its resolutions, the AC has no mechanism through which it can ensure that its member-nations do
not act in contradiction with the AC’s core missions. However,
given their support for fossil fuel development in the Arctic,
it is unlikely that the AC member-nations will voluntary create a new regulatory authority in the region. Thus action must
come from the international community, who —through the
“permanent-observer” nations—must apply pressure on the AC
continued on page 51
*Oded Cedar is a J.D. candidate, May 2012, at American University Washington
College of Law, specializing in Energy Law and Financial Regulation.
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Threats to a Sustainable Future:
Water Accumulation and Conflict in Latin America*
By Rutgerd Boelens, Mourik Bueno de Mesquita, Antonio Gaybor and Francisco Peña**
Introduction

I

n Latin America, debates over natural resource management policies and legislation fill discussion forums. This is
a needed discussion as coherent policies that both promote
democratic, equitable water use systems and also safeguard the
sustainability of water resources are rare in the region.1 The
absence of effective water regulation that considers the common
interest and long-term water availability results in poor management and use of natural resources, driving explosive conflicts.2
As in many regions of the world, there is growing demand and
competition for access to water in Latin America. Agricultural,
industrial, mining and energy companies, as well as large cities
and housing developments, have altered socio-natural geography
and are changing the rural panorama profoundly.3 These recent
demands are competing with existing water rights and ignoring
local water management rules in rural communities and indigenous people’s territories.4 Moreover, climate change and ecosystem degradation are further reducing water availability in the
region.5
Generally, new water reform processes have done little to
curb this situation and some have even worsened it. In many
cases in Latin America, elites and corporations have taken
advantage of government interventions.6 New international
privatization policies trample over the water rights of indigenous
and other rural peoples, monopolizing water access and control.7
This article reviews the general context and issues of water
governance in Latin America and analyzes the accumulation of
management power by a few elites through modern extractivist
policies and neoliberal governance. Using case studies in Ecuador,
Mexico and Peru, this article also illustrates how the prevailing
water economic and policy models lead to a deepening of
societal water conflicts, triggering reactions “from below.”

promoting a move toward decentralized water management.11
Water management agencies have thus initiated decentralization
and privatization schemes that have transferred some authority
to local or municipal authorities, user groups, private companies,
and public-private institutions.12 However, redefining water
policy is difficult given the varied ideologies and interests held
by the relevant stakeholders. 13 Among the issues discussed
is whether water can, or should, be treated as a privatized commodity rather than as a fundamental, non-transferable human
need.14 Discussion also centers around what roles the State and
private sectors should play in decentralizing water governance,
as well as whether market forces could effectively allocate water
to meet various needs.15 Even if these difficult ideological questions are answered, current Latin American governance structures
provide a challenging platform for the effective implementation
of new water management ideas. In some cases, weak agencies
run by bureaucrats or local elites leave little room for multi-actor
participation.16 Therefore, even if the government takes action
to decentralize or privatize water services and establish water
markets they are face inadequate regulation and enforcement.17
Furthermore, central government agencies also reject and
supplant local and indigenous water management initiatives.18
In general, cultural practices of water management are not taken
into consideration in national lawmaking; society is portrayed as
homogenous, with no room for differing water rights or forms
of water governance.19 Water policies and laws often assume
that simply adopting official legal norms will work to shape
and standardize the multi-faceted reality of water management,
creating a “modern”, “efficient” and “rational” management
system.20 Therefore, these methods of local water management
are discriminated against, and water rights are instead turned over
to “modern production and producers” – legally and illegally.21

The Context of Water Governance
Studies in Latin America have shown a serious disconnect
between water laws and actual governance. This is particularly
evidenced by fragmented enforcement of these regulations with
separate agencies administering different water uses.8 These
agencies take actions that are often contrary to public interests
and collective rights.9 State projects and water management
agencies also favor political agendas, often creating economic
opportunities for elites and government players.10
As a reaction to the Latin American government’s disjointed
and inefficient efforts to manage water resources, there is
consensus among most of the region’s stakeholders–both
groups with investment power and indigenous organizations,
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These centralized practices have disrupted a localized, pluralistic water management system that has existed for centuries,
especially in irrigation-based communities that have developed
management practices by incorporating both ancient water traditions and modern norms.22
Water accumulation and control by the few is a long-standing
problem in Latin America. Recent national and international
policies, combined with the economic power of multinational
corporations, make this problem more pressing than ever
before. Water thievery by these privileged stakeholders in times
of increasing scarcity, is leading to numerous conflicts, most
of them local.23 Unfortunately, these conflicts are usually not
mentioned in the national or international media.24 The few local
conflicts and protests that do reach the national media, which is
dominated by the ruling political and economic power sectors,
are immediately demonized.25
Latin American is not the only place where public water
policies are problematic. International interest in coordinating
better water management and enacting laws to enable local decision-making is growing.26 This vision calls for a greater decentralization of power from national authorities to local watershed
organizations, where local citizens would have a voice in deciding how to allocate water resources.27 The following sections
present some Latin American examples from Ecuador, Peru and
Mexico that highlight the issues of water governance.

Ecuador: Concentrating Water In Agri-Business
Ecuador has witnessed two simultaneous growing trends
over the last three decades: the increase in water use for agriculture and the development of irrigation for particularly profitable
crops.28 In the field, this is producing a certain type of commodities.29 In the past, exports were mainly dry land crops, but
current exports now require higher irrigation water content.30
Irrigated cultivation of certain commodities has become a
necessary condition for competitiveness in the international and
national markets where costs are low and the selling prices are
high.31 Some crops, such as bananas and flowers, would never
reach the international market without irrigation.32 The main
exporters of these water-intensive crops are the countries of
the South; in Ecuador, for example, all corporate agriculture
(“agribusiness”) for export is irrigated.33 This practice has
spread throughout Latin America, including growth in Mexico,
Colombia, and Peru. The domestic large-scale agriculture
market is also highly extractive of water resources, as evidenced by
water-demanding sugar cane production.34 In contrast, agriculture
for domestic consumption from small and medium farms, including
coffee and cacao for export, is not irrigated for most crops.35
This asymmetry helps explain the highly differentiated
dynamics of production and reproduction in these distinct
types of agriculture. In Ecuador, agribusiness profits for some
crops are high while profits for other crops are extremely low or
non-existent, especially for most small farmers.36 Thus, to
narrow the specificity of the agricultural crisis, only small farming has a crisis while large-scale agribusiness is booming.37
Agribusiness hoards the best land, almost all the water, and all
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the profit.38 Ecuador is heavily concentrating water with the
industrial few - this is the age of water dispossession.39
Neoliberal policy has given national and multi-national
power groups a normative framework to ensure their monopolization of Ecuador’s water and land.40 Water is plundered two
ways: formally, through concessions or authorizations granted
by the Ecuadorian government, or illegally.41 This historical,
long-standing process has continued to grow over these last
decades.42 The concentration of water in the hands of a few
mirrors the similarly inequitable distribution of land in Ecuador.
According to official figures, rural and indigenous populations
with community-based irrigation systems account for eightysix percent of users, but have only twenty-two percent of the
irrigated land area.43 What is worse is that these populations
have access to only thirteen percent of total water flow whereas
the private sector, representing one percent of agricultural
production units, has amassed sixty-seven percent of the water.44
When it come to land distribution, three quarters of farms in the
country account for only twelve percent of arable area, while the
two percent of farms owning larger than one hundred hectares
account for forty-three percent of the national total.45 Water, like
land, is becoming increasingly scarce, and most irrigation-ready
water has already been allocated formally or seized illegally to
national or international corporations.46
Examining some examples reveals the magnitude of this
water theft. Water monopolies are evident in three parishes
in the Ecuadorian province of Imbabura where large farms are
allocated ninety-one percent of the flow and only nine percent
is left for small and medium farms.47 In the lower Guayas river
basin, case studies of six rivers show that seventy-six percent
of water flow is used by sixty-one companies, while nearly one
thousand small and medium farms are left with the remainder.48
In the Guayas province, some sixty-two companies formally
receive water for irrigation at an average rate of six hundred
liters per second, an amount that could irrigate one thousand
small farms on the Ecuadorian coast.49 It is common in these
areas for large companies to block an entire river without
government authorization to use all or part of its flow.50
Of further concern, some large companies control the entire
production process, including the transformation of products,
the marketing of inputs, and capital goods.51 In Ecuador, an estimated 400,000 hectares of farmland (out of eight million total)
are dedicated primarily to agribusiness and the industrial production of sugar cane.52 This area constitutes only five percent
of the country’s farmlands but demand at least 400,000 liters per
second of water.53 To put this in perspective, this flow rate is
eighty percent of the total volume granted by the entire country
in 2008 (499,000 liters per second).54
Increasingly, this concentration of water rights and use
in the hands of a few creates conflict with and mobilization by
the larger population. These conflicts have historically been
localized as the farmers and rural residents who are affected
cannot afford to oppose the more powerful organizations.55 However, increasingly, conflicts have begun to branch out from the
local level to become regional, and even national, mobilizations.56
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Mexico: Concentrating Water Rights in a
Country With High Social Polarization
In modern Mexico, it is not only water rights that are being
concentrated but wealth as well. Scholars estimate that fifty to
seventy-five percent of Mexico’s population can be classified as
poor.57 Half of them are in “food poverty,” a federal classification whereby their income is not enough to provide the calories
required to survive.58 In the year 2008, the wealthiest ten percent
received thirty-six and a half percent of the nation’s income,
while the poorest ten percent received a mere four and a half
percent.59 Fifty families repeat and interweave their names
on lists of the country’s most industrial, financial and service
groups, thirty-nine of which are among the country’s richest
families.60 The deciding threads of Mexican economic life are
held by a small, powerful ruling class.61
Post-revolution Mexico, which for decades claimed to grant
social rights and promote “balance among production factors,”
has instead driven the concentration of wealth to favor the most
powerful economic groups over the past thirty years.62 For
example, the political class transferred government property to
private ownership in exchange for juicy bribes to top officials.63
Similarly, there has been a wave of water rights concentration by large landowners (mainly in northwestern and northern
Mexico), and by industry, especially those using large volumes
of water. Examples can be seen in the food industry, chemical
plants, cement plants and mining industry (particularly open-pit
mines using huge quantities of water to separate metal ores by
leaching).64 Real estate developers also purchase low-priced
agricultural water rights to transfer for urban use.65 These developers increasingly expropriate the water of rural communities
and small localities to supply resort developments (Acapulco
and Cancún for example) and expropriate community springs to
promote “green” tourism.66
In such a socially polarized country, this water concentration is not as visible as it should be. The media tends to conceal
the realities about the concentration of water rights and uses,
claiming that water is scarce due to global warming, and waste
by municipalities.67
Finding legal documentation of this water concentration
is no easy task. The Mexican Public Register of Water Rights
(REPDA) is an unreliable instrument with rampant underregistration of actual use, disclosing little about concessions
realities.68 Not recording the water used, or under-recording,
is common practice in Mexico and is often tolerated or even
promoted by the agencies responsible for enforcing the law.69
Although federal administrators often complain that small and
medium farms are the ones to blame, there is evidence that
industry, urban water supply companies, and even the government are guilty of under-reporting actual usage.70 For this reason,
inequality in accumulation of water rights is revealed through
direct evidence, such as the size of water facilities, production
volumes, amounts of wastewater discharged, and the like.71
This under-recording reveals at least two different things.
First is the existence of a legal pluralism in which indigenous
and rural communities do not feel it necessary to register their
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water use, simply because this use is perceived to be based on
their local and historical water sources and rights.72 The second
revelation is that large landowners who under-record avoid
paying for their water rights, demonstrating the power of the
Mexican elite in conjunction with governmental complicity.73
Corruption also enables major under-recording of industrial
water use and pollution by large industries.74
Water rights are no exception to the overall concentration of
wealth throughout Mexican society. The government’s asserted
efforts to incorporate society into the water management responsibility are far from the truth. Watershed councils, theoretically
designed to assist this management and build consensus, don’t
work because they have become yet another arena for dealmaking by controlling elites.75 The councils systematically
exclude rural groups, small businesses, environmental organizations and social platforms.76 For example the construction of the
La Parota dam (designed to supply tourism businesses in Acapulco) was completed without notice from the watershed agencies supposedly responsible for sustainable water management.77
Conflicts over water continue to increase in number, intensity,
and regional coverage.

Peru: Natural Resource Governance and
Socio-Environmental Conflicts
The recent history of water governance in Peru demonstrates the contradiction between nationalization efforts by
reform governments in the 1970s and a push for privatization in
recent decades.78 Common themes in this recent history include
the denial of rural communities and small farmers’ management
of their own water sources, the concentration of water access
with the few, and the centralizing of water control in government
agencies and economically dominant sectors.79 When Alan García took office as President in 2006, he aggressively promoted a
neoliberal policy that included the total opening of investment in
agro-export, mining, hydrocarbon extraction, and forest concessions.80 He also declared social protests to be “anti-system.”81
In July and August 2008, the Peruvian government prepared
a portfolio of ninety-nine legislative decrees to fill the gaps in
Peru’s policies on natural resources, environment, water, land
access, and the management and organization of rural and native
communities.82 These decrees ushered in a Trade Cooperation
Agreement, generally known as the Free Trade Agreement, with
the United States and intensified neoliberal economic policy.83
The Amazon indigenous peoples’ movement led protests
against these legislative decrees which threatened their territories and livelihoods.84 They argued that the national government
was not recognizing their rights to territory, natural resources,
and their cultural systems.85 These groups pointed out that Peru’s
Constitution obligated the government to consult them before
any legislation involving them.86 The government’s response
has been both counterproductive and repressive.87 The conflict
led to the violent repression in Bagua, in the Amazon region.88
And while the government made some concessions, its lethargy and lack of political will gave indigenous peoples little to
no hope.89 The same goes for the protests by Andean peoples
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and communities about mining companies.90 The relationship
between government and civil society is quite fragile and there
is no productive dialogue.91 Admittedly, this dynamic has earned
some indigenous movements political presence and influence in
Peru92—for example, the government is promoting the legalization of land titles and family ownership of land in rural communities of the Highlands93—but the successes are limited.94 The
formalization of water rights among as groups and individuals
ultimately grants mining companies access to water and land
owned by communities.95 Rural households are threatened
with the disappearance of community farming and communal
resource organization.96 These conditions are encouraging youth
to migrate to seek alternatives in cities or mining.97
A new water law, drafted by a team of professionals in urban
Lima, enacted with little debate in Peru’s congress,98 speaks
broadly of integrated water resource management by watersheds.99 This new law, however, actually reinforces top-down
management, creating local offices that are strongly dependent
on their central offices.100 This practice promotes watershed
councils that do not effectively involve constituents.101 Moreover, though the law makes vague claims to regulate the “usage
and customary” rights of rural and indigenous communities, in
practice it leaves significant gaps regarding the scope of privatizing water management and access.102
The weak management of water resources by Peru’s public sector has resulted in widespread water pollution as well as
increased concentration of water access by extractive industries
and some major cities.103 These trends are further generating
socio-environmental conflicts. For example, the Ombudsman
Office, which monitors conflicts in Peru, reported 32socio-environmental conflicts in April 2007 and 132 in October 2009 (79
percent involving mining and hydrocarbon companies).104 The
conflicts between corporations and local communities center
around inter-basin water transfer, water access, and ownership.
Some of the corporations involved include hydropower companies, rural communities, and mining companies.105
Conflicts have also increased between communities in
micro-watersheds regarding water division, scarcity and degradation. The effects of climate change over the last thirty years
have only worsened these problems.106 In the Peruvian Andes,
for example, communities are estimated to have lost fifty percent
of their water from sources such as springs and high-altitude
wetlands (bofedales), creating vulnerable rural communities and
decreased food security.107 Although Andean communities are
accustomed to climate variations, they are also facing increasing limitations on social governance of rural communities under
such adverse circumstances.108 Lack of vision and limited sociotechnical capacity for public governance provide no support for
Andean adaptation efforts, which is worsened in conflicts with
economically powerful stakeholders.109
The newest Peruvian government regime has a different
discourse regarding rural communities and indigenous peoples,
speaking of “inclusion.”110 However, as seen in neighboring
Bolivia and Ecuador,111 which also have governments who
are supposedly “anti-neoliberal” policy discourse is often only
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rhetoric as mega-cities and agribusiness or extractive industries
pressure for water access and control for– water flows in the
direction of power.112

Civil Society Responses
A variety of responses from populations affected by dispossession of water or land and environmental pollution have
emerged. In general, such mobilizations are both dispersed
and localized throughout the continent.113 They vary from road
blockades to litigation, and eventually to partial agreements.114
Frequently, mobilizations rely on specialized advice from civil
society organizations working with local leaders.115 In some
cases, mobilizations can lead to the temporary inclusion of the
conflict into public and political dialogues.116 However, any
dialogue is typically prolonged over long periods of time while
the controlling elite maintains the status quo by dividing the
mobilizations and prosecuting their leaders.117 However, a select
few civil society responses have been more successful. In Ecuador, for instance, various social groups—mestizos, montubios,
indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorians—mobilized to advocate for
the inclusion of water rights principles in the Ecuador Constitution in 2008.118 These groups, working with the Water Resources
Forum (Foro de los Recursos Hídridicos) and the National
Constituent Assembly (Asamblea Nacional Constituyente),
held three major events focusing on the issues of water rights,
allocation, and concentration.119 Approximately 1000 civil society delegates from around the country participated, discussing
water rights at length.120 The conclusions of the delegates were
then delivered to the Assembly, whose representatives publicly
committed to incorporating the proposals for the equitable redistribution of water in the political and constitutional plane.121
The Constitution, approved in October 2008, incorporates the
proposed redistribution of water in the following terms:
The Executive Branch, within two years after the
entry into force of the present Constitution, shall review
the situation of access to irrigation water for the purpose
of granting concessions, avoiding abuse and inequity in
the fees charged for water use, and guaranteeing more
equitable distribution and access, especially for small
and medium-sized farm and cattle producers.122
It should be clarified, however, that the Ecuadorian government has not followed through with this proposal.123 More pressure is needed from social organizations, particularly along coastal
regions where the concentration process is the most severe.
Currently, a new water resources bill is pending in the
Ecuadorian legislature.124 Also addressed was the human right
to water.125 Without a doubt, one of the most transcendental
subjects in the debate was the decentralization of water.126 The
national indigenous movement also presented on two main
themes. The first revealed the large amount of irrigation that is
concentrated among the wealthy as a result of the concessions or
water theft.127 The second was the implementation of a collective right under the 2008 law that makes water a public asset.128
In Mexico, less powerful social groups, such as rural and
indigenous, low-income urban residents, and small businesses,
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are also taking various lines of action. These groups are promoting local management and action, such as advocating that private
corporations obtain renewable permits from local communities
to develop and use water resources, and pay communities to
preserve water resources from production.129 The movements
focus on local control of springs, rivers and wells in addition
to some agricultural water.130 These community actions have
involved regulations on access to water, shared responsibilities
to maintain common availability, defensive actions to protect
community assets, and agreements with neighbors.131 A second
promising trend is the preference for smaller water systems and
less-centralized administration. In the last two decades, social
opposition to large water systems, such as inter-basin transfers
and dams, has come back to life.132 Conversely, governmental
programs are now accepting smaller works, even involving
direct labor input by local inhabitants.133
A third trend is an increase in mobilization and direct political action, particularly in the heaviest conflicts. These actions
generally overlap with local action, involving coalitions of community authorities, groups of neighbors, and national or international non-governmental organizations.134
In Peru, like in Mexico, the mobilizations are usually less
coordinated and less integrated between local and national
movements.135 However, increasing social mobilizations has
generated political influences that commonly express themselves
in electoral processes and strengthen movements at the regional
and national levels.136 These movements generate high expectations by the affected populations, but their impacts on big interests and dominant powers are rarely substantial.137 Instead, the
influence of international opinion is frequently more influential
in the Peruvian government.138
When mobilizations begin to have a political presence, the
government actively works to divide the movements and weaken
momentum.139 Recent political changes that promise social and
cultural inclusion or new discourse rarely come to fruition.140
For actual change to take place there needs to be a restructuring
of the Peruvian government and a redefining of its relationship
with the population.141 In Peru, the government resistance is everstronger, easily overcoming the cries for water equity by social
mobilizations.142

Conclusion
In the last three decades, Latin America has experienced
aggressive governmental implementation of neoliberal policies
that are favorable to extractive exploitation and agro-export companies.143 This has generated the accumulation and concentration
of natural resources in the hands of the few at the expense of water
security, food security, and less-privileged parts of society.144 The
affected parties are enveloped in frequent conflicts. State interventions often end unfavorably for rural and indigenous people in
light of the massive power asymmetry and cultural marginalization.145 Under these circumstances, these parties feel increasingly
excluded and marginalized, making protest intense.146
This article has analyzed how in Ecuador, Mexico and Peru
this process of water concentration limits and seriously affects
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potential for local development, prospects for survival among
small communities and reproduction of the social fabric.147
In “modern” Latin American societies, natural resources—
-particularly water—are valued predominantly in economic market terms, to the detriment of social, cultural and environmental
values.148 At the same time, these last two decades of international policies claiming to democratize water management and
decentralize decision-making, have instead aggressively taken
over governments in the Latin American region, obscuring any
interference by the majority of localized water users.149 Political
and legal reform for water management is grounded in standardizing management norms.150 To facilitate bureaucratic control
by “hydrocrats,” or to create an efficient market for water rights
along neoliberal lines, it is considered necessary to leave behind
the practices of the rural or indigenous population labeled
as “backward.”151 Diversity in rules and rights is actively discouraged because it would obstruct regional and international
transfers and sales, which require a uniform legal framework.152
Local rules and rights are considered anomalies that would curb
investments and profits.153 Therefore, decentralized water policies are not replacing bureaucratic policies, but instead regiment
and oppress local pluralism.154 Government bureaucracies are
“reformed” to draft and enact legislation that enables water markets to emerge.155 Community and collective rights systems that
do not fit in the neoliberal system are, by definition, denied as
“backward” and “inefficient.”156
For these reasons, there is a lack of trust between the government and civil society with obvious exceptions when shared
public governance is recognized by the public.157 This unwillingness to engage in intercultural dialogue about management of
natural resources, water, land, and territory is problematic.
The effects and impacts of concentrated water rights by
dominant economic producers will likely worsen with increasing
climate change phenomena.158 The vulnerability and poverty of
rural peoples deepens as water is less available and competition
increases. If this neoliberal policy and economic development
model grounded in extractive industries and large agro-export
companies remains, this situation of accumulation, concentration, and waste cannot change and conflicts over access to and
uses of water, land and territories will only increase.
Nevertheless, “bottom-up” responses are useful. In some
cases, large public protest and the proposals for alternative law and
policy can be influential, potentially even influencing the national
constitution, as in Ecuador. In other cases, as in Peru and Mexico,
mobilization and alternative policy-making tend to be of lower
profile and the few successes can be noticed especially in localized
events. Along with protests and mobilizations by civil society and
rural and indigenous communities against private and concentrated
water rights, there is also a more subtle struggle for these constituents to establish and enforce their own rights and rules.
Endnotes: Threats to a Sustainable Future: Water Accumulation
and Conflict in Latin America on page 67
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Collaboration and the Ecology
of Democracy*
by Daniel Kemmis and Matthew McKinney**

T

Introduction

his article explores various citizen-driven, multiparty
natural resource and public land management collaborations, viewed as one emerging species within the
“ecology” of democracy. Examples from the Quincy Library
Group Partnership, Beaverhead–Deerlodge National Forest,
Blackfoot Valley, and Valles Caldera Trust will trace the trajectory of collaborative democracy from its organic inception to its
present form. To anticipate the core of the argument: we believe
that the kind of problemsolving collaboration we will be examining is democratic in the most fundamental sense of that word
because it is nothing more nor less than the effort of people to
shape the conditions under which they live, rather than leaving
that shaping to someone else.
We begin by explaining what we mean by an “emergent
form of democracy.” This concept of emergence derives primarily from complexity theory. Complexity theorists stress that it is
inherently impossible to provide in advance a rule or algorithm
that will produce the structure or pattern that in fact emerges.1
This phenomenon is illustrated both in the social and physical
realm: similar to emerging markets and cities, politics seem to
merge naturally out of the human condition. As the bureaucratic
state matured throughout the 20th century, it produced its own
characteristic set of mechanisms for “participatory democracy,”
including public notice and hearings, comment periods, and
administrative appeals.
In terms of the evolving ecology of democracy, a new
democratic life form is emerging in the open spaces left by
the older, established democratic forms of representative,
procedural, and direct democracy.2 This movement toward
a collaborative democracy is a direct response to some of the
shortcomings of the late 20th-century framework of procedural
democracy.3 Whatever else public hearings might accomplish,
they rarely result in democratic solutions.4 Surprisingly, it is the
stakeholders, who have battled each other in public hearings for
decades, who are beginning to engage in serious, face-to-face
problem solving.5 Therefore a desire for authentically-engaged
and constructive citizen involvement arose, producing new, less
structured forms of deliberative and collaborative democracy.
Multiparty collaborative natural resource and land management includes elements of alternative dispute resolution and
deliberation, but also exhibits unique features that justify its
treatment as a separate species of democracy. Specifically, the
emergence of collaboration is also a reaction to the previously
neglected importance of “place” when governing public lands.
Because so much of the collaborative experience to this point is
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place-driven, it seems worthwhile to explore what there is about
place-focused problems in land management that has produced
so much of this emergent democratic form.

The Emergence of Collaborative Land
and Natural Resources Management in the
American West
To that end, we turn our attention to the remarkable spread
of collaborative practices in our own place—the American
West—and to a range of collaborative activities arising within
this familiar setting. The West is characterized by contentious,
fairly localized natural resource issues on or near public lands
in the western states.6 Our hope is that, by examining how collaboration has emerged and matured in this rather narrow niche of
public land management, we can develop useful methodologies for
studying what catalyzes, constrains, and sustains its existence (or
for studying what might cause its failure to thrive) in other settings.
There are two especially salient components of this land
management niche. One is literally ecological: these collaborations, without exception, revolve around the uses to be made of
very specific landscapes, as well as the soil, water, flora, and
fauna of those landscapes.7 Part or all of each of these landscapes
consist of public land, usually administered either by the U.S.
Forest Service or the Bureau of Land Management.8 In most
cases, the parties to the collaboration include natural resource
extractors and users of the public land in question on the one
hand (timber or grazing interests, for example) and conservationists seeking to protect the land or the species inhabiting it
on the other.9 A fundamental feature of the dynamics behind
collaboration in these cases is the simple fact that different
people or interests have conflicting objectives for what should
happen to one particular piece of land and its natural resources.
The second key component of this setting is the existing
decision-making system that constitutes the governing framework for the public lands. This decision structure is remarkably complex, comprising a broad range of statutes such as the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (“NEPA”),10 the
*This article has been adapted from Collaboration and the Ecology of Democracy (Kettering Foundation, 2011), a book-length monograph by Kemmis and
McKinney. The editors of this journal have revised and adapted the longer monograph for purposes of this journal.
** Daniel Kemmis is the author of Community and the Politics of Place and This
Sovereign Land: A New Vision for Governing the West.
Matthew McKinney is Director, Center for Natural Resources & Environmental
Policy, The University of Montana and Chair, Natural Resources Conflict Resolution Program.
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Endangered Species Act of 1973 (“ESA”),11 the National Forest
Management Act of 1976 (“NFMA”),12 the Federal Land Policy
and Management Act of 1976 (“FLPMA”),13 and the Federal
Advisory Committee Act of 1972 (“FACA”).14 These statutes
are further fleshed out by a corresponding and even more voluminous set of agency regulations, multiple layers of appeals
(including frequent recourse to federal courts), and the case law
emerging from that litigation.15 This is the “procedural republic”
in all its glory.16
The increasing problems with this governing framework
have been extensively noted and analyzed. For example, former
Secretary of the Interior Cecil Andrus describes the public land
and natural resources governance system as “the tangled web of
overlapping and often contradictory laws and regulations under
which our federal public lands are managed.”17 Congressman
Scott McInnis, former Chair of the Subcommittee on Forests and
Forest Health, defines the system as “a decision-making apparatus that is on the verge of collapsing under its own weight.”18
Similarly, former Forest Service Chief Jack Ward Thomas calls
this governing framework “a sort of blob,”19 and in June 2002,
Forest Service Chief Dale Bosworth presented to Congress a
report entitled, “The Process Predicament,” which describes the
effects of regulatory and administrative gridlock on national forest management.20 The report focused heavily on the Agency’s
increasing inability to fulfill its primary duties.21 The undeniable
fact remains that the current resolution processes for addressing
natural resource conflicts on public lands simply do not work.
Collaborative democracy is emerging so profusely in this
setting because many of the people with the greatest stakes in
the landscapes in question find that the existing decision system
cannot reconcile competing stakes in these resources as effectively as can the stakeholders themselves acting on their own initiative.22 This response is especially rife in the vast reaches of the
West where public lands and natural resources are so prevalent.23
Here, in what is often referred to as the “public lands West,” we
have seen a steadily growing number of local agreements among
environmentalists, ranchers, loggers, miners, and recreationists about how the public land and natural resources should be
managed in their particular river drainage area or ecosystem.24
More and more Westerners have come to realize that they
can do better by their communities, economies, and ecosystems
by working together outside of the established, centralized
governing framework.25 Accordingly, they have largely abandoned the cumbersome, uncertain, underfunded, and increasingly irrelevant mechanisms of that older structure.26
The collaboration movement is a pragmatic response to the
slowly accumulating evidence that our historical experiment
with proceduralism produces mixed results at best. The more
statutory and regulatory layers added to any particular issue, the
denser the maze and the higher the likelihood that the system
will malfunction. Then, it is not surprising that the “public lands
West,” where more layers exist than anywhere else, is the place
where the search for an alternative decision making structure is
most active.27 It is because the existing system is so pervasively
and palpably unworkable out West that people are willing to
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put so much work into fashioning an alternative. It is this set
of circumstances, above all, that is propelling the collaborative
movement in the West.
There is simply too much at stake to let the prevailing
system continue—and inevitably fail. As such, the collaborative
method of resolving public land and natural resource issues has
spread across the region evolving from a purely organic creation
into its now-institutionalized state.28 And although some agencies now promote collaboration in a variety of ways,29 this has
not established the method’s foothold on the landscape at anyone’s direction or by anyone’s design; collaborative democracy
remains almost entirely undirected and most often occurs without any official sanction or any clear way of connecting it to the
existing decision structure.30 Thus, we will begin our tour of this
democratic evolution with the most feral examples of collaboration, and then move on to more domesticated instances.

The Quincy Library Group
The Quincy Library Group is a typical example of a
collaborative effort that arose organically and originated outside
the established governing structure. In Quincy, California, mutually dissatisfied with a management plan proposed by the Forest
Service, a group of loggers, environmentalists, citizens, and local
government officials from the area came up with an alternative
five-year management plan to preserve old growth, endangered
species habitats, and roadless areas for 2.5 million acres of forest
surrounding Quincy, and also to keep the town’s local sawmills
in business.31 Unable to persuade the Forest Service to adopt
the plan through the traditional methods, the group enlisted the
support of their congressional delegation and eventually got their
bill through Congress in 1996.32 Ultimately, the locally initiated
collaboration created a congressionally binding resolution to the
region’s valuable timber resources.33

The Beaverhead–Deerlodge Partnership
The Beaverhead–Deerlodge Partnership is another example
of the organic development of collaborative democracies. This
Partnership emerged in response to the Forest Service’s forest
plan review, which the Forest Service is obligated to conduct
at least every fifteen years.34 In keeping with that requirement,
the Forest Service published a new draft forest plan for the
Beaverhead–Deerlodge National Forest of southwestern Montana
in 2006.35 But reactions to the draft plan were mixed.36 Conservationists and timber interests had a shared history of deep
antagonism, in which they had typically taken diametrically
opposed positions at public hearings on anything proposed by the
Forest Service.37 Thus, the owners of the locally owned lumber
mills still operating in the area, already hard-pressed by global
competition, were concerned that the proposed plan would drive
them out of business because it would not allow them to harvest enough timber from the national forest to keep their mills
running.38 Conservationists, on the other hand, were convinced
that the proposed plan was short on wilderness designation and
that the proposed fish and wildlife programs were not protective
enough of threatened species.39
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One local sawmill owner, Sherman Anderson, observed that
environmental activism and Forest Service policy had reduced
the amount of public timber coming into his sawmill from ninety
percent of his feedstock to five percent.40 Those supply problems, coupled with fierce competition from Canadian mills, had
driven a steady stream of small sawmills out of business over the
last few years.41 Anderson, operating at a loss even before the
bottom dropped out of the housing market in the recession of
2008, feared that he would be next.42
After years of conventional management tactics that
resulted in this situation, representatives from five Montana
lumber mills instead began meeting independently with local
representatives from the National Wildlife Federation, the
Montana Wilderness Association, and the Montana Trout
Unlimited to explore whether they might collectively find more
beneficial outcomes for forest management than those proposed
by the Forest Service.43 This collaborative effort became known
as the Beaverhead–Deerlodge Partnership.44 The partners found
common ground after some of the conservationists acknowledged that logging itself was not necessarily bad for wildlife
and water quality if it was conducted in the right way and at
the right scale.45 The timber interests, meanwhile, acknowledged
the conservationists’ view that substantial portions of the forest
should not be logged, but would be better protected as wilderness.46 The two sides hammered out ways to fit fish and wildlife
restoration into a sustainable timber-harvesting program.47 The
Partnership’s laborious efforts were eventually incorporated into
legislation introduced by Senator Jon Tester, which is currently
pending in Congress.48

The Blackfoot Challenge
As this kind of citizen-initiated collaboration has gained
momentum in the public land and resources arena, government
agencies have sometimes been invited to become collaborating
partners. Consider, for example, the Blackfoot Challenge. This
collaborative group that includes private landowners, federal and
state land managers, local government officials, and corporate
landowners now coordinates much of the management of the
Blackfoot River, its tributaries, and adjacent public and private
lands—approximately 2,400 square miles in western Montana.49
Working together, the mission of the Blackfoot Challenge is
“to coordinate efforts that conserve and enhance the natural
resources and rural way of life throughout the watershed.”50 The
Blackfoot Challenge is now known nationally as a collaborative
model for preserving the wild beauty, ecological health, and
natural resources of the watershed.51
When the Obama administration launched its America’s
Great Outdoors initiative in 2010, it staged its first public event
on the ranch owned by Jim Stone, the chair of the Blackfoot
Challenge board, as a way of underscoring how important the
collaborative efforts of groups like this have become in the
recent history of American conservation.52 In a recent interview,
Denny Iverson, the Challenge Board’s Treasurer, explained
that he moved with his parents from Minnesota to a Blackfoot
Valley ranch in 1975.53 He was in high school at the time, and
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he tells how his father, whose dream had long been to own a
ranch in Montana, initially struggled to make this dream ranch
profitable.54 Many ranchers were already employing creative
ways to preserve their properties. For example, like many of
their neighbors, one way the Iverson’s had kept their ranch in
the black was by leasing some of the surrounding public land
for their cattle to graze on.55 As with hundreds of other ranchers
across the West, the profitability of their ranch depended on the
grazing resources of those leases.56 But once public land grazing
had become a target of several national environmental groups,
these groups threatened the ranchers that their leases would not
be renewed unless grazing could be done in an environmentally
benign way.57
Another way the Iversons kept their ranch solvent was by
spending a fair amount of time in the local woods, supplying
timber to local sawmills.58 Some of that timber came from private
land, like their ranch, but some also came from Forest Service
land.59 As with public land grazing, some national environmental
groups sought to end all commercial harvesting of timber from
public land.60 If successful, those efforts would have reduced
the thin margin that supported the Iverson ranch and family.
Ultimately, the family survived by collaborating with neighbors
and local interests in the Blackfoot Challenge. Whether it was
grazing or logging, the Iversons and their neighbors (including
the neighboring sawmills) learned that they had to become
conservationists to preserve their way of life. It is primarily the
Blackfoot Challenge that enabled them to do that. Above all, i
t has given them a new way of working with conservation
organizations like the Nature Conservancy or Trout Unlimited,
and with government agencies like the Forest Service.
Both federal and state land management agencies are seated
on the Board of Blackfoot Challenge, and Iverson spends a lot
of time working with them.61 When asked whether his involvement with this collaborative group has changed his view of
government, Iverson responded, “It’s changed it in a big way.
Before, I was just trying to scratch a living out of the ground.
I was a pretty right-wing conservative, with very little use for
government, especially the federal government.”62 Although he
has not changed his core principles, he now recognizes that both
he and the government agencies have changed since their initial
consultations; Iverson considers himself to be more moderate
than before, 63 and says that the agencies are “more efficient
[and] more responsive.”64 Iverson attributes his involvement with
the Blackfoot Challenge with enabling him to see the agency
personnel as people who share similar community values.65
According to Iverson, “When the meeting’s over, we’ll buy them
a beer. In fact, we’d never have gotten to know each other so well
if we hadn’t started going to Trixie’s Antler Saloon together.”66
Iverson and the Blackfoot Challenge have show “how government works—or maybe more important, how it can work.”67
Here again, as with the Beaverhead-Deerlodge Partnership,
a diverse group of citizens has taken the initiative to conserve a
place that is near and dear to their hearts. As a result, the Blackfoot Challenge’s mission statement, “to coordinate efforts that

Sustainable Development Law & Policy

conserve and enhance the natural resources and rural way of life
throughout the watershed,” has finally become a reality.68

The Valles Caldera Trust
At present, one of the strongest tributes to the effectiveness of collaboration in the public land and resource arena
is the fact that the practice itself has become more often
blessed, if not mandated, by both statutes and agency rules and
procedures.69 One good statutory example is the Valles Caldera
Trust.70 In 2000, Congress acquired the privately-owned Baca
Ranch in northern New Mexico.71 Instead of giving one of the
existing land management agencies responsibility for this newly
acquired public land, Congress mandated that “an experimental
management regime should be provided by the establishment of
a trust capable of using new methods of public land management that may prove cost-effective and environmentally sensitive.”72 Specifically, Congress established a diverse, multiparty
governing board for the land and its natural resources and, in
effect, mandated that it be managed collaboratively.73 Given the
initial success of the Valles Caldera Trust, Congress again called
collaboration into play three years later in the Healthy Forests Restoration Act of 2003.74 This shows that Congress has
confidence in the various stakeholders’ ability to “reduce wildfire
risk to communities, municipal water supplies, and other at-risk
Federal land through a collaborative process of planning, prioritizing, and implementing hazardous fuel reduction projects.”75

Moving Towards Government-initiated
Collaborative Land and Natural
Resource Management
Following this trend toward governmental involvement,
public land management agencies themselves now routinely
invite or encourage collaboration among various stakeholders.
To illustrate this type of collaboration, consider the ongoing
process to develop a new planning rule for the Forest Service.
The National Forest Management Act (“NFMA”), which governs
land and resource management in the national forests, requires
the Agency to develop plans for all national forests and grasslands.76 The Forest Service adopted the first set of rules to guide
the development of these plans in 1979.77 Although the planning
rules were revised in 1982, all four subsequent attempts to revise
the rules have each failed.78
In 2009, at the direction of the Obama administration,
the Forest Service launched yet another effort to revise and
update the planning rules.79 Collaboration has emerged as a
hallmark of this new process. According to the official Forest
Service website, the agency “is committed to developing a new
planning rule that endures over time. We believe a transparent
and participatory method is the best way to accomplish this.
We’ll be working hard to gather input collaboratively throughout
the development of a new planning rule.”80
This rulemaking approach is an example of how government agencies now frequently use collaboration. In this case,
it is being used to develop administrative rules, but agencies
also increasingly use collaboration to develop policy proposals,
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management plans, and site-specific work plans.81 The government’s use of collaboration is not limited to natural resources
and environmental policy, and is increasingly invoked at every
level—local, state, and federal—to formulate (via the legislative
branch) and implement (via the executive branch) public policy.82
However, the transition of place-specific collaborative
results into legislation remains problematic. One observer has
noted, for example, “if replicated more broadly, the place-based
approach to forest management could further disaggregate the
National Forest system.”83 This concern was also echoed by
Undersecretary of Agriculture Harris Sherman when he testified on Senator Tester’s pending bill, noting that place-specific
collaboration “establishes a potentially harmful precedent
because it may lead to multiple site-specific legislative efforts
transferring much needed resources from other units of the
National Forest System where priority work must also be
accomplished.”84 Here again, the difficulty may be viewed as
a manifestation of the old problem of the few and the many.
The perspective of a more broadly representative, but genuinely
deliberative, public could be brought to bear on some of these
conflicts, which could expand the range of public involvement without necessarily losing the problem solving impetus
that has led to the collaborative solution in the first place.
Integration of the enactment into legislation of place-based collaborative management into legislation, then, is both promising
and problematic.
The one thing that contributes most significantly to the
steady expansion of collaborative problem solving is the fact
that, in so many circumstances, it works. And in fact, it works
better than other available democratic mechanisms.85 In evolutionary terms, this is a straightforward example of natural
selection: what works well survives and thrives.86 Collaboration
has gained a foothold in certain niches of our political ecology
because it brings a kind of selective advantage to those settings.

Conclusion
Although these government-sponsored efforts are a welcome addition to the ecology of democracy, they represent
a qualitatively different kind of collaboration than the type of
citizeninitiated collaboration illustrated by the Beaverhead–
Deerlodge Partnership or the Blackfoot Challenge. Our experience has convinced us that, at least in the public lands arena,
collaboration would never have been widely employed by agencies, let alone mandated by legislative bodies, had it not initially
emerged in a completely organic, indirect way, and if it had not
proven its viability on the challenging political landscape that
produced it. It is this organic, citizen-initiated form of collaboration that we mean when we speak of “collaborative democracy.”
Encouraging as the government adoption of collaborative
methods may be, it also raises questions about how readily collaboration can be transposed into settings that vary substantially
from those in which it emerged. To extend the ecological metaphor a step further, creating collaborative approaches to public
land and resource issues by the use of legislation or administrative practice can be viewed as the equivalent of domesticating
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animals or plants that originally emerged and evolved in the
wild. Useful and often lovable as these domesticated species
may be, it nevertheless remains true that a dog is not a wolf,
nor is a cat a tiger. Thus, while we promote and encourage
collaboration in a number of constrained institutional settings,
the need to preserve space and if possible, native habitat, means
that collaborative democracy must continue to flourish and
evolve in its own organic, undirected way.87
Recall, for example, the Blackfoot Challenge, the landowner-based group in Montana that helps to coordinate the
management of the Blackfoot River, its tributaries, and adjacent
public and private lands.88 The Challenge was organized locally,
but known nationally as a model for preserving the rural character,
ecological health, and natural beauty of its watershed.89 It supports environmentally responsible resource stewardship through
cooperation of private and public interests.90 These interested parties all share a common vision of how the Challenge operates in
the Blackfoot watershed, and all believe that success is most likely
to result from building trust by working together.
The Blackfoot Challenge, however, is merely part of a
grander scheme. It is a good example of how place-based collaborative efforts often “nest” within one another as the watershed
lies within the much larger Crown of the Continent.91 During the
past eight years, a number of independent and complementary
initiatives (including the Blackfoot Challenge) have emerged to
promote conservation and community stewardship in this remarkable landscape.92 These initiatives present the prospect of grander
collaboration between individual collaborative coalitions.

The enticing possibility is that this nesting of networked,
collaborative initiatives will evolve into new forms of governance. This is best described by Meg Wheatley and Deborah
Frieze in “Using Emergence to Take Social Innovations to
Scale,” as a common phase in the process of emergence characterized by “the sudden appearance of a system that has real
power and influence.”93 Further, Wheatley and Frieze explain
how “[p]ioneering efforts that hovered at the periphery suddenly
become the norm.”94
This emerging system has profound implications for
regional entrepreneurs. By better understanding the emergent
properties of nested, place-based collaborative efforts in a locale
like the Crown of the Continent, individuals and organizations
will be better poised to mobilize political power and facilitate
lasting change. Coincidentally, they can also develop and test
new forms of governance, thinking regionally and acting at
whatever spatial scale makes sense.
These, then, are some of the governance implications that
seem to be manifesting in conjunction with the ongoing emergence of collaboration (especially place-based collaboration) as
a democratic form. While it may be impossible to predict with
any precision what exact forms of democratic governance might
actually emerge, it seems clear that the better we understand
the dynamics driving these exciting and promising developments, the better positioned we will be to encourage those most
likely to advance both the cause of democracy and protection of
America’s natural resources.
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Water Crisis in the Murray-Darling Basin: Australia Attempts to
Balance Agricultural Need with Environmental Reality
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adoption of the forthcoming Basin Plan and eventual compliance
with its standards.42 The MDBA faces the challenge of redirecting
policy toward a future of sustainable water use that recognizes the
vulnerability of the communities that will be affected most.43 As
the Guide’s proposals are integrated into the forthcoming Basin
Plan, the MDBA must show MDB communities how their input

has been incorporated and how the central government’s policy
decisions have the communities’ interests at heart.44 As proposed
by the Guide, the Basin Plan, and its implementation, must provide
a viable framework for balancing these considerations in order to
ensure future water resource security, economic stability, and necessary environmental rehabilitation.45

Weak Planning Process Frustrates Protection of Puerto Rico’s
Threatened Coastline
by Mark Borak
		continued from page 23
the development of an island-wide master plan has been in the
works for many years, but has been repeatedly delayed.21 This
legacy of poor planning has fostered the island’s chronic sprawl,
causing increased consumption of land even as population growth
has slowed.22 By drafting and enacting a long-range master plan
focused on resolving the island’s inefficient land use patterns and
prioritizing natural resource conservation, policymakers have

an opportunity to reverse this trend. Accompanied by transparency, public participation and gubernatorial accountability, the
approval of a comprehensive master plan could represent the best
hope of protecting finite natural resources and promoting sustainable economic development on one of the world’s most densely
populated islands.23

The Arctic Council: Gatekeeper or Doormat to the World’s Next
Major Resource Battle?
by Oded Cedar
		continued from page 40
member-nations to establish the organization’s binding powers. The
permanent-observer nations should argue that the impacts of fossil
fuel development are of global concern and affect all nations.31
Therefore, proper safety and environmental standards are needed
to ensure stable and sustainable development of the Arctic’s natural resources, a goal to which the AC is already committed.
The permanent-observer nations should also seek more influence on the affairs of the AC in relation to fossil fuel development. Without usurping the position of the member-nations, the
permanent-observer nations should demand some limited voting
rights when the AC wishes to enact binding resolutions. Providing
the permanent-observer nations with voting rights would allow
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more countries to voice their priorities and concerns, which may
force the AC member-nations to consider the implications of their
fossil fuel development plans on the global community.
If the AC member-states wish to take advantage of the benefits of climate change in the Arctic, they should do so in a manner
that also honors their Ottawa commitments and the AEPS. The
international community, then, should pressure the AC to make
changes to its structure and provide effective oversight of fossil
fuel extraction in the Arctic. In turn, the AC should respond by
making the Ottawa Declaration binding and enforceable upon
member-nations, allocating voting power to the permanentobserver nations, and effectuating the needed regulations.
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